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Abstract

A growing literature indicates that the representation of women in legislatures is
positively associated with the passage of female-friendly social policy. However, there is little
corresponding research concerning the effect of women in cabinet on female-friendly social
policy. Yet, almost all advanced industrial democracies are parliamentary democracies, where
policies typically originate within the cabinet and governments typically enjoy substantial
control over the legislative process. Thus, to the extent that women promote female-friendly
policy, women in cabinet positions should be ideally placed to do so, and indeed, possibly be
more influential than women in legislatures. The purpose of this study is to analyze the role of
female cabinet ministers in the adoption of a wide range of female-friendly policies, thus
addressing this gap in the gender and politics literature. However, the role of female
officeholders on female friendly policy may differ by policy.
To address this issue, I look at three different policy areas: family leave, working time,
and child care. I create an index measure for each policy area so that I am able to analyze
women‘s impact on both individual policies (e.g. maternity leave) and a wider range of related
female-friendly policies (e.g. family leave policies in general). In order to assess female
officeholders‘ effect on female friendly policy in general, I sum the three policy indices to form a
single measure of female-friendly policy; this is the Support for Women‘s Employment Index.
Using OLS regression, I find that female ministers have a significant effect on the adoption of
female-friendly policy generally and in each of the three policy areas.
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Chapter 1: Gendered Representation and Female-Friendly Policy
Introduction
The past decade and a half has witnessed tremendous growth in research on gender
representation and policy outcomes. Much of the work to date has focused on the role of female
legislators in the adoption of policy that addresses gender inequality in the labor market
(Kittilson, 2008; Schwindt-Bayer & Mishler, 2005; Wangnerud, 2000). These scholars argue
that female politicians tend to represent the interests of women; therefore, female legislators are
the key to the passage of these types of policies. What has gone largely unnoticed in this
research, however, is the issue of executive dominance over the legislature. In particular,
researchers have failed to acknowledge that the majority of advanced industrial democracies are
parliamentary systems in which the cabinet typically exerts considerable control over the
legislature. Thus, the current research has not taken into account the role of the cabinet in the
adoption of public policy. It is of practical importance that this omission be addressed because
the issue of gender equality is now attracting serious attention in many advanced industrial
democracies.
The increased importance of gender equality in the labor market stems from one basic
issue: population aging. This is a demographic phenomenon in which low mortality rates
combine with low birth rates to produce a society in which the elderly and middle-aged make up
a disproportionate share of the population. Welfare systems in these societies are likely to
become unsupportable as an aging population decreases the number of workers in the economy
and increases the strain on already over-burdened systems (Castles, 2004; Myles, 2002). A
1

proposed solution to the welfare problem is to encourage women to join the workforce, thus
increasing the number of workers contributing to funding the welfare state (EU, 2006; OECD,
2004).
Yet, in most societies, women are at a disadvantage in the workforce because of their
potential to become mothers. As Esping-Andersen (2002b) points out, because women are likely
to interrupt their careers to care for their families, a rational employer is more likely to invest in
male workers. Consequently, working women often choose to postpone motherhood, or even
rule it out completely (Esping-Andersen, 2002b). In addition, it is difficult to harmonize
motherhood and employment; therefore many mothers choose to work outside the home only
part-time, if at all. These choices reduce female labor force participation and lower birthrates,
thus exacerbating the population aging problem. However, research indicates that where women
do not lose economically as a result of childbearing they are more likely to have children and
remain attached to the labor market (Chesnais, 1996; McDonald, 2002; Rindfuss, Guzzo, &
Morgan, 2003). Consequently, governments have become interested in implementing social
policy aimed at reducing the economic inequalities associated with motherhood; these policies
are often referred to as ‗female-friendly‘ policies (Esping-Andersen, 2002b; EU, 2007b;
Gauthier, 2005).1
A large body of literature posits that increased numbers of female legislators will lead to
passage of female-friendly policies, and researchers have found evidence that supports this
hypothesis (Schwindt-Bayer & Mishler, 2005; Tremblay, 1998). I argue that, given our
understanding of the policy process in advanced industrial democracies, it is necessary to
1 The female-friendliness of such policies is debatable; this will be discussed at length below.
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determine the extent to which female cabinet ministers influence female-friendly policy. Most of
these countries have parliamentary systems in which the level of executive dominance over the
legislature is relatively high. Executive dominance is evident in three main areas of the policy
process: initiation, design, and adoption. First, cabinets are the primary source of policy
initiatives in parliamentary democracies; in most countries, a member of parliament is restricted
from initiating legislation. Second, an individual minister has considerable discretion over the
crafting of policies within her purview. As a result, the design of policies is often a reflection of
the minister‘s own policy agenda. Third, cabinets typically exert substantial control over the
legislative agenda, meaning that they have significant discretion over which policies can even be
considered by legislatures. In sum, the cabinet is the dominant institution in policy making;
therefore, we should expect the presence of women in cabinets to be of greater importance to the
adoption of female-friendly policy than the presence of women in legislatures.
It is this issue, the influence of female cabinet ministers versus that of their legislative
counterparts in respect to the adoption of female-friendly policy, which I address in my
dissertation. In order to do so I develop an index measure of female-friendly policies. I do this
because most studies focus on a single policy area (e.g. childcare), despite evidence that
women‘s influence varies depending on the policy being considered (Weldon, 2010). There are
many types of female-friendly policy and there is considerable cross national variation with
regard to which of these policies is actually adopted. A more appropriate approach is to
determine how female officeholders influence both individual policy areas and a range of
female-friendly policies. To that end, my index will be comprised of a total of nineteen
variables, divided into three sub-indices: family leave, childcare policy, and labor regulations.
3

Each sub-index will be used to test the influence of female officeholders on individual policy
areas; the full index will be used to determine these women‘s influence on a larger package of
female-friendly policies.
In the following, I first discuss the social and political issues that have made femalefriendly policies a pressing concern in many advanced industrial democracies. I then outline the
ideological debate over the definition of female-friendly policy and define female-friendly policy
for the purposes of my research. In the third section I explain the theories of descriptive and
substantive representation, focusing on the expectation that female officeholders will represent
women‘s interests. In the fourth section, I explain the concept of executive dominance as it
applies to parliamentary democracies. When considered together, the theories of female
representation and executive dominance suggest that it is not general female representation that
matters to the passage of female-friendly policy; it is female representation in the executive. In
the fifth section, I explain the methodology and data that are used to test my hypotheses. This
section also includes an explanation of the index measures of female-friendliness that I am
developing to test my hypotheses. I conclude with a chapter-by-chapter overview of the
dissertation structure.
The Practical Politics of Female-Friendly Social Policy
―Men were the indisputable protagonists of high industrialization; women may occupy centrestage in post-industrial society.‖
~Gosta Esping-Andersen (2002b, p. 68)
Over the past two decades, gender inequality in the labor market has become a matter of
vital interest to policy makers in many advanced industrial societies. The pressing need to create
4

gender equity in the labor market stems from policy makers‘ belief that women are the key to
maintaining appropriate levels of funding to the welfare state. As a result of generous benefits
and low contributor-to-recipient ratios, many wealthy nations are experiencing a profusion of
funding problems in many areas of the welfare state. A good example is ―the looming pension
crisis‖ (OECD, 2007a). Wealthy societies have built pension systems that are predicated on
having a high ratio of contributors to recipients. Unfortunately, contributor-to-recipient ratios
have fallen to historical lows in many countries; this has resulted in the high likelihood of
pension system insolvency in many countries (Eberstadt, 2004). Analysts predict that the
pension systems in wealthy nations will become increasingly unsupportable as population aging
further decreases contributor-to-recipient ratios (Castles, 2004; Myles, 2002).
As mentioned, the population aging problem stems from two main sources: low
mortality rates and low birth rates. First, people are living longer, therefore mortality rates are
falling. While this is typically viewed as a boon, it is a pressing concern for welfare systems,
particularly those in which solvency requires high contributor-to-recipient ratios. Second, since
the 1960s, a number of factors have combined to cause birthrates to plummet in most of the
wealthy nations; 2 this has decreased the number of people entering the workforce and
contributing to pension schemes. Given the magnitude of the problem, and the low likely of
rapid large-scale reform,3 countries must find ways to increase the number of people contributing
to welfare systems.

2

For a full explanation, please see Coleman, 2005. The United States is the primary exception.
As Myles (2002) points out, wholesale reform is unlikely to take place unless social consensus regarding change
can be achieved. Unfortunately, welfare systems are so well entrenched that citizens typically vehemently oppose
reforms. Therefore, it is assumed that massive restructuring is unlikely to occur in the immediate future.
5
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While migration has been touted as a solution to increasing the number of contributors, it
is not a tenable solution. As McDonald (2002) notes, unless a country‘s fertility rate is at least
1.6, the level of migration needed to even sustain the current workforce is too large to be
feasible.4 Harris (2006, p. 97) provides the following examples:

Expressed in terms of migrants per million inhabitants in 2000,
Italy would require the highest number of immigrants—at
6,500 annual immigrants per million inhabitants, in order to
maintain its working-age population, followed by Germany,
with 6,000 needed annual immigrants per million
inhabitants…the numbers of immigrants necessary to keep
constant the ratio of those age 15-64 to those age 65 or older—
that is, the support ratio—are extraordinarily large…for Italy,
the figure [between 2000 and 2050] would be 113 million (or
2.3 million per year).

Thus, it seems that immigration is at best a stopgap measure. Consequently, policy
experts recommend that countries increase the female labor force participation rate in order to
increase overall participation in paid employment and, as a result, increase contributions to ailing
welfare systems (Esping-Andersen, 2002b; Longman, 2004; Myles, 2002). The European Union
concurs, stating in a 1999 (p. 11) report that ―Women's increasing participation will be the main
source of future labor force growth in many Member States.‖ In order for that to happen,
governments must remove—or at least lessen—barriers to female labor force participation
(Gauthier, 2005).
Child bearing and rearing are the primary barriers to women‘s participation in the labor
market (Esping-Andersen, 2002b; Gornick & Meyers, 2003). First, women who bear children
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Only a few advanced industrial democracies (the Scandinavian countries, France, and the US) are consistently at or
above a fertility rate of 1.6 children per woman.
6

are at a major economic disadvantage—for each year a woman is out of the workforce in order to
care for children, she loses 1.5 to 2 percent of her lifetime earnings potential (Esping-Andersen,
2002, p. 78). This ―cumulative wage penalty‖ makes childbearing cost prohibitive for careeroriented women. Consequently, as female labor force participation rates have increased, fertility
rates have fallen (McDonald, 2000a). Second, research shows that employers are reluctant to
hire and/or promote women; not only might a female employee take time off to have a child, she
will then have to take additional time off to care for the child (Esping-Andersen, 2002b).
Therefore, a rational employer will be reluctant to fully invest in female employees; the return on
investment is likely to be greater for a male employee. Thus, governments cannot expect
employers to voluntarily increase female labor force participation rates. Removing the
childbirth/rearing barrier to female employment has therefore become a public policy issue
(Gauthier, 2005). Because research indicates that when women are not penalized financially for
motherhood they are more likely to have children and remain attached to the labor market, many
policy analysts recommend a female-friendly policy solution that includes affordable daycare,
paid maternity and parental leave, and family-care leave (Esping-Andersen, 2002b; McDonald,
2002, 2006; OECD, 2007a; Rindfuss, et al., 2003).
Are these Policies Truly Female-friendly?
Despite the foregoing, it can be challenging to determine which policies are truly femalefriendly. The feminist movement is divided on which policies promote equality and which
reinforce traditional gender roles. As Ferguson (1984) notes, the feminist movement is broadly
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split between liberals and radicals.5 Liberals seek gender equality in existing institutions.
Conversely, radicals seek to transform existing institutions—they reject the liberal approach
because they believe that the institutions to which the liberals seek access are essentially flawed
(Ferguson, 1984). Women‘s voice in policy making is a primary area in which radical and
liberal feminists split.
Historically, feminist policy analysis has leaned toward the radical approach. Analysis
has hinged on the study of androcentrism in institutions, policies, and laws (Hawkesworth,
1994). What these scholars report is that both policies, and policy studies, are gendered—they
often are based on the experiences and interpretation of men (Hawkesworth, 1994; Sapiro, 1986).
In particular, feminist scholars argue that throughout much of its history, social welfare policy
has been based on the experiences and actions of men, rather than on the experiences and needs
of the women the policies are meant to benefit (e.g. benefits to women are often based on the
income of their husbands, or on the male-breadwinner model) (McDonald, 2002; Sainsbury,
1996). In radical feminist literature, social welfare policy is typically regarded as a patriarchal
societal mechanism by which men collectively ―separate the sexes and devalue and control
women‖ (D. C. Miller, 1990). Radical feminists view policies termed ―female-friendly‖ as
attempts to erode women‘s power. They argue that the state has taken on a patriarchal role, via
the social welfare system, to exert control over women and that the state perpetuates the cycle of
female dependence (D. C. Miller, 1990; Pascall, 1997).
In contrast with their radical colleagues, liberal feminists view lobbying for femalefriendly policies as a way to guide welfare policy so that it benefits women (King, 1998). As
5

More recent research shows that there are other factions in the feminist movement, however Ferguson‘s will be
used for simplicity sake, and because this division best mirrors the division over family policy.
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Heitlinger (1991, pp. 28-29) notes, ―…the main goal of the assimilationist [liberal] model of
absolute equality of opportunity has been the reduction of the traditional penalties associated
with motherhood.‖ Starting in the 1930s in Sweden, women began to see equity gains as a direct
result of welfare policies, gaining ―extensive provision of government services for parents and
children‖ (Heitlinger, 1991, p. 364; 1993). King (1998) relates that French women also reaped
the benefits of these types of policies, gaining increased welfare transfers to women, stateprovided daycare, maternity benefits, and healthcare6. Throughout the Nordic countries, policies
designed to strengthen the family have allowed women to more fully participate in the labor
force without loss of pay typically associated with childbearing (Gauthier, 2005). Liberal
feminists view these policies as wins. Radicals would argue that family policies have, at best,
been a partial gain because the paucity of the benefits does not help women escape the trap of
poverty and dependence (Pascall, 1997). Nevertheless, in the mainstream of liberal feminist and
non-feminist social thought, female-friendly policies have been considered a boon to women‘s
equality in society (Chesnais, 1996; Gauthier, 2005).
Even in the liberal feminist tradition, there is not a universal definition of female-friendly
policies. Definitions range from any policy that is placed on the agenda by women (e.g.
Hoskyns, 1996), to any policy that benefits women, families, or children (e.g. Thomas, 1994).
For the purposes of this research, I follow Bratton‘s (2002, p. 123) definition, in which women‘s
issues are those addressed by legislation that would ―decrease gender discrimination or alleviate
the effects of such discrimination and those that are intended to improve the sociosocioeconomic status of women.‖ I am including policies that specifically address both
6

The explicit goal of the French government was to stimulate fertility, however these policies are designed to lessen
the economic penalties women often suffer as a result of leaving the workforce to have a child (King, 2002)
9

discrimination and socio-economic loss by attempting to ensure that a woman‘s career is not
harmed when she temporarily leaves the workforce for childbearing or when she must take time
away from work for child care activities (Ahn & Mira, 2002; Chesnais, 1996; Esping-Andersen,
2002b; McDonald, 2000b). My focus is on mother-friendly policies because research shows that
women—regardless of parental status—are often at a disadvantage in the workforce because of
their potential to be mothers (Esping-Andersen, 2002b). Accordingly, because the opportunity
costs of even the potential for motherhood are a deterrent to the financial equality of all working
women, mother-friendly policies equate to female-friendly policies. These include the childcare
and leave policies mentioned above, but also working time policies that regulate vacation, parttime work, and non-standard working hours.
Each of these policy areas has the potential to engender equity in the labor market. First,
where access to affordable and reliable childcare is limited, women are often forced into an allor-nothing situation; they must either work full-time in order to be able to afford childcare, or
they must stay home in order to care for their children themselves (Gornick & Meyers, 2003).7
The public provision of affordable and reliable childcare gives parents the ability to be both
earners and caregivers. As such, access to childcare is crucial to creating gender equality in the
labor market because, as Gornick and Meyers (2003, p. 197) note, ―in the absence of acceptable
alternatives it is mothers not fathers who loosen their ties to the labor market to care for
children.‖

7

Although childcare is often viewed as an issue only when children are under the age of 3, the age at which many
countries begin to provide pre-primary education, childcare remains an issue for school-aged children in systems
where the school day—or , as in France, the school week—is not continuous. Therefore, school scheduling can also
be viewed as a childcare-related policy.
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Second, the provision of properly designed maternity and parental leave programs fosters
a dual earner-carer relationship between parents, thus fostering gender equality. I emphasize,
however, that leave policies must be carefully designed in order to achieve equality. Extended
leaves have been shown to weaken women‘s labor market attachment when the leave is
exclusive to women either because of take-up or design (Deven & Moss, 2002). However,
where maternity and parental leaves are designed to encourage fathers to take leave gender
equity is strengthened and women‘s labor market attachment is less likely to be weakened.
Finally, working time can also have a large impact on gender equality. For example, because
women make up a disproportionate share of the part-time workforce, policies that improve the
pay and quality of part-time work decrease income inequalities between men and women
(Gornick, 1999).
It can be argued, however, that even when a policy has the potential to increase women‘s
equity in the labor market, the same policy is not necessarily one that increases women‘s equity
at home. Gelb and Palley (1996) argue that gender-related policies either reinforce traditional
gender roles (e.g. maternity leave reinforces a woman‘s role as caretaker) or challenge traditional
gender roles (e.g. paternity leave challenges the traditional woman-as-caretaker role). Thus,
while I define both examples as female-friendly because they help increase women‘s economic
independence, paternity leave is more female-friendly because it splits the burden of care
between both parents.
Since the 1970s, many wealthy nations have implemented at least some of the femalefriendly policies mentioned above. For example, the Scandinavian countries have offered
incentives for fathers to take parental leave, some of Continental Europe has moved towards a
11

continuous school day, and most European nations have removed restrictions on when/where
women can work. The main explanations scholars provide for the expansion of female-friendly
policy are: power mobilization in the form of left parties, labor unions and women‘s movements
(e.g. Esping-Andersen, 1985; Huber & Stephens, 2001; Sainsbury, 1999; Weldon, 2010) and
female political participation (e.g. Dahlerup, 2006b; Kittilson, 2008; Tremblay, 1998). Although
power mobilization is addressed briefly below, my main focus is female political participation:
specifically, the representation of women by female politicians.
Left Parties, Labor, and Women’s Movements
Power resources theory is frequently used to explain welfare state expansion; it is argued
that benefits and spending will be greater in countries in which women‘s movements, labor
unions, and left parties are strong (Esping-Andersen, 1985; Lambert, 2008; Stephens, 1979). It
is expected that women‘s movements, as advocates for women‘s rights, will be more important
determinants of policies that challenge traditional gender relations, such as anti-discrimination or
violence against women policies (Gelb & Palley, 1996; Weldon, 2002). For example, Weldon
(2002, 2010) finds that cross-national variation in the adoption of violence against women
policies is best explained by the relative strength of women‘s movements and, to a lesser extent,
the proportion of women in the legislature. Also, in direct contradiction to earlier analysis
(Mazur, 2002), Weldon (2010) finds that where there are strong and autonomous (e.g. not
affiliated with parties or the government) women‘s movements, there is a greater likelihood that
policies which challenge traditional gender roles will be adopted.
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In contrast, it is expected that labor unions and left parties (as champions of the working
class) will be key determinants of policies that address class interests, such as welfare state
generosity and/or public provision of services (Weldon, 2010). For example, Lambert (2008)
finds that union density is a significant determinant of policies that support mothers‘
employment. Similarly, Weldon (2010) finds that labor protest is a significant predictor of the
adoption of family leave policies. Both Lambert (2008) and Weldon (2010) also find gendered
representation to be a determinant of female-friendly policy.
Gender and Political Representation
A key debate in studies of female representation concerns the conditions under which
female officeholders are able to promote female-friendly legislation (Schwindt-Bayer & Mishler,
2005; Tremblay, 2006). This debate primarily focuses on the interplay between descriptive and
substantive representation. Descriptive representation refers to shared characteristics between
representatives and their constituencies, i.e., the representative and the represented are part of the
same group, be it ethnic, racial, gender, etc. Substantive representation refers to the
responsiveness of the representative to the policy demands of the group (Pitkin, 1967). There is
an extensive body of literature which argues that descriptive representation leads to increased
focus on substantive issues of importance to women (Dahlerup, 2006b; Kittilson, 2006; O'Regan,
2000; Phillips, 1998; Thomas, 1994). In this literature, the contention is typically that descriptive
representation results in the passage of female-centric policies as the number of women in a
legislative body increases. The counterargument is that descriptive representation does not
inherently lead to substantive representation. First, women come from different backgrounds,
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therefore they do not speak with one voice (Paxton, Kunovich, & Hughes, 2007). Second,
female politicians are primarily concerned with being politicians and, like their male
counterparts, must always be concerned with party dictates, serving their constituencies, and reelection (Norris & Lovenduski, 1989). Additionally, party loyalties may prevent women from
acting on behalf of women (Grey, 2006). Therefore, even if a female legislator‘s preference is to
promote women‘s issues, political barriers will limit her ability to pursue her own agenda.
Despite these hindrances to pursuing a female-friendly agenda, an increasing number of
studies suggest that women do tend to have more female-centric and care-related policy priorities
than do men (Beckwith & Cowell-Meyers, 2007; Paxton, Kunovich, & Hughes, 2007). At the
voter level, Shapiro and Mahajan (1986) determined that female American voters are
consistently more supportive of health, welfare, and education spending than male voters. At the
bureaucratic level, Wilkins and Keiser (2006) found that female bureaucrats are most likely to
substantively represent their clients in child support cases when the policy benefits women. At
the candidate level, Norris & Lovenduski (1989) found that in the UK, irrespective of political
party, female candidates tend to be more liberal than do male candidates; as such, if more women
were to enter parliament, they could alter direction of public policy. At the legislative level,
Manon Tremblay (1998, p. 463) found that in Canadian legislative debates on women‗s issues,
female MPs speak twice as often as do male MPs, and Wangnerud (2000, p. 82) found that more
Swedish female parliamentarians have personal social welfare policy goals than do their male
counterparts.
There is also an extensive body of literature which illustrates that increased numbers of
women in office leads to increased attention to issues of substantive importance to women
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(Dahlerup, 2006a, 2006b; Kittilson, 2006; O'Regan, 2000; Thomas, 1994). For example, Bratton
and Ray (2002) found that at the municipal level in Norway, the proportion of women in local
elected office is positively related to the percentage of children enrolled in public daycare. Also,
Thomas (1994) found that in US state legislatures with female membership greater than twenty
percent women introduce a greater amount of female-friendly legislation than they do in state
legislatures where female membership is less than ten percent. Similarly, Grey (2006) found that
the bulk of New Zealand‗s female-friendly policies were passed once women‗s presence in
parliament passed fifteen percent. The fact that we see cross-national and multi-level support for
women‗s policy preferences indicates that it is likely that female cabinet ministers will also
pursue the policy goals shown to be favored by female voters, bureaucrats, and legislators.
Executive Dominance in Parliamentary Democracies
As mentioned above, studies of female-friendly policy typically concentrate on the role
of the legislature in the policy process (e.g. Bratton & Haynie, 1999; C. M. Miller, 1989;
Oppenheimer, 1983; Tremblay, 1998).8 This provides an incomplete, and potentially misleading,
picture. The place of policy origination is critical for determining who is important in the policy
process. Most advanced industrial democracies are parliamentary democracies;9 therefore policy
typically originates in the cabinet rather than the legislature (O'Regan, 2000). I argue that if we
are to understand how women‗s policy goals are translated into policy successes, analysis must
begin at the cabinet level. There are three reasons for this. First, the place of policy origination
is critical for determining who is important in the policy process; in most advanced democracies,
8

There are a limited number of studies that focus on local governments (e.g. Bratton & Ray, 2002) or bureaucracies
(e.g. Wilkins & Keiser, 2006).
9
Of the countries involved in this study, only the United States and Switzerland are non-parliamentary systems.
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policy typically originates in the cabinet rather than the legislature (O'Regan, 2000). Second,
given that government backbenchers are expected to support government bills, it is logical to
expect that the representation of women in the cabinet is as important as, if not more important
than, the representation of women in the legislature.
Finally, cabinets are more influential than legislatures because the legislative agenda is
typically controlled by the government. Legislators very often have little influence on which
proposals are brought to a vote; this severely restricts legislators‘ pursuit of personal agendas
(Doring, 1995; Laver & Shepsle, 1994; Siaroff, 2003; Strøm, Müller, & Bergman, 2003). In
addition, in the rare case that a legislator is able to pursue a personal agenda, governments are
exceedingly reluctant to allow backbenchers to pursue legislation that has clear spending
implications. As a result, female legislators are not likely to have latitude to propose and promote
female-friendly policy. Therefore, female legislators are likely to have considerably less effect
on female-friendly policy than female ministers.
Individual ministers have significant control over policy priorities in their respective
policy areas (Laver & Shepsle, 1994). Therefore, ministers are able to promote policies that
address issues about which they have specific concerns; they can also impede legislation that
interferes with their policy goals (S. James, 1999; Martin, 2004). In most countries, cabinet
ministers have little ―inclination or ability…to shape the substance of policy emanating from the
department of a ministerial colleague‖ (Laver & Shepsle, 1994, p. 298). Moreover, cabinets often
have unwritten rules of non-intervention that make ministers hesitant to interfere in the formation
of policy in other ministers‘ domains (Nousiainen, 1994). In addition, ministers typically lack indepth knowledge of portfolios other than their own; this increases their hesitance to interfere in
16

other policy areas. Accordingly, cabinet ministers are not only well-placed to promote policies
they favor, but they can also expect their colleagues to give them substantial latitude in doing so.
In point of fact, ministers are so influential in determining policy that analysts can
predict policy based on the preferences of the person holding a portfolio (Laver & Shepsle,
1994). Female ministers tend to hold portfolios related to caring professions, such as health,
education, and welfare (Siaroff, 2000; Towns, 2003). Since female policymakers often craft
policy with the interests of women in mind, women who hold care portfolios are more likely to
promote female-friendly policies than are men holding such portfolios. It has been argued that
this concentration of women in the pink ghetto of care portfolios is simply ―a way of excluding
women from the highest political offices and to reserve to the ‗first sex‘ the most regal offices of
the state (defense, foreign affairs, finance, etc.)‖ (Janova & Sineau, 1992, p. 119). However,
because the minister has a great deal of discretion when crafting policies in her area, this
concentration of female cabinet ministers in care portfolios may well have beneficial
consequences for women. I argue that a strong female presence in social policy portfolios should
have a positive effect on the passage of female-friendly policy.
When considered in conjunction, theories of gendered representation and executive
dominance suggest that it is the presence of women in the executive that should be a significant
determinant in the adoption of female-friendly policy. In short, because the cabinet is the
dominant institution in the development of policy I argue that female cabinet ministers are likely
to be more influential in the policy process than are female parliamentarians. In addition, this
discussion of executive dominance suggests that while greater numbers of women in cabinet
should have a positive effect on female-friendly policy, it may be crucial that the women be
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placed in social welfare portfolios in order to have the greatest impact. Thus, in this dissertation
I will be testing two hypotheses:
H1: The greater the proportion of women in cabinet positions, the more female-friendly
policy is adopted
H2: The greater the proportion of women holding care portfolios the more femalefriendly policy is adopted

I should note that although the premise of this dissertation hinges on the contention that
the cabinet controls the policy agenda, this is not true for all democracies. In presidential
democracies, the system is designed to provide multiple avenues for the introduction of
legislation. The checks and balances in the system preclude the executive from dominating the
legislative agenda; the president and his cabinet have little or no control over legislative
business. However, inclusion of non-parliamentary systems in the analysis is necessary; it
allows me to determine whether or not the inclusion of women in the cabinet is important even
when the cabinet does not control the policy process. If women in cabinet are important in nonparliamentary systems, it could indicate that gendered representation in the executive affects
policy implementation.
Increased Female Representation at the Cabinet Level
In most countries, the most common pattern of recruitment into the cabinet is
from the legislature (Blondel & Thiébault, 1991); legislators who have successfully navigated
through the party ranks are tapped for cabinet posts. Thus, party seniority is a key factor when
legislators are considered for ministerial positions. As greater proportions of women have been
18

elected to legislatures, the number of female cabinet ministers has also risen. The cross-national
increase in female cabinet ministers is shown in figure 1.1, below.
[Figure 1.1, here]
Women have historically been given social welfare portfolios such as health or education
(Davis, 1997). This pattern has stayed remarkably consistent. Figure 1.2 shows that in only two
of the seven countries in which women were represented in cabinet in 1970 has the proportion of
women in social welfare ministries dropped by 2005.
[Figure 1.2, here]
I expect that the overall increase in female cabinet ministers, and the relatively high
concentrations of women in social welfare portfolios, will have a significant impact on the
adoption of female-friendly policy.
Dissertation Structure
This project includes analyses of the influence of female officeholders in three main
policy areas (family leave, childcare, and working time regulations), as well as analysis of their
influence on female-friendly policy generally. I have structured the dissertation so that each of
these is addressed separately. This is vital to the project because evidence suggests that women
may have different levels of influence depending on which type of policy is under consideration
and whether the policy is being introduced or expanded (Bratton & Ray, 2002). Chapter 2 will
discuss the support for women‘s employment index; the index measure will then be used to test
the hypotheses being addressed in the dissertation. Chapter 3 will address family leave in
theoretical and historical perspective and will contain cross-national statistical analysis, using the
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family leave sub-index to test my hypotheses. Chapters 4 and 5 will follow the same pattern,
providing theoretical and historical explanations of childcare policy and labor regulations
respectively, as well as cross-national statistical analyses of the policy determinants. Chapter 6
will conclude the dissertation, providing a summary of the findings as well as the wider
implications of the research.
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Chapter 2: Data and Methods
Introduction
A major obstacle to studying the effects of female officeholders on female friendly policy
is that there is no single dependent variable that allows researchers to study the issue in a broad
context. In most studies, researchers typically make generalizations about the effect of female
politicians on female-friendly policy based on a single policy issue (e.g. violence against women,
maternity leave, or equal pay). However, although single-policy analysis is very effective at
finding the determinants of individual policies, I argue there are several reasons that using an
index measure is a better approach to finding generalizable determinants of female-friendly
policy. First, there is the issue of group heterogeneity; although we often treat them as a single
group, women‘s policy priorities are not uniform—leftist women may well have different policy
priorities than right-wing women, for example. It is important to see those differences in the
adoption of individual policies, but also in the overall approach to reconciliation policy.
This leads to the second reason that an index approach is useful in the study of gender
and representation; women‘s priorities may lead to differing levels of influence on individual
policies. Thus, studies of individual policies may produce contradictory results. We need to be
able to see not just the micro trends (e.g. adoption of individual policies), but also the macro
trends (e.g. the development of female-friendly policy packages). Finally, the
interconnectedness of reconciliation policies means that these policies reinforce each other. For
example, if a state introduces child care, but does not synch the hours with typical working
hours, state provided child care will not be less effective at promoting female labor market
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participation. Given these connections, the policies must be studied in conjunction in order to
determine the true influence of female politicians on female-friendly policy. In the remainder of
this chapter, I first discuss the importance of the index approach to the study of gender and
representation. I then briefly describe each of the sub-indices.10 Following this, I detail the
construction of the full index. I conclude with an explanation of the independent variables and
methodology I use to test my hypotheses.
Why an Index Measure?
Research on gender and politics has produced broad support for the argument that female
officeholders do represent the interests of women (e.g. Bratton & Ray, 2002; O'Regan, 2000).
Many of these studies specifically find that female legislators are more likely to address issues
the are particularly important to women, such as child care and family leave (e.g. Tremblay,
1998; Wangnerud, 2000). These studies of representation typically look at a wide range of
policies; however, as scholars have begun to look at how (if) that representation has resulted in
the adoption of policies that address women‘s concerns , researchers have typically focused on
the adoption of individual policies (e.g. Kittilson, 2008; Schwindt-Bayer & Mishler, 2005). I
argue that this approach to studying the influence of female officeholders on female-friendly
policy has several drawbacks and that an index measure of female-friendliness is likely to
produce more generalizable findings.
First, women are not a single, homogenous group. While women do tend to have similar
concerns, they do not always agree on government‘s role in addressing those concerns. For
example, in the 1980s, Norwegian politicians agreed that child care needed to be improved;
10

Each sub-index is described in detail in subsequent chapters
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however, Bystydzienski (1995) found that women and men from left parties were more likely to
support government subsidized daycare, while women and men from right parties were more
likely to support cash transfers to families. There is a danger, then, that generalizing based on
individual analyses may strongly reflect these differences, but may miss larger trends in the
adoption of female-friendly policy in general.
Second, recent research finds that women are likely to have varying levels of influence
depending on the policy under consideration (Sanbonmatsu, 2003). Thus, one researcher, using
maternity leave as her dependent variable, may find that female legislators are a key determinant
of female-friendly policy (Kittilson, 2008); another, using violence against women policies as
her dependent variable, may find that women‘s movements are the key determinant in the
adoption of female-friendly policy (Weldon, 2002). The differences in these findings may stem
from differences in what Stetson and Mazur (2000, p. 603) call the policy environment; they note
that the policy environment concept is ―similar to the political opportunity structure construct in
that it focuses attention on the possibilities for movement influence in a particular policy area
during a particular period of time.‖
Stetson and Mazur (2000) indicate that there are two parts of the policy environment that
are likely to influence the adoption of female-friendly policy: the policy sub-system and the party
or coalition in power. First, policy subsystems, like iron triangles, are clusters of political actors
concerned with a specific policy area (e.g. a childcare policy subsystem) (J. E. Anderson, 1994);
the more open the sub-system is to new actors, the more likely that it will address women‘s
issues. Second, when left parties are in power, they are more likely to address women‘s issues.
Thus, the ability of female representatives to affect change in a given policy area is likely to
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change over time. At any given point, women may enjoy a favorable policy environment for one
policy area but not for others. This indicates that it is unlikely that generalizations based on the
analysis of a single policy area provide an accurate picture of the overall determinants of femalefriendly policy. It is therefore very important to analyze women‘s influence on the shift to a
more female-friendly society more holistically; an index measure of female friendliness will
allow researchers to do so.
Third, female-friendly policies such as child care, family leave and working time are not
stand-alone policies. As Gornick and Meyers state (2003, p. 255), ―families and workers
experience policies not singly and distinctly but as combinations or packages of policies.‖ For
example, the adoption of generous maternity leave does not make the harmonization of paid
work and motherhood easier unless affordable childcare is available when the mother decides to
return to work. Germany, for instance, provides a total of about three years of maternity and
parental leave; however, the lack of childcare services (either public or private) has traditionally
prevented most mothers from working full-time (Schweiwe, 2000). In contrast, Sweden
combines generous maternity and parental leaves with state-subsidized childcare, resulting in
some of the highest levels of FLP in the world (Naz, 2004). Because of this interconnectedness,
it is important that we see not just the determinants of individual policies but of the broad
spectrum of policies that contribute to a female-friendly labor market (Gornick & Meyers, 2003).
Finally, there is strong evidence that analysis using index measures is effective when
studying public policy. For example, Weldon (2010) uses index measures to test for the
determinants of paid leave and generosity of family leave (weeks); she finds that union activity is
a strong determinant of both. Similarly, Lambert (2008) employs an index measure to test for
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the determinants of maternal employment policy; she finds that union density and proportion of
women in parliament are strong predictors of maternal employment policy. In addition, several
researchers use index measures to analyze policy outcomes. For example, Plantegna and Hansen
(1999) developed a composite indicator of gender equality to test the efficacy of reconciliation
policies on gender equality outcomes. They find that gender equality is improved where there
are policies that help balance paid and unpaid work for both sexes. The OECD (2001) used an
index of work/family reconciliation policies to determine the correlation between these types of
policies and female employment rates; they find that while many of the individual policies have
low, or even negative, correlation with employment rates, the correlation between the index and
employment rates is high (OECD, 2001, pp. 152-153). Given the results of these policy outcome
studies, it is appropriate to use the composite index approach to assess the determinants of policy
adoption.
The Indices
To address the concerns outlined here, I have constructed an index measure of support for
women‘s employment; it is modeled on the Support for Mothers‘ Employment index developed
by Gornick, Ross and Meyers (1997) and Gornick and Meyers (2003). My index is comprised
of three sub-indices: family leave, working time, and child care. The family leave index includes
variables such as weeks of leave, leave benefits, and maternity-related job protections (e.g. legal
protection from termination because of pregnancy/use of maternity leave). The working time
index includes measures of working time, vacation, and gendered work restrictions. Finally, the
child care index includes variables related to the availability of publically available childcare,
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school scheduling, and public expenditure on care. Each of these is used to test women‘s
influence in each specific policy area; the three are combined to test overall support for women‘s
employment.
The Family Leave Index
The first component of the Support for Women‘s Employment Index (SWEI) is family
leave. In recent decades, many advanced industrial democracies have adopted parental,
paternity, and childcare leave policies, thus making more comprehensive packages of family
leave policies. Maternity and paternity leaves are commonly associated with the birth or
adoption of a child, whereas parental leave is intended to allow either parent to care for a
newborn and is typically taken immediately following maternity leave (EU, 2007d). Finally,
childcare leave is normally provided to parents in order to care for small children, and is most
often available until the child‘s third birthday. A package of family leave policies is not
restricted to the provision of leave. Family leave packages often include pay, job protections for
pregnant workers, and incentives for fathers to take leave; thus I include these in the Family
Leave Index, as shown in Table 2.1.11
[Table 2.1, here]
Arguably, family leave provides the easiest test of my hypotheses. First, most family leave
policy leaves are seen as women‘s concerns. Because leaves are typically low-paid, men are
unlikely to use what little leave to which they are entitled. Thus, leave policies are typically seen
as ensuring mothers’ time to care; this is then a women‘s issue and female cabinet ministers are
11

All tables and figures are found in Appendix B.
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likely to promote policies that address it. In addition, there have been studies of gendered
representation and family leave policies that demonstrate positive relationship between female
officeholders and maternity leave. For example, both Kittilson (2008) and Schwindt-Bayer and
Mishler (2005) find that female legislators are key determinants of maternity and parental leave
policies. In addition, Weldon (2010) and Lambert (2008) find that both legislators and women‘s
movements are key determinants of expansions of leave policy. Thus, given the fact that
ministers tend to come from the legislative ranks, there is quite a bit of support for the likelihood
that female ministers will promote family leave policies.
The Working Time Index
The second component of the SWEI is the regulation of working time. Research shows
that women‘s equity in the labor market increases when work weeks are shorter, vacation is
longer, part-time work is protected by law, and women are not prohibited from working nonstandard hours (Gornick & Meyers, 2003). In particular, where time for paid and unpaid work is
balanced between women and men, via a short standard work week (under 40 hours) gender
equity is strengthened (Rubery, Smith, & Fagan, 1998). Longer vacation times provide a similar
benefit in that they provide long blocks of time for both parents to spend with children; long
vacations also lessen the need for parents to find adequate child care during summers (Gornick &
Meyers, 2003). In addition, regulations that prevent employers from discriminating against parttime workers help to ensure the availability of quality part-time work. Quality part-time work
makes it easier for women to remain engaged in the labor market after having children; as a
result, it can contribute to women‘s economic independence (Esping-Andersen, 2002b; Warme,
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Lundy, & Lundy, 1992). Finally, many countries have historically limited women‘s access to
night/nonstandard working hours; even today Austria, Germany, Italy, and Switzerland prohibit
night work for pregnant women (ILO, 2010a). While this is positioned as maternity protection,
in reality it prevents these women from working hours that are often more lucrative than standard
working hours (Gornick & Meyers, 2003). I have combined measures of each of these policies
to form the Working Time Index (WTI), shown in Table 2.2.
[Table 2.2, here]
Of the three policy areas, working time regulations provide the hardest test of my
hypotheses. Regulation of working hours, particularly the adoption of shorter working time and
protections for part-time work, is necessary for the harmonization of paid employment and
parenthood. However, whereas leave policies are typically viewed as gender issues, working
hours and vacation time are typically viewed as labor or class issues. Thus, it can be expected
that pressure for shorter working hours, longer vacation time and regulation of night and/or parttime work will come from labor unions rather than from members of government (Figart &
Mutari, 2000). Indeed, trade unions have been effective in pressuring government for reduced
working time in France, while they have been less effective in the UK, which still has among the
highest average working hours in Europe (Kamerman & Kahn, 1997). Similarly, German and
Dutch trade unions have historically been effective at blocking protections for part-time work,12
while in recent years Swedish trade unions have endorsed the right of all workers to a quality
part-time option (Eklund, 2004; Fuchs, 2004; Visser, Wilthagen, Beltzer, & Koot-Van Der Putte,

12

In both countries, developments in the mid-2000s indicate that both German and Dutch trade unions have backed
off of their traditional opposition to part-time protections.
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2004). Given the unevenness in cross-national trade union effectiveness vis-à-vis working time
regulations, and because each of these policies has significant influence on both women‘s labor
force participation and on gender equity, I do expect that women in cabinet will be influential in
increasing the female-friendliness of working-time regulations.
The Child Care Index
The final component of the SWEI is child care policy. It can be argued that childcare is
the most important of the female-friendly policies, as women are unable to reconcile paid
employment and motherhood without it. Esping-Andersen (2002b) provides strong support for
this argument, finding that childcare availability is the key determinant of the harmonization of
motherhood and paid employment for both part-time and full-time female workers. Child care
policy is not limited to public provision of child care; it also includes child care benefits (e.g. tax
credits or transfers) and school scheduling. Thus, I combine five measures of child care policy to
form the childcare index, as shown in Table 2.3.
[Table 2.3, here]
Child care policies also present a challenging test of the hypotheses that women in
cabinet, particularly women in social welfare ministries, will be strong determinants of femalefriendly policy. In some countries, such as Sweden and Norway, expansion of childcare services
or spending has been attributed, in large part, to female officeholders (Bratton & Ray, 2002;
Byrne, 1997). Other studies have demonstrated that a combination of female representation and
women‘s policy machineries (e.g. women‘s movements both autonomous and party-affiliates) is
the key determinant of expansions in child care policy (Bergqvist & Jungar, 2000; Curtin, 2008).
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In contrast, however, Bleijenbergh and Roggeband (2007, p. 453) find that ―neither the presence
of a strong women‘s movement nor the representation of women in parliament is a necessary
condition for the introduction of public care giving support. The presence of equality
machineries is the only necessary condition for the improvement of social-care policies.‖
Similarly, Ross (2001) argues that the establishment of the EU‘s Equal Opportunities Unit (and
Childcare Network) were instrumental in getting child care on the European political agenda.
However, there have been few corresponding studies in countries in which women‘s
representation in cabinet is historically low (e.g. Greece or Switzerland), or in countries such as
Spain women‘s policy machineries have traditionally been too weak to press for female friendly
work-family reconciliation policies (Valiente, 2000). Given the inconsistent results provided by
these studies, it is unclear as to whether women‘s policy machines, female officeholders, or a
combination of the two are effective determinants of child care policy.
The Support for Women’s Employment Index
The Support for Women‘s Employment Index amalgamates each of the preceding subindices into a larger measure of overall support for women‘s employment. This is a key
component of this research project, given the lack of consistent results in the current literature.
Construction of the index was undertaken as follows. To operationalize the measures, I entered
the quantitative data numerically (e.g. weeks of maternity leave available to mothers); qualitative
data were coded into categories (e.g. protection of part-time work was coded yes or no). All
qualitative data were then converted to quantitative values (e.g. yes, no, sometimes were
converted to 1, 0, .5, respectively). All data were scaled such that all values fall between 0 and
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1; original values were used for proportions (e.g. spending), all other values were divided by the
observed maximum (e.g. working hours). This ensures that no single measure is unduly
weighted in the construction of the index.
I use Chronbach‘s Alpha to determine whether or not there is an underlying structure
inherent in the variables. The scale reliability coefficients for each index, reported in Table 2.4,
demonstrate that the scale formed from the variables measures a single uni-dimensional latent
construct. This indicates that additive index measures are appropriate, so I simply sum the
values of the variables to create each index. The theoretical and actual minimum and maximum
values of the indices are also reported in Table 2.4.
[Table 2.4, here]
As can be seen in Figure 2.1, there has been an across-the-board increase in support for women‘s
employment. These overall improvements overshadow the fact that gains have been quite
modest in countries such as Switzerland, the US, and New Zealand. Women in these countries
still face a significant lack of public support for combining paid employment and motherhood. Is
there a lack of public demand in these countries? Do they need stronger women‘s movements,
labor unions, or female representation? I, of course, argue that stronger female representation is
needed. However, there are also variables, such as GDP and welfare regime type, that influence
the adoption of female friendly policy and must be considered in the analyses; I detail both the
key explanatory variables (female officeholders) and the control variables in the following
section.
[Figure 2.1, here]
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Independent Variables
Key Explanatory Variables
Women in Cabinet: As mentioned above, the relative importance of the cabinet in policy making
implies that women in cabinet are better positioned to influence policy than are women in
parliament. Thus, I expect that women in cabinet will be a positive and significant influence on
the dependent variable. This variable is measured as the proportion of cabinet portfolios held by
women.13
Women in Social Welfare Portfolios: It is important to be sensitive to the possibility that while
the two are correlated, female-friendly policy may not be caused by higher levels of women‘s
representation in the cabinet. If parties place a higher priority on gender issues, male party
leaders may simultaneously promote more women to cabinet positions and more female-friendly
policy. To the extent that this occurs, higher levels of women‘s representation in cabinet may
correlate with and even precede the development of more female-friendly policy, but that
representation may not be exerting any direct causal effect on policy. By testing for the direct
effect of women in social policy portfolios on the extent of female-friendly policy we effectively
address this possibility. This variable is measured as the proportion of social welfare portfolios
held by women. 14
Women in Parliament: Current literature indicates that women in parliament likely have a
positive and statistically significant influence on the passage of female-friendly policy, and I

13

All data for women in cabinet and women in social welfare portfolios were compiled from the annual editions of
the Europa World Yearbook (Europa Publications Limited., 1981-2006); cabinet ministers‘ names were crossreferenced with data from the Guide to Women Leaders files (Christensen, 2007)
14
See previous note.
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expect this positive relationship to be borne out in these analyses. This variable is measured as
the proportion of parliamentary seats held by women.15
Control Variables
Women‘s Movements: I include women‘s movements to control for extra-governmental forces
that influence the adoption of female-friendly social policy. Research indicates that where
women‘s movements are strong and autonomous (e.g. independent of parties/state control) they
are likely determinants of female-friendly policy (Weldon, 2010). Following Weldon (2002) I
code women‘s movements as 1 if the movements are rated both strong and autonomous; I code
them as 0 if either of those two conditions are not met.16
Union Density: Because labor mobilization is often found to be a key determinant of social
welfare policy, I include net union membership (total membership less self-employed and
retired) weighted by the total dependent labor force.17
Strikes: In addition to union density, I include the total number of strikes/lockouts per year. This
helps to measure labor union militancy and ensures that level of labor protest is accounted for
(Weldon, 2010).18
Welfare Regime Type: At a general level, the structure of the different national social policy
packages is likely to favor or constrain the extension of female-friendly policies. I use EspingAndersen‘s (Esping-Andersen, 1990, 1999) classic welfare state typology: Christian democratic,
liberal, and social democratic.
15

These data were gathered from the IPU‘s (1995) Women in National Parliaments 1945-1995: A World Statistical
Study and the IPU online archives (www.ipu.org).
16
I thank Laurel Weldon for sharing these data with me.
17
Union density data are drawn from Golden, Lange, and Wallerstein (2006).
18
Strike/lockout data are drawn from the ILO Laborsta database (ILO, 2009).
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Left Government: Several studies have demonstrated that left governments are positively
associated with increased numbers of women in office, as well as increases in female-friendly
policy. Therefore, it may be the case that female-friendly policy is driven by left parties, rather
than by women in office. I measure left government as the proportion of cabinet seats controlled
by left parties.19
Federalism: I control for federalism because, as Huber and Stephens (2001) argue, there are more
veto points in a federal system, thus making the passage of social policies more difficult.
Following Kittilson (2008), Federalism is measured on a three point scale, ―0‖ (no federalism),
―1‖ (weak federalism) and ―2‖ (strong federalism).
European Union Membership (EU): I control for membership in the EU because it has been
argued that the EU exerts upward pressure on leave entitlements and Kittilson (2008) finds a
positive association between EU membership and state guaranteed leave entitlement. EU
membership is measured as a dichotomous variable ―1‖ if a country was a member in a given
year, ―0‖ if not.
GDP per capita: I include GDP per capita as a measure of a country‘s wealth because it is
possible that a certain level of wealth must be reached before a country can ―afford‖ state
guaranteed leave entitlement.20
Case Selection and Methodology

19

Left cabinet data for 1980 – 2000 are from Huber and Stephens (2004). Data for Greece, Spain and Portugal, all
years, and all other countries for 2001-2003 are from the IPU (2009); left cabinet calculated as per Huber, et al.
(2004) that is, left party parliamentary seats as a percentage of all governing party(s) parliamentary seats.
20
GDP per capita data were gathered from OECD.stat (2008)
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In any cross-national analysis a researcher faces two main considerations with regard to
selection of the statistical sample: the number of cases and their level of similarity. I have
selected the advanced industrial democracies in order to ensure a base-level of similarity; each
country in the study is politically stable, democratic, wealthy, and has a developed welfare state.
This has provided the limitations on the number of cases in the study. The countries included in
the study are: Austria, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany,
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, The United States, and the United Kingdom. Following Gornick and Meyers
(2003, p. 22), I have excluded the countries of the former Soviet bloc, as well as most of the
Pacific Rim. The primary reason for excluding these nations is that their welfare systems are
very different from those in the advanced industrial democracies and they are not universally
stable, democratic, and wealthy. In addition, we lack full data for these countries in the time
period in question.
In this dissertation, I use statistical analyses to make generalizations about the
determinants of female-friendly policy in advanced industrial democracies (Peters, 1998). Given
that there are data from 1970 to 2005, a time series option would seem to be preferable in order
to control for time-serial effects (Beck and Katz, 1995, 1996). However, despite the theoretical
desirability of using measures of public policy, they do suffer from the problem that they vary
relatively little over time. Thus, I employ OLS regression with standard errors clustered by
country to address the issue that the data are independent across, but not within, countries.
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To address the lack of variation in the dependent variables, I measured five year period
averages of each variable for each country (e.g. 1970-1974, 1975-1979 and, so on). This
transformation of the data markedly increases the variation on the dependent variable but it also
reduces the number of observations from 735 to 147. This data reduction is undesirable, but
given that many of the independent variables in my analyses also display limited cross-temporal
variation it does not present significant estimation problems. In the following chapters, I employ
this methodology to test for the determinants of the family leave, working time, and child care
indices. I then turn to analysis of the determinants of support for women‘s employment.

36

Chapter 3: Family Leave in Comparative Perspective
Introduction
Although maternity leave is the oldest type of family leave policy, it is no longer the only
type of family leave policy. In recent decades, many advanced industrial democracies have
adopted parental, paternity, and childcare leave policies, thus making more comprehensive
packages of family leave policies. Maternity and paternity leaves are commonly associated with
the birth or adoption of a child, whereas parental leave is intended to allow either parent to care
for a newborn and is typically taken immediately following maternity leave (EU, 2007d).
Finally, childcare leave is normally provided to parents in order to care for small children, and is
most often available until the child‘s third birthday.21 While the definitions are fairly common
among advanced industrial democracies, there is considerable variation in how, or if, these
policies have been adopted (EU, 2007d).
Family leave is a necessary component in the harmonization of parenthood and
employment. Thus, when family leave policies provide a legal right for a parent to take time to
care for a child, they are typically viewed as female-friendly (Esping-Andersen, 2002b; Weldon,
2010). In this study, however, I define female-friendly policies as those which strive to increase
gender equity in the labor market and women‘s economic independence. There is considerable
debate over whether or not family leave, in particular maternity leave, meets these criteria.
There are two basic characteristics of leave policies that must be considered in order to
determine whether or not leave policies further gender equity (Weldon, 2010). First, the
21

Many countries use the terms childcare and parental leave interchangeably, thus making studies of parental leave
challenging. In this project, I focus on childcare leave.
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researcher must consider the structure of the leave policy package. Is maternity a protected
category in anti-discrimination law? Is leave restricted solely to the mother? Is there any
provision for paternity leave – and is that leave (a) paid, and (b) reserved for the father? Second,
the researcher must consider the compensation provided by the leave package: Is the leave paid?
If so, by whom (government or employer) is the leave paid and at what rate?
Because of the many variations in structure and compensation, family leave policies do
not have a universal impact on gender equality in the labor market—some are more femalefriendly than others, and it is therefore important to look at each individually. In this chapter, I
trace the evolution of the various types of family leave policies, putting particular emphasis on
developments that increase the female-friendliness of each policy. I then use regression analysis
to investigate the relationship between family leave and female officeholders.
Female-Friendly Family Leave Policies
Maternity Leave
Maternity leave is not a modern policy development; it was first introduced in Germany
in 1891 (Frank & Lipner, 1988). The intent of this initial policy, which disallowed women‘s
paid employment within four weeks of childbirth, was to encourage mothers to (a) breastfeed
longer in order to reduce infant mortality and (b) to return to their place in the home (Tilly &
Scott, 1978). Britain instituted a similar ban on maternal employment in 1895, followed by the
implementation of an insurance scheme that provided minimal compensation during maternity
leave (Frank & Lipner, 1988). This development sparked a wave of demand across Europe for
remunerated leave; however these demands were shelved due to budget constraints caused by
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military spending during World War I. Ironically, World War I intensified public pressure for
maternity leave policies; the decimation of European populations and economies forced
governments to encourage women to bear children and engage in paid employment (Bell &
Offen, 1983). This public pressure did not lead to more female-friendly maternity leave,
however, as fears of depopulation continued to drive maternity protection legislation well into
the 1940s. This caused a wave of explicitly pronatalist and nationalist maternity protection
schemes (Frank & Lipner, 1988). Although many European countries adopted some form of
maternity leave in these schemes, the policies provided little or no compensation and no job
protection for pregnant workers (Frank & Lipner, 1988). In both structure and compensation,
these policies did little to promote economic equity for women; thus early maternity leave
policies should not be deemed ―female-friendly,‖ and my definition effectively excludes them
from consideration.
Turning to modern adaptations of maternity leave policy, a more positive picture of
female-friendliness emerges. First, every advanced industrial democracy now provides for at
least some form of unpaid leave22 and many provide paid leave. The policies vary tremendously
in terms of length; the duration of paid maternity leave ranges from fourteen weeks in Germany
to nearly sixty-nine in Sweden (Gauthier, 2003). Second, pregnancy and maternity leave are
commonly protected categories in anti-discrimination law. Sweden first enacted legislation that
prohibited discrimination in hiring and employment on the basis of pregnancy in 1945, followed
by Germany in 1952, and Italy in 1966 (EU, 2007d; ILO, 2008; Neal, 1984). As you can see in

22

Australia, New Zealand, and the United States do not offer maternity leave, however they all offer unpaid family
care leaves that may be used as maternity leave.
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Table 3.1,23 few other countries adopted comparable legislation until the 1970s (e.g. Denmark,
Belgium, and the US). Some countries did not enact pregnancy/maternity anti-discrimination
laws until the 1980s (e.g. Finland, Australia, and France), the 1990s (e.g. Switzerland and
Ireland) or even the 2000s (e.g. Greece24) (EU, 2007d). The prohibition against discrimination
in employment and hiring based on pregnancy and/or maternity has been an important step in
increasing the over-all female-friendliness of maternity leave policies in the advanced industrial
democracies (Zippel, 2009).
[Table 3.1, here]
Analysis based on the second gender equity guideline, compensation, gives a more
ambiguous picture of the relative female-friendliness of maternity leave policies. This is
partially because of the complexities of maternity leave compensation. First, not all countries
(e.g. the US, Australia, and New Zealand) have provisions for paid maternity leave. Second,
where a country does mandate paid maternity leave, the leave can either be publically-funded or
employer-funded. Finally, there are multiple ways in which compensation can be determined;
these include compensation as a percentage of actual earnings, unemployment insurance, or
sickness benefit, and compensation as a flat rate benefit (Gauthier, 2003). Thus, there is no
common pattern regarding maternity leave compensation policies in advanced industrial
democracies; however, it is possible to construct an ideal female-friendly compensation
structure. First, higher levels of compensation make it more likely that women can afford to

23

All tables and figures are found in Appendix B
Greece first implemented maternity protections in 1997; however the legislation did not cover women in the
police, army, or women employed in private households. The legislation was amended to cover these groups in
2003 (Karamessini, 2003).
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actually take maternity leave (Weldon, 2010). Second, as the ILO noted in the revised Maternity
Protection Convention (1952), when the burden of maternity leave compensation falls on the
employer it creates an incentive for employers to discriminate against women in hiring. Thus,
the most female-friendly maternity compensation package would be one in which full wage
replacement is provided by public funding. However, Table 3.1 shows that the provision of
maternity leave and benefits varies widely across the advanced industrial democracies.
Although the variety and complexity of compensation packages partially explains the
lack of clarity about the female-friendliness of maternity leave policies, there is an additional
complication. Research shows that leave policies do increase women‘s economic independence
(Esping-Andersen, 1999; Gornick & Meyers, 2003). However, there is also evidence that long
maternity leaves reinforce occupational segregation; women are more likely to be employed in
the public or service sectors (Hansen, 1995). Sociologists argue that this is because women tend
to go into care occupations in which promotions are not dependent on continuous employment
(Polachek, 1979, 1981; Stier, 1996). In addition, the length of time a woman might be out of
work due to family leave is likely a deterrent to women‘s employment in fields that require long
and/or expensive training (Mandel & Semyonov, 2005). Regardless of field of specialization,
long leaves are likely to decrease a woman‘s long-term earnings potential either as a result of
employer discrimination or decreased time in the workforce (Esping-Andersen, 2002b; Mandel
& Semyonov, 2005, 2006). While maternity leave may allow for greater economic
independence, it is also likely to negatively affect gender equality by increasing occupational
segregation and decreasing long-term earnings potential (Stier, Lewis-Epstein, & Braun, 2001).

41

Thus, from a compensation perspective, maternity leave is at best a draw in achieving greater
gender equity in the labor market (Weldon, 2010; Zippel, 2009).
Family Leave Policies for Fathers
Gender segregation is not simply an issue in paid employment; it is also an issue in
unpaid care and household work (Esping-Andersen, 2002b). Although female labor force
participation rates have increased throughout the advanced industrial democracies over the past
four decades, very little has changed in the patterns of unpaid child care and household work as a
result (Seward, Yeatts, & Fletcher, 2009). Women still do the bulk of unpaid care and household
labor; in addition, women are more likely to adjust their work schedules to accommodate family
pressures than are men (Vandeweyer & Glorieux, 2008). In an effort to change this gendered
division of labor, many wealthy countries have adopted paternity leave policies and incentives
for fathers to take family leave; policy provision by country can be seen in Table 3.2.
[Table 3.2, here]
Both types of policies are considered female-friendly because they encourage fathers to
contribute to family care work (O'Brien, Brandth, & Kvande, 2007). Theoretically, fathers‘
involvement in care increases gender equity in the labor market; where men and women share
household duties more equally, women are less likely to suffer economic harm as a result of
excessive absences from the labor force (Mandel & Semyonov, 2006). Of the two policies,
however, paternity leave is less likely to promote gender equity. In general, paternity leave is
very short in duration, poorly compensated at best, and not necessarily protected by law (EU,
2007d). Essentially, paternity leave is too short for it to truly affect the gender division of
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household labor and use of paternity leave can have negative economic and/or employment
consequences for fathers. Thus, although paternity leave policies should promote gender equity,
in practice, their efficacy is questionable.
Incentives for fathers to take family leave are more likely to help increase gender equity.
As noted earlier, mothers are much more likely to take family leaves than are fathers (Lappegard,
2008; OECD, 2007b; Vandeweyer & Glorieux, 2008). Several countries, most notably the
Nordic countries, have attempted to increase take-up rates among fathers by reserving a portion
of the family leave for the father‘s use. In these schemes, families are entitled to additional
weeks of leave, provided those weeks are taken by the father—the leave cannot be transferred.
This significantly increases the female-friendliness of family leave policies. Research shows that
when fathers take leave and care for the infant by themselves, they are more likely to participate
in care work after the leave ends, thus the full burden of care no longer rests on the mother
(O'Brien, et al., 2007). However, the reserved ‗daddy days‘ have had only marginal success in
increasing fathers‘ use of family leave; as the OECD (2007b, p. 120) notes ―this does not reflect
a fundamental behavioral change, as mothers almost exclusively take long periods of leave.‖ It
must be noted that leave policies, particularly those that include reserved leave, are
comparatively new; it is unlikely that these policies are commonly accepted practice, yet
evidence does suggest that take-up rates among men are increasing (EU, 2007a). Thus, where
the scheme at least protects a parent‘s right to take time off to care for a newborn, a degree of
female-friendliness has been achieved, and leave schemes that are structured to encourage takeup by fathers are truly female-friendly.
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Childcare Leave
Analysis of childcare leave in comparative perspective is a challenging proposition; many
countries use the terms parental leave and childcare leave interchangeably and take-up rates are
often catalogued accordingly. In this study, I focus on childcare leave, as it is the more widelyused term. As you can see in Table 3.3, few countries adopted childcare leave until the 1980s.
Austria25 was the lone provider of childcare leave until 1973, when Italy began providing 26
weeks of leave. France, Norway and Sweden implemented childcare leave policies between
1977 and 1978. An additional six countries26 began providing childcare leave in the 1980s,
while the remainder27 did not adopt childcare leave policies until the 1990s.
[Table 3.3, here]
Childcare leave policies, like parental leave policies, are designed to increase gender
equity by allowing either parent to take time off from work in order to care for small children.
Like parental leave, the specifics of childcare leave policy in advanced industrial democracies
have been only marginally female-friendly. First, no country has adopted a childcare leave
policy that includes incentives for fathers to take leave (Gornick & Meyers, 2003). Second, most
countries have either adopted low-paid or unpaid leave (Gauthier, 2003). As you can see in Table
3.3, as of 2005, twelve of the countries in this study offered only unpaid leave, six offered
childcare leave compensated at only a flat rate (typically low), and only three offered
compensation at a percent of earnings. Given the evidence that relates low compensation to
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Austria introduced this leave in 1961, for mothers only, and only for the child‘s first year (Badelt, 1991).
Belgium, Finland, Germany, Greece, New Zealand, and Portugal
27
With the exception of Switzerland
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fathers‘ low take-up of parental leave (Vandeweyer & Glorieux, 2008), it is likely that childcare
leave is predominantly taken by mothers rather than fathers. Third, relatively few countries allow
parents to take childcare leave after the child‘s third birthday; thus, parents must use annual or
unpaid leave to care for older children. However, despite its structural and compensation
deficits, however, the legal entitlement to time off in order to care for a child does allow women
to better combine motherhood and paid employment. In that sense, childcare leave is a femalefriendly policy; however, its level of female-friendliness could easily be improved.
Cross National Analysis of Family Leave
This discussion suggests that the design determines the female-friendliness level of the
family leave policy. A truly female-friendly policy must be carefully designed to protect the
parents‘ jobs and encourage fathers to use family leave; it must also provide adequate
compensation to both mothers and fathers. Because policies are designed at the cabinet level, I
expect that women in cabinet are likely to be more influential in the adoption of female-friendly
leave policies than are women in legislature. If this argument is supported by the analysis, it
would suggest new avenues for research on gender and representation. It would further suggest
that advocates of female-friendly leave policy should pursue their agenda at the cabinet level
rather than at the legislative level. In the next section, I explore this argument by analyzing the
effect of female officeholders on an index measure of family leave policies.
The Family Leave Index
Because the structure of the overall package of leave policies is the key to the level of
female-friendliness the policies achieve, it is important to include all structural components of
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the leave package in the analysis. To this end, I have created an index measure of family leave
policies. The index includes the nine variables listed in Table 3.4, below.
[Table 3.4, here]
The data have all been scaled so that their values fall between 0 and 1; original values were used
for proportions, other values were divided by the observed maximum (e.g. weeks of leave) or
theoretical maximum (e.g. maternity leave benefit). I then used the Cronbach‘s alpha test to
determine whether or not there is an underlying structure inherent in the nine variables. The
scale reliability coefficient (0.79) indicates that the scale formed from the variables measures a
single unidimensional latent construct. Therefore, I simply sum the values of each variable to
create the index. The theoretical minimum value of the additive index is 0; the theoretical
maximum is 9. The actual minimum value is 0; the actual maximum is 7.17. Figure 3.1 shows,
by country, the difference between the relative female friendliness of leave policies in 1970
versus their relative female friendliness in 2005.
[Figure 3.1, here]
Analyses
In general, I expect that higher female representation at the cabinet level will have a
positive effect on the female-friendliness of individual family leave policies, particularly those
that are gender role changing, as well as on the family leave index. As explained in chapter 2, I
test this using OLS regression with standard errors clustered by country. The observations are
compressed into 5 year period averages to increase variation on the dependent variables. The
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key independent variables are once again women in cabinet, women holding social welfare
portfolios, and women in the legislature. The control variables are, as detailed in chapter 2:
women‘s movements, union density, strikes, welfare regime type (Christian Democratic, Social
Democratic, and Liberal), left government, federalism, European Union membership, and GDP
per capita. The results of the statistical analyses are summarized in Tables 3.5 and 3.6 below.
The Predictors of Family Leave Policies
I first determined the influence of female officeholders on the individual policies that
make up the Family Leave Index. I estimated eight models; each assessed the influence of the
three key explanatory variables on a single leave-related policy. The results are shown in table
3.5, below. As I expected, women in cabinet are a strong predictor of maternity and child care
leave provision. Although I expected female ministers would have a strong effect across the
board, they have little or no independent effect on the remaining policies.
[Table 3.5, here]
Although surprising, these results are similar to those found by OECD researchers in their
2001 study of the correlation between female-friendly reconciliation policies and women‘s
employment: the effects of individual policies were quite varied, ranging from -0.04 to 0.59.
The researchers found that the strongest correlation (0.68) was between the index measure of
female-friendly policies and women‘s employment (OECD, 2001, pp. 152-153). I expect that
the strongest results in this study will also come from the analysis of the index measure.28

28

OECD researchers chose to remove the low and/or negatively correlated policies from their index; however, I
include all of the policies because full inclusion provides a harder test of the hypotheses.
47

There are a few other oddities in the analysis of individual policies. First, women in
social welfare ministries have no influence on the majority of the policies. This provides direct
contradiction to my second hypothesis. This may indicate that women‘s presence in cabinet,
versus women‘s specific placement in social welfare ministries, is the more important
determinant of some family leave policies. Most perplexing, however, is that where they do
have an influence (father incentives), it is both negative and significant. However, diagnostic
analyses not reported here indicate that father incentives analyses are sensitive to the exclusion
of individual countries or outliers. For example, if any one of 10 countries29 is dropped from the
analysis of father incentives female social welfare ministers again lose significance. Thus, the
independent effect of female social welfare ministers in these models is questionable.
A second oddity is that women‘s movements seem to have a significant negative
influence on weeks of maternity and childcare leave. While it seems counterintuitive that
women‘s movements should have a negative influence on any of the dependent variables, many
feminist groups have opposed lengthening maternity and child care leave periods, as these types
of leave reinforce traditional gender divisions of care and child rearing (Gelb & Palley, 1996;
Weldon, 2010). More interesting is that left cabinets seem to have a negative effect on the
adoption of maternity leave and pay. A closer examination of the data reveals that there are 5630
observations in which the proportion of left government is less than or equal to the mean
proportion of left government in the sample (0.37). In these observations, the mean number of
weeks of maternity leave (14.4) is higher than the mean in the sample (12.5). Additionally, in 22

29
30

Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Japan, The Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland and the UK
Out of the full sample of 104 observations
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of the 56, the maternity leave pay level is 3; this is not only the highest score possible, it is also
about one standard deviation above the mean pay level in the full sample. Conversely, there are
only 40 observations in which both left government and maternity leave pay exceed their sample
means.
More puzzling is that, in comparison with the liberal regime, SD regimes seem to have a
significant negative influence on maternity and pregnancy related job protections (job
protections). The SD and liberal regimes31 adopted job protections in the 1970s (Canada,
Denmark, Norway, UK, US) and 1980s (Australia, Finland, New Zealand), thus there seem to be
no indicators in the data that explain this result. The final oddity in these results is the positive
influence of federalism on child care pay levels/the provision of child care leave after the child‘s
third birthday. The federalism results are strongly driven by Canada and Belgium; when the
former is dropped federalism is no longer a significant influence on the level of child care pay.
When the latter is dropped, federalism ceases to have a significant effect on leave after the age of
three.
Turning to the remaining results, it is unsurprising that both welfare regime types are
positive in most models; the reference category is the Liberal welfare regime, which is the
regime least likely to provide paid family leave and incentives for fathers to take it. That EU
membership is positive and significant in the majority of the models is expected, given that the
EU has been very vocal in its recommendations that members adopt female-friendly policies
(EU, 2006, 2007b; Weldon, 2010). Interestingly, it seems that GDP per capita is only a

31

With the exceptions of Sweden, which adopted job protections in 1945, and Ireland which adopted protections in
1994.
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significant influence on the adoption of pregnancy/maternity-related job protections and
incentives for fathers to take family leave; I would have expected it to have more of an influence
on the more benefits-intensive policies, given that higher levels of wealth are typically associated
with welfare spending. However, that GDP per capita is not a significant predictor of family
leave is consistent with other research on predictors of family leave, including Atchison and
Down (2009) and Kittilson (2008). Also intriguing is that strikes are significant only in the
adoption of higher levels of remuneration during child care leave and union density is significant
only in the adoption of paid paternity leave. Given Weldon‘s (2010) and Lambert‘s (2008)
findings, I expected labor activity to have a wider effect. However, these two results are very
consistent with Weldon‘s (2010) finding that union strength is the strongest predictor of paid
leave. Overall, these analyses provide strong support for the argument that the influence of
female officeholders varies by policy.
The Predictors of the Family Leave Index
To test the effects of female officeholders on the overall female-friendliness of family
leave policies, I estimated five models assessing the effect of each key explanatory variable
independently and in combination. These results are shown in Table 3.6, below. Model 1
presents the effects of female cabinet ministers; as expected, female ministers have a strong
positive effect on family leave in general. Model 2 presents the relationship between women in
social welfare portfolios and family leave. This analysis indicates that female social welfare
ministers do not have a statistically significant independent influence on the overall adoption of
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family leave and related policies. Model 3 presents the effect of female legislators; like female
social welfare ministers, they seem to have little influence on family leave policies.
[Table 3.6, here]
In Model 4, I test the effects of both women in cabinet and female legislators on the
adoption of female-friendly family leave policy. As hypothesized, when both variables are
included in the model, women in cabinet is the stronger predictor. Model 5 presents the effects
of all three key explanatory variables on the adoption of leave policy. Again, female cabinet
ministers have a statistically significant positive effect on female-friendly leave policy, while
female legislators and women in social welfare ministries do not. Because extant research
strongly indicates that female legislators have a significant influence on leave policies, while
these analyses indicate that they do not, I tested the significance of female ministers and female
legislators in Models 4 and 5. In both, the test statistic was significant, indicating that legislators
are not without influence in the adoption of family leave policies.32 Model 5 indicates that it is
the presence of women in cabinet, not their placement in particular ministries, which is important
for the passage of female-friendly family leave policies. This directly contradicts my second
hypothesis, and provides support for the argument that descriptive representation in the
cabinet—more women in office—is important in the adoption gender equity policies.
Turning to the other explanatory variables, given Weldon‘s (2010) findings it is
surprising that women‘s movements have a negative (albeit insignificant) influence on the family
leave index. This latter finding may stem from the fact that several policies that make up the
32

Model 4 test statistic=2.81; probability=0.09
Model 5 test statistic=2.94; probability=0.08
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index are gender-reinforcing, rather than gender-challenging, thus women‘s movements may not
have actively supported them. This may also be a function of the timing of policy adoptions, as
discussed above. It is also interesting that strikes and union density are not significant predictors
of female-friendly family leave policy. However, unions have long been bastions of male
workers; challenging gender roles has not likely been their priority. That EU membership is
positive and significant in every model is expected. The EU has long promoted female equity
policies, and has strongly recommended that member countries adopt female-friendly policies
such as family leave in order to address the aging population issue (EU, 2006, 2007b). 33 As in
the analyses of individual leave policies federalism is a positive, although insignificant, predictor
of female-friendly leave policy; of the seven federal states in the study, four provide a year or
more of family leave. This may account for these unexpected positive results. Finally, it is
unsurprising that the CD and SD welfare regimes are positive across all models, as the reference
category is the Liberal welfare regime.
Because the number of observations is relatively small, 104 per model, I also examined
the effect of outliers on the results.34 For each model I computed dfbeta statistics for each
gender indicator, identified and omitted those cases for which the dfbeta was above or below
2/√N (a commonly used standard) and re-estimated each model, once for each indicator‗s
outliers. Thus, for example, model five was re-estimated three times, once removing women in
legislature outliers to examine the effect on the women in legislature indicator, once removing
women in cabinet outliers to examine the effect on the women in cabinets indicator, and so on.
33

The only non-EU country with a family leave index score over 4 is Norway; the other non-EU countries fall
between 1.2 (Switzerland) and 3.8 (Canada).
34
See Appendix B, Table 3.7 for results
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The removal of outliers affected a key explanatory variable only in models 4a and 5a—the
models in which female legislative outliers were removed. In model 4a, when the 4 female
legislator outliers are removed female cabinet ministers lose statistical significance; the same
thing happens when 2 legislative outliers are removed in model 5a. This indicated the possibility
of joint significance; thus, I estimated the joint significance of female cabinet ministers and
legislators in models 4 and 5. In both cases, the test statistics were statistically significant. This
indicates that women in cabinet may be best able to promote female friendly family leave policy
when they have adequate female support in the legislature.35 It should also be noted that in
models 4 and 5 the removal of outliers caused GDP per capita to attain statistical significance.
Thus, I cannot rule out the possibility that GDP per capita has an independent effect on a femalefriendly package of family leave policies. Overall, however, the results appear relatively robust
to outliers.
Conclusion
Much of the gender and representation literature suggests that women in legislature are a
key determinant in the adoption of female-friendly policies; alternate explanations indicate that
women‘s movements or union activity are strong predictors. However, the analyses presented
here indicate that female cabinet ministers have a significant and positive impact on the adoption
of a broad range of female-friendly family leave policies, as measured by the Family Leave
Index. The most interesting findings presented are that female ministers‘ influence on the
individual leave policies that make up the index is quite varied. This provides strong evidence in
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Model 4: F=2.8, Probability=0.09; Model 5: F=2.9, Probability=0.08
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favor of the argument that women are likely to have different levels of influence on a range of
policies.
The results of the analyses of individual policies are somewhat puzzling, however. I
expected that female cabinet ministers would be highly influential in the adoption of femalefriendly policies that change traditional gender roles (e.g. paternity leave), and less influential—
if not neutral/negative—in the adoption of gender reinforcing policies (e.g. maternity leave).
However, women in cabinet have a positive, but not significant, impact on two of the three
gender-role changing policies included in the index: paternity leave and paternity leave benefits.
In addition, they do have a significant influence on the adoption of two highly gender-role
reinforcing policies in the index: weeks of maternity and childcare leave.
The explanation for these puzzling results may lie in social attitudes toward the gender
division of household and child-related labor. Multiple researchers note that women remain the
primary caregivers/caretakers in the home (Esping-Andersen, 2002c; Huber, Stephens, Bradley,
Moller, & Neilsen, 2009; Lewis, Knijn, Martin, & Ostner, 2008; Maume, 2008). Similarly, as
mentioned above, multiple studies report that take-up rates for family leave are overwhelmingly
higher among eligible women than eligible men. It is typically assumed that this is a rational
choice made within a working family; the parent that makes less money is more likely to take up
the leave and the mother is typically the lower-earner (Dex & Joshi, 1999; Weldon, 2010).
However, recent research indicates that social attitudes and norms may play a large role in both
take-up of leave and support for gender-role changing leave policies (Fine-Davis, Fagnani,
Giovannini, Højgaard, & Clarke, 2004).
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For example, Fine-Davis, et al (2004, p. 14) report that fully 50% of French parents
surveyed indicated that a parent should leave the workforce when the child is young;
furthermore, 32% feel that the non-working parent should be the mother, vs. 15% who believe it
should be the lowest-earner. In addition, Fine-Davis, et al (2004, p. 233) find that French
parents, particularly fathers, strongly believe they will be resented and/or taken less seriously in
the workplace if they use their family leave and both men and women believe it is more
acceptable for women to take leave than men. Both Irish and Danish parents also believe that a
man will be taken less seriously if he takes family leave; on top of this, Fine-Davis, et al (2004)
find that a large proportion of Danish employers also believe that leave should be taken by
women. In Italy, despite the provision of daddy days, fathers are highly unlikely to take family
leave; this is in spite of the fact that Italian parents agree that the father‘s use of leave would
allow both parents to better reconcile work and family (Fine-Davis, et al., 2004; Zanatta, 1999).
Italian fathers generally feel that women are better able to care for the children, thus their
involvement in domestic and/or childcare work is among the lowest in Europe. In Ireland, where
there was no provision of paid parental leave at the time of the study, Irish parents
overwhelmingly agreed that paid parental leave was desirable; notably, however, that research
indicates that the support is because mothers have typically been forced to use their own leave
time to care for ill children (Fine-Davis, et al., 2004).
In addition to the Fine-Davis, et al (2004) study, public attitudes toward parental leave
were captured in a 2003 Eurobarometer survey. In the survey, 61% of fathers36 indicated that
they were not considering taking parental leave. Nearly 13% of those respondents reported that
36

2,790 respondents
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they were not considering taking parental leave because leave is more for women, while about
10% of the fathers pointed to the mother‘s use of the full leave period as their reason for not
considering taking parental leave. In addition, all non-retired men37 were asked what
discourages men from taking parental leave, 16% indicated that parental leave is more for
women, 10% indicated that their wives would be better at childcare, 23% indicated that they did
not want to interrupt their careers, and 43% indicated that parental leave does not provide enough
compensation.
The research presented by Fine-Davis, et al (2004) and the 2003 Eurobarometer results
both indicate that parents typically view childcare as the purview of the mother. This indicates a
probable lack of public demand for gender-role changing policies such as higher benefits and
paternity leave. Fine-Davis, et al‘s (2004) research also indicates that there is likely public
demand for longer leave periods so that mothers do not have to use vacation or sick time (or
unpaid leave) to care for their children. Although female officeholders may be inclined to pursue
gender-role challenging policies (Tremblay, 1998; Wangnerud, 2000), there is likely no political
benefit to pursuing policies that women are not demanding.

37

5,546 respondents
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Chapter 4: Gender & Working Time in Comparative Perspective
Introduction
In the previous chapter, the analysis of female cabinet ministers‘ effects on femalefriendly family leave supported my first hypothesis: female cabinet ministers have a statistically
significant influence on the adoption of a wide range of female-friendly policies. I have used
these findings to support the argument that female cabinet ministers, more so than female
legislators or unions, are lynchpins for the adoption of policies that help women reconcile work
and family. The working time policies analyzed in this chapter present a harder test, however.
Regulation of working hours is necessary for the harmonization of paid employment and
parenthood. However, working hours and vacation time are typically viewed as labor or class
issues—not gender issues. Thus, it can be expected that pressure for shorter working hours,
longer vacation time and regulation of night and/or part-time work is more likely to come from
labor unions than from female officeholders (Figart & Mutari, 2000). However, because each of
these policies has significant influence on women‘s labor force participation and on gender
equity in the labor market, I do expect that women in cabinet will be influential in increasing the
female-friendliness of working-time regulations.
In particular, where time for paid and unpaid work is balanced between women and men,
gender equity is strengthened (Rubery, et al., 1998). For example, a short standard work week
(under 40 hours) provides more time for domestic and care work by both women and men; this
helps to remove men‘s paid working time as a barrier to more equitable distribution of unpaid
labor in the home (Gornick & Meyers, 2003). Longer vacation times provide a similar benefit in
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that they provide long blocks of time for both parents to spend with children; long vacations also
lessen the need for parents to find adequate child care during summers (Gornick & Meyers,
2003). In addition, regulations that prevent employers from discriminating against part-time
workers help to ensure the availability of quality part-time work. Although these protections
also make it easier for men to engage in part-time work, the primary benefit is to women, as the
bulk of part-time workers are female (O'Reilly & Fagan, 1998). Quality part-time work makes it
easier for women to remain engaged in the labor market after having children; as a result, it can
contribute to women‘s economic independence (Esping-Andersen, 2002b; Warme, et al., 1992).
Finally, many countries have historically limited women‘s access to night/nonstandard working
hours; even today Austria, Germany, Italy, and Switzerland prohibit night work for pregnant
women (ILO, 2010a). While this is positioned as maternity protection, in reality it prevents these
women from working hours that are often more lucrative than standard working hours (Gornick
& Meyers, 2003).
There are a number of variations in working time regulations across the advanced
industrial democracies, thus the female-friendliness of working time regulations must be
examined individually. To be female-friendly, working time regulations should help balance
paid and unpaid work for both men and women (Figart & Mutari, 2000; Rubery, et al., 1998). In
addition, female-friendly working time regulations should be gender-neutral to prevent
discrimination against women. In this chapter, I examine standard work weeks, vacation time,
part-time work, and non-standard working time regulations as they apply to women in the work
force. I then use regression analysis to analyze the determinants of female-friendly working time
policies.
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Female Friendly Working Time Policies
Work Weeks and Annual Leave
Traditional theories of full employment have typically assumed a male-breadwinner
system in which standard working time is an 8 hour day or 40 hour work week (Bruegel, Figart,
& Mutari, 1998; Schmid, 1995; Wheelock & Vail, 1998). Newer theories have begun to
challenge this assumption, arguing that redistribution of employment is necessary to create the
number of jobs needed to reduce both persistent unemployment in marginalized groups and overwork in others, particularly women (Wheelock & Vail, 1998).

Within this literature, feminist

political economists argue that the gender division of paid and unpaid labor must be redistributed
in order to achieve gender equity (Bruegel, et al., 1998; Figart & Mutari, 2000). The current
division of paid employment and unpaid domestic work creates what many people call women‘s
―double burden‖ (Esping-Andersen, 2002b; Woodward, 1998, p. 143); women engage in paid
labor while at the same time shouldering the bulk of the household and child-minding work
(Huber, et al., 2009). The double burden is illustrated in figures 4.1 and 4.2, below. Figure 4.1
indicates that only 24% of male respondents spend 16 hours or more on housework (including
cooking, cleaning, child-minding, etc.) each week, versus 49% of female respondents. In
contrast, Figure 4.2 shows that about 72% of men and 70% of women work more than 36 hours
per week.
[Figures 4.1 & 4.2, here]
The double burden can be reduced by shortening standard working hours for all workers
(Figart & Mutari, 2000; Gornick & Heron, 2006; Mutari & Figart, 2001). It is preferable this is
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done via national legislation, as there are employees not covered by collective agreement.
However, collective agreements can shorten working time considerably. Reduction of standard
working hours helps both men and women to balance paid employment and unpaid domestic
work (Gornick & Meyers, 2003). Achieving this balance is, as Rubery, et al. (1998, p. 71) argue,
a ―prerequisite for greater equality at home and for achieving greater equality in the labor market
and the broader society.‖ Long work-weeks (40 hours or greater) tend to be associated with low
levels of FLP, as the lack of flexibility in working time makes harmonization of employment and
family difficult (Figart & Mutari, 2000); low levels of FLP are, in turn, indicators of low levels
of economic equity (Huber, et al., 2009). In contrast, where work weeks are shorter, both FLP
and economic equity tend to be higher (Woodward, 1998); thus, policies such as regulation of
maximum working hours reduce working hours and increase the female-friendliness of the labor
market. Table 4.138 notes the year in which each country adopted regulations on maximum
working time, as well as the average hours worked by employees in the year of adoption, versus
hours worked in 2005.
[Table 4.1, here]
The argument in favor of longer vacation time is an extension of the argument for shorter
working weeks: less time at work leaves more time for both sexes to participate in family life,
thus helping to balance the gender division of labor. However, there are additional femalefriendly benefits that accompany longer vacation time. First, longer vacations allow parents to
harmonize their vacations and their children‘s summer breaks (Hertz, 1999). This means that
parents, typically mothers, will have less difficulty arranging childcare during school breaks
38

All tables and figures are found in Appendix B
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(Gornick & Heron, 2006; Gornick & Meyers, 2003). In addition, where generous childcare
leaves are not provided (e.g. the US), or where childcare leave ends after the child‘s 3rd birthday,
vacation time is often used to care for a sick child (Milkie & Peltola, 1999). Parents with short
vacation time can then be left without leave either for vacation or for additional care-work (FineDavis, et al., 2004). Table 4.2 demonstrates that this is likely a problem for parents in Australia,
Canada, Japan, and the US.
[Table 4.2, here]
Research shows that men are more likely to have unused vacation days than women
because women are more likely to take vacation time to care for a sick child or care for their
children when there are issues with day care (Maume, 2006, 2008). Thus, policies that extend
vacation time are gender-neutral, reduce the burden of care on mothers, and help to achieve
work-life balance for both sexes. As such, extended leave policies are female-friendly.
Part-Time Employment
Of all of the policies considered in this chapter, the regulation of part-time employment
as a female-friendly policy is the most controversial. Patrick Bollé (2001, p. 215) summarizes
the debate neatly, asking ―Part-time work: solution or trap?‖ At one extreme, it is argued that
wide-spread availability of part-time work allows for employment flexibility that helps women to
harmonize paid work and family time (Daniela Del Boca & Wetzels, 2007). On the other, it is
argued that because part-time employment is typically concentrated in the service sector and is
associated with low skills, low wages, and few benefits, part-time work actually diminishes
women‘s long-term employment prospects and lifetime earnings (Bollé, 2001). In practice,
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however, the issue is less clear-cut. The reality is that among the advanced industrial
democracies, we see a relatively uniform pattern in part-time employment.


The expansion of part-time work leads to greater female labor force participation
(Delsen, 1998); however, the true level (in terms of hours worked) of female participation
in the labor market is often overstated, as headcount measures do not account for the fact
that part-time work is heavily dominated by women (Jenson & Sineau, 2001; OECD,
2002b; Smith, Fagan, & Rubery, 1998).



The bulk of part-time work has typically been concentrated in the service sector—from
40 percent in Greece to more than 80 percent in several countries, including Finland,
Australia, and the UK (Delsen, 1998, p. 66; Sciarra, Davies, & Freedland, 2004)



Part-time jobs tend to be gender segregated, poorly paid, and low-status, such as
cleaning, personal services, and retail sales (Smith, et al., 1998), and require firms to
make minimal investment in human capital (Delsen, 1998).

In short, in most of the advanced industrial democracies women are disproportionately
represented in low-quality employment. This is indicated in figure 4.3, which shows the
proportion of part-time work performed by women versus men. This would seem to support the
argument that part-time work is a trap for female workers.
[Figure 4.3, here]
There are several points that support the argument that part-time work is a solution for
harmonizing parenthood and paid employment. First, Esping-Andersen (2002b, pp. 79-80) notes
that when a woman leaves the workforce for 5 years, she loses an average of 1.5 to 2% of her
annual lifetime earnings potential; if, however, she engages in part-time work rather than exiting,
the labor market, the cumulative wage penalty declines to 0.5%. In addition, where part-time
opportunities are not available, parents are left to choose between full-time employment and
unemployment. Neither option may be feasible given that childcare must be available in order
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for a parent to participate in full-time employment and a working partner must be present in
order for a parent to choose unemployment (Bollé, 2001). Thus, part-time employment provides
a necessary middle-ground. Finally, where provisions to allow new parents to work part-time in
their pre-child jobs part-time work is less precarious, less gender-segregated, and better
compensated (Rubery, et al., 1998).
These broad discussions of part-time employment obscure an interesting point, however:
there is no discernable cross-national pattern regarding rates of part-time employment and female
labor force participation. Some countries, notably the Sweden and The Netherlands, have
actively promoted quality part-time employment as a mechanism for increasing FLP, as mothers
as mothers often find it easier to work part-time (Esping-Andersen, 2002b; OECD, 2008;
Rubery, et al., 1998);39 in contrast, Finland has very high FLP, but comparatively few part-time
workers (Bollé, 2001; Rubery, et al., 1998). On the opposite end of the spectrum, because of
strict labor regulations, Spain and Greece provide few opportunities for part-time employment
and both have among the lowest levels of FLP in Europe (Adam, 1996; Rubery, et al., 1998).
The lack of a cross-national pattern regarding part-time work and female labor force
participation makes it difficult to generalize about gender equity and part-time work (Figart &
Mutari, 2000; Garibaldi & Wasmer, 2004; Sciarra, et al., 2004; Smith, et al., 1998).
The one point on which there is general agreement is that in order to increase genderequity in part-time work, there must be legislation that prevents discrimination against part-time
workers (Garibaldi & Wasmer, 2004). As Bollé (2001, p. 228) notes, ―where part-time work is
39

Quality part-time work is protected by law, meaning that it is illegal to discriminate against part-timers: they must
have pay, benefits, and training/promotional opportunities that are proportional to those of their full-time colleagues
(EU, 2007c).
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accompanied by adequate legal protection…it can be an excellent means of dividing one‘s time
between economic activity, family responsibilities, and other pursuits.‖ The elimination of
discrimination is the key objective of the EU‘s Council Directive on Part-Time Work (1997),
wherein member states agreed ―to eliminate discrimination against part-time workers and to
improve the quality of part-time work‖ (EU, 2007c; Gornick & Meyers, 2003, p. 312). The
Directive was passed as a specific attempt to increase gender equity in the labor market
(Bleijenbergh, de Bruijn, & Bussemaker, 2004).40 Thus, for the purposes of this project, where
countries have adopted legislation that prevents discrimination against part-time employees (who
are largely female), I consider that their part-time employment laws have taken steps toward
becoming female-friendly.
Non-Standard Working Time
Non-standard working time includes night, evening, and weekend work. I focus here on
night work, as that is where regulations concerning women have historically been concentrated.
Many countries consider night work a hardship, and special benefits/pay may be granted
accordingly. For example, in Austria, an employee who performs six or more hours of heavy
night work more than 51 times per year is entitled to two additional days of annual leave (ILO,
2010a). In Germany, unless otherwise determined by collective agreement, night workers must
be granted paid time off to compensate for the night work and employers must pay ―an
appropriate supplement over and above the gross wage due to them for the hours worked‖ (ILO,
2010a). Italian law specifies that collective agreements must provide for higher salaries for night

40

The emphasis on gender equity came at the expense of a call for reduction in working hours, however
(Bleijenbergh, et al., 2004).
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workers (ILO, 2010a), while Swiss law mandates a 10% increase in salary for regular night
workers and a 25% increase for employees temporarily assigned to night work (ILO, 2010a).
These provisions for night workers are generous, however they are also discriminatory.
In each of these countries, pregnant women are prohibited from undertaking night work,
regardless of the nature of said work. Germany and Italy take this one step further; Germany
prohibits night work for breastfeeding mothers, while Italy prohibits night work until the child
turns one (ILO, 2010a). Belgium had similar restrictions until 1998, whereas French restrictions
on women and night work were not lifted until 2001 (Gornick & Meyers, 2003).

These

regulations are prima facie discriminatory toward women. First, they exacerbate gender
inequality because they specifically target mothers (Gornick & Meyers, 2003). Second, they are
predicated on the idea that women must be protected in the labor market; thus, they are highly
paternalistic. Third, these gendered regulations prevent women from benefitting from the
increased compensation that accompanies night work. Despite a 1991 European Court of Justice
ruling that any ban on women‘s night work violates EU law, the member states mentioned above
have made no move toward complying with the Court‘s decision (Gornick & Meyers, 2003).
Repealing gender-biased working time regulations will significantly increase the femalefriendliness of non-standard working time policies.
Cross National Analysis of Working Time Policies
The Working Time Index (WTI)
The overall nature of a country‘s working time policies must be considered when
attempting to determine the female-friendliness of the country‘s working time policies. I have
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accounted for this by constructing an index measure of working time policies. Following
Gornick and Meyers (2003), I identified five policies related to female-friendly working time.
These are listed in Table 4.3, below.
[Table 4.3, here]
The data have all been scaled so that their values fall between 0 and 1; original values were used
for binary measures (e.g. regulation of non-standard working time). Because higher values
indicate greater female friendliness, average working time was first divided by the observed
maximum (45.74) and then subtracted from 1. Thus the highest number of working hours
(45.74) has a value of 0 in the index, while the lowest (31.90) has a value of 0.303. Vacation
time was simply divided by the observed maximum.
As in the previous chapter, I used the Cronbach‘s alpha test to determine whether or not
there is an underlying structure inherent in the five variables. The scale reliability coefficient
(0.72) indicates that the scale formed from the variables measures a single unidimensional latent
construct.41 Therefore, I again sum the values of each variable to create the index. The
theoretical minimum value of the additive index is 0; the theoretical maximum is 5. The actual
minimum value is 0; the actual maximum is 4.2. Figure 4.4 shows, by country, the difference
between the relative female friendliness of leave policies in 1970 versus their relative female
friendliness in 2005, by country.
[Figure 4.4, here]

41

Soss, Schram, Vartanian, and O‘Brien (2001) and Brians and Wattenberg (1996) indicate that this is a modest,
but acceptable alpha score.
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Analyses
Overall, I expect that working time regulations will prove a much more difficult test of
my hypotheses than did family leave. While family leave is universally acknowledged as a
gendered policy area, working time regulations are much less specific to women. Thus, it may
be the case that union activity (strikes and union density) is the more important determinant of
working time regulations. However, because shorter working times and protection of part-time
employment are very important to women‘s ability to combine parenthood and paid
employment, I expect that female cabinet ministers will have a significant influence on femalefriendly working time regulations. Again, I test this using OLS regression with standard errors
clustered by country. The observations are compressed into 5 year period averages to increase
variation on the dependent variables. The key independent variables, as in the previous chapter,
are women in cabinet, women holding social welfare portfolios, and women in parliament. The
control variables are: women‘s movements, union density, strikes, left government, GDP per
capita, federalism, European Union membership, and welfare regime type (Christian Democratic,
Social Democratic, and Liberal).42 The results of the statistical analyses are summarized in
Tables 4.4 and 4.5 below.
The Predictors of Working Time Regulations
To test the effects of female officeholders on the individual working time regulations, I
ran five models. Each tested the effect of the three key explanatory variables on a single
working time regulation. The results are shown in table 4.4, below. On the whole, the results

42

Operationalization of these variables can be found in chapter 1.
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indicate that women do not have a statistically significant influence on working time policies,
with the exception of average working hours. In interpreting the results of the average working
hours analysis, it is important to remember that in this analysis lower working hours are more
female friendly. Thus, it is odd that a higher proportion of women in cabinet leads to higher
working hours. However, in line with my second hypothesis, it seems that higher proportions of
female social welfare ministers lead to reduced working hours. Given that female ministers tend
to be concentrated in social-welfare portfolios, the two variables are highly correlated (0.67).
However, the VIFs do not approach 10, indicating that multicollinearity is not an issue. The
average working time analysis may be a case in which higher levels of women are not necessary
for adoption of female friendly policies; however it is necessary that a woman be in a key
position to influence policy adoption. This may also be that case with vacation time, as female
social welfare ministers are a significant predictor of longer vacation time while female
ministers, in general, are not.
Turning to the controls, it is unsurprising that women‘s movements have a significant
positive influence on the adoption of maximum working time regulations; however, it is—on the
surface—quite odd that women‘s movements would have a negative (albeit insignificant) impact
on the repeal of gendered regulation of working time. This is likely related to timing; when I run
the regression model using the data only for 1970-89 (the most active period in the repeal of
gendered regulation of working time), women‘s movements have a significant and positive
influence on gendered regulations. It is interesting to note that several of the countries that either
repealed these laws comparatively late or have not yet repealed them also have historically had
strong women‘s movements: e.g. Belgium, France, Italy, and The Netherlands. At the other end
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of the spectrum, several countries that do not have a history of gendered regulations, or that
repealed these policies in the 1970s/early 1980s, do not have strong and autonomous women‘s
movements: e.g. Finland, Japan, Spain, and Sweden. Thus, the negative result is odd, but not
inexplicable.
Left cabinets are significant predictors in only one model: average working hours. As
proportion of left cabinet increases, working hours decrease. Moving to the labor variables,
given Weldon‘s (2010)and Lambert‘s (2008) studies I expected both labor variables to be strong
predictors across the board, with the possible exception of gendered regulation of non-standard
working time. Thus, it is surprising that union activity is significant in only 2 of the 5 models:
average weekly working hours and part-time protections. However, reduction of working time
has long been a focus of labor unions, thus it is unsurprising that they have the greatest influence
on reduction of average hours worked. Lower working hours may also be a function of
collective agreements (as in Denmark) rather than regulation of working hours; this can also be
attributed to union activity. Also of interest is the negative impact of strikes on the adoption of
protections for part-time workers. This is expected, as unions have traditionally opposed parttime work.
That GPD per capita is insignificant in all models is unsurprising; these policies have
little impact on government spending. It is interesting, however, that federalism is a significant
negative predictor of average working hours. However, these results are driven by the relatively
low average working hours in Belgium, Australia, and Germany; if any of these are dropped
from the model, federalism is no longer a significant predictor of low average working time.
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Thus, I cannot rule out the possibility that federalism has no independent influence on working
hours.
At first glance, it seems odd that EU membership would be associates with lower average
working hours, longer vacation time, and regulation of maximum working hours, but a negative
predictor of gendered regulation of working hours. However, seven EU member states43 have
historically regulated women‘s night work; three of those continue to do so today (Austria,
Germany, Italy). In contrast, five of the six non-EU members44 analyzed did not have gendered
regulations during the period of this study. Finally, that the CD welfare regime is statistically
significant in almost all models is unsurprising, as the reference category is the liberal regime.45
Liberal regimes have traditionally had the fewest regulations on non-standard working time. This
lack of regulation also explains why both CD and SD states are significant and negative
predictors of gendered regulation of working time in comparison with the liberal states.
Although three SD regimes and six CD regimes46 regulated women‘s working hours between
1970 and 2005, none of the liberal states had similar regulations.
The Predictors of the Working Time Index
To test the effects of female officeholders on the adoption of female-friendly working
time policies, I ran five models assessing the effect of each key explanatory variable
43

32 observations: Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, and The Netherlands
52 observations: Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, and the US; Finland, Spain and Sweden were
free of gendered regulations prior to joining the EU.
45
That both regimes are negative predictors of average working time seems odd on the surface; however it must be
kept in mind that the variable was constructed so that higher values are considered more female-friendly. Thus,
these results indicate that both CD & SD welfare states are likely to have lower average working hours than liberal
states.
46
SD, 15 observations: Austria, Belgium, Netherlands; CD, 35 observations: France, Germany, Greece, Italy
Portugal, Switzerland
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independently and in combination. These results are shown in Table 4.5, below. Model 1
presents the effects of female cabinet ministers on working time regulations; as expected, female
ministers have a significant and positive effect. Model 2 presents the relationship between
women in social welfare portfolios and working time policy. In direct contradiction of my
hypothesis, this analysis indicates that female social welfare ministers have a positive but
insignificant impact on female-friendly working time policies. Model 3 presents the effect of
female legislators; they have a positive and significant effect on the adoption of policies that
increase the female-friendliness of standard working time. In Model 4, I test the effects of both
women in cabinets and female legislators on working time. When both variables are included in
the model, both are significant predictors of female-friendly working time policies. Model 5
presents the effects of all three key explanatory variables; both female ministers and legislators
are again individually significant. In addition, in both models 4 and 5 the two variables are
jointly significant at the .05 level.47
As mentioned above, working time policies are commonly thought to be class-related
policies, thus they are thought to be the purview of labor unions. This analysis indicates,
however, that union density is not a significant predictor, while strikes are a significant negative
predictor of female-friendly working time policies. It should be noted, however, that in 11 of
the 12 observations in which there are an average of 2000 or more strikes, the WTI score is
below the mean by an average of nearly 0.8, and in 5 of the 12 the difference is greater than 1.3
standard deviations. Furthermore, when the strike outliers48 are dropped, strikes lose statistical

47
48

Model 4: F=5.25, Probability=0.016; Model 5: F=5.22, Probability=0.017
Denmark, 1999; Ireland, 2000-05; Italy, 1995-99; Japan, 1970-74; UK, 2000-05
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significance. Thus, that strikes have a negative influence on female-friendly working time
policies cannot be stated with great certainty.
In addition, EU membership is a positive, but not significant, predictor of female-friendly
working time policies. This is surprising, as the EU has long promoted shorter working times,
the regulation of working hours, and the repeal of gendered regulation of non-standard working
time. However, as noted above, several EU countries still regulate women‘s working hours in
some way; this may be a factor in the EU‘s non-significant influence. Finally, that the CD and
SD regime types are positive predictors of female-friendly working time is as expected, given the
liberal reference category.
As in the previous chapter, the small number of observations (104) made it important to
test the effects of outliers on the results.49 With respect to the key explanatory variables, only
change s come in Models 2 and 4b. In model 2, female social welfare ministers become
significant when 10 outliers are dropped. More interestingly, when cabinet outliers were
excluded from model 4b, cabinet ministers lost statistical significance. This once again raises the
possibility of joint significance; indeed, female ministers and legislators are jointly significant
predictors of leave policy.50 Also of interest, removal of the key explanatory variable outliers in
models 4, and 5 caused left government to attain significance. This means that left government
is significant in 5 of the 8 diagnostic analyses. Therefore, it must be noted that left government
may have an independent effect on the adoption of female-friendly working time policy.

49
50

See Appendix B, Table 4.6 for Outlier Analyses.
F=4.96; probability=0.02
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Conclusion
The analyses suggest that it is likely that women in cabinet are a key determinant of
female-friendly working time policy; however, the results further suggest that female ministers
are best able to push a female-friendly agenda when there are higher proportions of women in the
legislature. These findings are especially telling, as working time policies have historically been
credited, at least in part, to labor activity. My results indicate, however that strikes may actually
be a negative predictor of female-friendly working time policies. It should be mentioned that the
overall results may be driven by the fact that unions have historically viewed part-time work
with skepticism, arguing that expansion of part-time work would limit workers‘ education and
training options, increase gender segregation, and cut full-time positions (Delsen, 1998; Eklund,
2004; Fuchs, 2004). Although trade unions in some countries now support the protection of parttime work, this is a relatively new development and is far from universal (Delsen, 1998; Fuchs,
2004). In addition, the finding that women in cabinet and women in legislature are jointly
significant not only supports the substantive representation argument in general, but also
supports my first hypothesis and the argument that women in legislatures are key determinants of
female-friendly social policy. Women do, indeed, respond to demands for more female-friendly
working time policies.
For example, a 2004 Eurobarometer (Papacostas, 2004) survey indicates that of the
7,815 respondents that plan to reduce their working hours, 44% of them would like to be able to
reduce their daily/weekly hours, while 33% would like to be able to increase their vacation time,
and 8.5% would like to do both. It is likely, however, that governing parties must also be
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amenable to these policies in order for the women to successfully push for change. Since the
1970s, the conditions have been good: states have frequently viewed the reduction of working
time and the extension of part-time employment as strategies to combat unemployment (Bollé,
2001). A prime example comes from France; in 1982 the Socialist-led government implemented
working time reductions aimed at decreasing unemployment (Laulom, 2004). In addition, states
often view the encouragement of part-time work as politically expedient. As Bollé (2001, p. 216)
notes, the expansion of part-time employment opportunities ―can lower politically-significant
unemployment rates without requiring an increase in the total number of hours worked.‖
The results presented here also indicate that the CD welfare regime type is a consistent
positive predictor of the overall adoption of female-friendly working time policy, as well as
strong predictors of the regulation of weekly working hours, lengthy vacations, protections for
part-time workers. This would seem to support the idea that welfare regime is a driving force
behind working time policies. I would agree that the regime type sets the stage; however, where
significant the coefficients for regime are smaller by 25-40% than those of women in cabinet.
Thus, it seems that women in cabinet have a larger effect on the overall female-friendliness of
working time regulations.
The analyses presented here indicate that the presence of women at both the cabinet and
legislative levels is important for the adoption of female-friendly working time policies. This
finding is of primary importance where working time policies are still restrictive to women or
where working time is comparatively long. For example, in Austria, Germany, Italy, and
Switzerland, where regulations still prevent some women from working non-standard shifts, anti74

discrimination activists and European Union representatives51 are more likely to see success if
they focus their efforts to repeal these policies on a coalition of women in the cabinet and women
in legislature—a two-pronged approach is likely to be more effective than focusing only on
women in legislature. In addition, given the paucity of female-friendly policy options for women
in liberal regimes, liberal states should look to the policy lessons learned from CD and SD52
welfare states in order to promote the adoption of policies that balance the gender division of
labor, decrease women‘s burden of care, and increase the overall female-friendliness of working
time policies.

51

Austria, Germany, and Italy are all currently in violation of a 1991 ECJ decision that ruled gendered regulation of
working time a violation of EU law.
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Chapter 5: Female-Friendly Childcare Policies in Comparative Perspective
Introduction
In the preceding chapters, I examined several policies that provide important support for
working women; among these policies are maternity and childcare leave, as well as shortened
working hours and increased vacation time. I have found that the presence of female cabinet
ministers is generally a positive predictor of female-friendly policy. Female ministers,
particularly in conjunction with female legislators, are instrumental in the adoption of family
leave policies and female-friendly working time policies. In this chapter, I examine the one
policy area that is strictly necessary for the harmonization of paid employment and motherhood:
childcare. Childcare, like family leave, is typically viewed as a female concern rather than a
working class concern. The issue is one in which women are typically more vested than men; as
Gornick and Meyers (2003, p. 143) point out, when faced with poor childcare options it is
mothers that will disassociate from the labor market in order to care for their children. Thus,
improving the availability of affordable and reliable childcare services is vital to improving
gender equity in the labor market.
Indeed, it can be argued that childcare is the most important of the female-friendly
policies, as women are unable to reconcile paid employment and motherhood without it. EspingAndersen (2002b) provides strong support for this argument, finding that childcare availability is
the key determinant of the harmonization of motherhood and paid employment for both part-time
and full-time female workers. Because this is an issue of prime importance to women, I expect
that the design and adoption of childcare policy will be heavily influenced by female
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officeholders. Once again, the policy design becomes a central part of determining the femalefriendliness of the final policy. While childcare policies are usually viewed as female-friendly,
there are several components that contribute to improving the relative levels of femalefriendliness. In this chapter, I focus on care entitlements for infants and pre-school aged
children, childcare subsidies (tax or transfer) to parents, school age, and continuity in the school
day/week.
First, universal state-provided childcare for infants and preschoolers, such as the Swedish
child care system, is highly female-friendly. Because the state provides benefits for all children,
Swedish parents are able to procure quality care for their children regardless of the family‘s
economic status.53 The situation is quite the opposite in the US, where parents‘ childcare options
are constrained by income; lower-income American parents often have difficulty finding quality
care and many American children end up in inadequate care arrangements (Gornick & Meyers,
2003). Second, where childcare is not state-provided, tax or transfer benefits that offset the cost
of childcare are an important component of increasing the affordability of childcare, thus
improving the female-friendliness of available care. Most countries now provide some sort of
childcare subsidy, credit or rebate—however, the level of assistance varies tremendously. In
Spain, for example, childcare is heavily subsidized; the maximum parents will have to pay is
20% of the cost of care (Kamerman, 2000). In contrast, the US provides a tax credit that
reimburses 20% of childcare costs for middle-income parents and 30% for low-income parents—
thus American parents pay, on average, about 76% of the cost of childcare (Kamerman, 2000).

53

Fees are assessed; however they are low and are calculated on a sliding scale based on parental income. Parents
end up paying about 13% of the cost of care (2007c).
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Third, although not specifically positioned as a female-friendly policy, school age is an
important part of a female-friendly childcare package. Having young children is the largest
barrier to maternal employment (d‘Addio & d‘Ercole, 2005); the earlier the age at which
children are allowed to attend school, the better for mothers—particularly when non-maternal
childcare options are limited and/or expensive. Finally, irregular school hours are an additional
impediment to mother‘s employment; when either the school day or school week is not
continuous, the burden of care increases. For example, Swiss schools have morning and
afternoon sessions, but only a handful of schools provide care between the sessions (Androwski,
2010). In contrast, British mothers do not have to concern themselves with mid-day care or
irregular weeks, as the school day and week are continuous throughout the UK (Gornick &
Meyers, 2003).
Given the wide variety of childcare arrangements both within and across the advanced
industrial democracies, it is important to examine the full spectrum of childcare policies. In this
chapter, I examine the public provision of childcare, childcare benefits, school ages, and the
continuity of school time. I first describe each policy, emphasizing the qualities that enhance
each policy‘s female friendliness. I then conduct regression analysis to determine to what degree
female officeholders influence the adoption of childcare policy.
Female Friendly Childcare Policies
Childcare
Ensuring care for the children of working mothers has been an issue in many countries
since the industrial revolution. For example, in Francophone Belgium, the first nurseries opened
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their doors to the children of working class women in the 1820s; these were charitable
institutions designed to prevent vagrancy and promote morals and hygiene (EU, 2008/09n). In
England, poor working mothers had access to similar day nurseries as early as the late 18th
century (EU, 2008/09p). These working-class facilities were typically overcrowded and poorly
staffed, but working class mothers had no other options. In countries such as The Netherlands,
these facilities gradually shifted their focus from child-minding to pre-school education (EU,
2008/09o). However, in most cases, basic child-minding centers were the only available nonfamilial care until the 1960s or 1970s. These day nurseries had several drawbacks, however.
First, the child-minders were often ill-paid and ill-trained. Second, the services were typically
available only to poor women, so working women of higher income were forced to rely on help
from female relatives or nannies. Third, day nurseries were care-centric, and children in them
received little education. Finally, space was limited, so these facilities became inadequate as
rates of female employment began to increase across all segments of society in the 1960s and
1970s. The question became what role, if any, the government should play in the provision of
childcare.
There are four basic patterns of government intervention in childcare across the advanced
industrial democracies: public provision for all children, public provision for children aged three
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and up, childcare allowances,54 and childcare benefits in the form of transfers or tax credits.
Table55 5.1 shows the provision of childcare polices in each country, circa 2005.
[Table 5.1, here]
Sweden was an early provider of public care. Swedish lawmakers chose to extend public
provision of care to all children, with the express intent of facilitating women‘s entry into the
labor market (Bergqvist & Jungar, 2000). In comparison, the French chose to promote stay-athome motherhood until age 3 by ensuring a right to childcare only after the child‘s third birthday
(Lanquetin, Laufer, & Letablier, 2000). Similarly, the Japanese government provides subsidized
municipal daycare; however, priority is given to low income and single-parent families and
availability is severely limited (Allen, 2003). Thus, the policy leaves women—particularly those
in the middle class—little choice but to stay at home with small children. The German state
chose to fully reinforce the male-breadwinner model in which women bear the primary
responsibility for private care; this was done by provision of a childcare allowance that pays
women a modest sum when they stay home with small children; this results in very low
employment among mothers of young children (Schweiwe, 2000). In the US and Australia, the
state chose to neither promote nor discourage female employment; instead implementing tax
credits to help parents offset the purchase of private care56 (Kamerman & Kahn, 1997).

54

Although this is a common method of intervention, in this project I do not examine child-raising allowances, as
these pay mothers to stay home with small children and do not help reconcile parenthood and paid employment. In
fact, some research shows that cash-for-care schemes may have a negative effect on mother‘s employment
(Kamerman, 2000).
55
All tables and figures can be found in Appendix B
56
It should be noted that the purchase of child care effectively acts as a tax on the secondary earner‘s (typically the
mother‘s) wages; thus, the tax credit may be more beneficial to the mother (depending on whether or not the state
uses joint taxation)(Gornick & Meyers, 2003).
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Public Provision of Childcare
The cost of quality childcare can be staggering, particularly for families with more than
one child. Research finds that high childcare costs have a negative effect on maternal
employment; as care costs rise, women leave the labor market (Gornick & Meyers, 2003).
Anderson and Levine (1999) determined that in the US—where the vast majority of childcare is
privately purchased—a 10% reduction in the cost of childcare could lead to 3 to 4% increase in
the likelihood of maternal employment; they further note that low-income mothers are
particularly sensitive to childcare costs. In addition, childcare costs act as, in effect, an
additional tax on the secondary earner‘s (the mother‘s) wages; this significantly reduces
women‘s equity in the labor market (Gornick & Meyers, 2003). Duncan and Giles (1996) argue
that public subsidies for childcare are likely to encourage more mothers to work, thus decreasing
their dependence on a spouse‘s income. Lundholm and Ohlsson (1998) also find that public
provision of childcare increases women‘s earnings and significantly increases female
participation in the labor market.
This is best illustrated by the Scandinavian-Spanish differential: low provision of care
results in low FLP rates in Spain, while widespread provision of childcare in Scandinavia results
in some of the highest FLP rates in the world (Esping-Andersen, 2002b; Valiente, 2000). As you
can see in Table 5.2, however, this differential is not absolute. Swiss parents, for example, have
low access to formal care, but high FLP. In these cases, it is assumed that family and informal
care arrangements substitute for formal care centers. This is sub-optimal, as family/informal
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care arrangements are often irregular and non-regulated, and can thus pose both availability and
quality issues for parents (Gornick & Meyers, 2003).
[Table 5.2, here]
Public provision of care services can also alleviate some of the wage penalty issues
associated with women‘s exit from the labor market in order to care for small children. Where
there is little access to childcare (e.g. Germany), mothers often have little choice but to exit the
workforce for the first three years of their children‘s lives; this causes a loss of skills and a wage
penalty (Duncan & Giles, 1996; Schweiwe, 2000). However, the wage penalty is lessened when
women are able to get back into the workforce more quickly (Esping-Andersen, 2002b). In
addition, research shows that the use of childcare services is linked to the probability that women
will engage in full-time employment (Ghysels, 2004; Schøne, 2004). However, there is also
evidence that women are less likely to work full-time when they have to pay for childcare,
presumably because the cost of care outweighs the benefit of employment (Ghysels, 2004;
OECD, 2007b). Thus, it becomes important that governments provide care services, or—at the
very least—offset the costs of childcare in order to increase women‘s labor force participation
rates.
Offsetting the Costs of Childcare
The expense of childcare can be a major barrier to female employment (d‘Addio &
d‘Ercole, 2005). If care is available but unaffordable, it does little to help women reconcile
parenthood and employment. Thus, subsidies that mitigate childcare expenses can be an
important tool for increasing FLP. The two most common methods of subsidizing the cost to
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parents are tax credits/deductions and transfers (Gornick & Meyers, 2003). As shown in Table
5.1, countries as diverse as Australia, Japan, Finland and the US are among the countries that
provide some form of subsidy. In Australia, this takes the form of the Child Care Benefit, a
rebate paid on a sliding scale (by income), which can be paid directly to the service provider or
taken as a lump sum by the parents at the end of the year (Australian Bureau of Statistics., 2002).
The Finns and Danes provide subsidies, typically paid to private care providers, if parents choose
private care centers rather than public (Cleveland, 2010; Waldfogel, 2001). In contrast, Canadian
and Dutch parents receive a tax deduction to moderate the cost of childcare, while parents in the
US and the UK receive a tax credit (Cleveland, 2010).
The range of subsidies creates great variety in the amount parents pay for childcare across
the advance industrial democracies. An OECD-sponsored study (d‘Addio & d‘Ercole, 2005, p.
55) noted that ―as a result of different programmes, the out-of-pocket childcare costs borne by
families vary significantly across countries: at gross income levels of 100% of the earnings of an
APW57 they range from more than 40% of gross family income in Ireland and the United
Kingdom to less than l0% in Denmark, Finland, Germany, Greece and Sweden.‖ In some
countries, such as Denmark, France, Italy, Spain and Sweden, parental co-payments are based on
family income and are capped to ensure that parents pay only a small percentage of the costs
(Child Policy International., 2008; Gornick & Meyers, 2003; Kamerman, 2000).
Because of the minimal impact of some subsidies, e.g. the US tax credit offsets less than
an estimated 25% of costs, the expense of childcare is still an impediment to female employment
in countries such as Ireland, Canada, and the US. For example, Irish childcare costs are the
57

Average production worker.
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highest of any EU country and are not income-adjusted (Fine-Davis, et al., 2004); as a result,
childcare acts as a regressive burden on low income parents. This is problematic because US
research indicates that high childcare costs increase the likelihood that low income parents will
need income support from the state (Connelly & Kimmel, 2003).
This is not simply an issue of income level, however. Researchers find that high
childcare costs act as a significant negative influence on mothers‘ labor force participation,
regardless of income. For example, in a study of Canadian women‘s employment choices,
Cleveland, Gunderson and Hyatt (1996, p. 147) find that a 10% increase in childcare costs results
in a 3.9% reduction in the likelihood a mother will engage in paid employment. Similarly,
Michalopoilos and Robins (2000, pp. 457-460) find that increasing the cost of formal care by just
$1 per hour is likely to decrease mothers‘ full-time employment by 3%. In contrast, they find
that increasing annual childcare subsidies by $100, to American and Canadian women in fulltime employment using non-parental care, will likely increase employment by about 1%. In the
same vein, Duncan & Giles (1996) find that increasing childcare subsidies to parents in the UK
is likely to have a positive impact on mother‘s employment—particularly for lower-income
mothers and mothers of children under the age of 3.
Policies for School-Aged Children
In this research, I consider two policies related to school-aged children: (a) the age at
which parents may first enroll children in school58 and (b) the continuous school day/week.59

58

In many cases, the age at which children may be enrolled and the compulsory school age are the same, however,
in a few cases parents have the option to enroll children early. If, for example, the compulsory school age in the
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These are shown in Table 5.3. First, the age at which parents may enroll children in school is
important, particularly when childcare access is limited. Lower ages are more advantageous for
working parents. For example, while there is little access to childcare for ages 3 and under in
Ireland, parents may enroll children in public pre-school at age 4 thus considerably lessening the
burden of care on parents (EU, 2008/09g). Public kindergarten starting at age 5 provides a
similar benefit for parents in the US and The Netherlands (Gornick & Meyers, 2003). In
contrast, Sweden provides a guaranteed place for every child, ages 0-6 (EU, 2008/09l); thus, the
fact that the school age is 7 is unlikely to cause care problems for parents.
Even more important to mother‘s employment, however, is a continuous school day/week
(Gornick & Meyers, 2003). School schedules, particularly in countries with short school weeks
(e.g. the French 26 hour school week), are often difficult to reconcile with parent‘s work
schedules (OECD, 2007b). Nevertheless, schools provide an important source of supervised care.
However, whereas American and Swedish parents are able to take a child to school and not
worry about child care for the length of the school day, German and Swiss parents are faced with
a non-continuous school day (Gornick & Meyers, 2003). They are typically forced to arrange
childcare for their children over the mid-day break (a break of varying lengths), as the school is
not responsible for the children during that time (Androwski, 2010; EU, 2008/09e). This
increases the burden of care on parents, particularly since many countries that do not have
continuous school days also have lower access to non-parental care (see Tables 5.2 and 5.3). In

Netherlands is 5, but parents can enroll children at age 4 (Schøne, 2004). This significantly increases the country‘s
coverage rates for the over 3s, even though there is no legal guarantee of a place for every child.
59
I also considered children‘s hours in school and weeks per year, however in no country for which data could be
found did these data change between 1970 and 2005.
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addition to these scheduled breaks, some parents are faced with unpredictable school hours due
to teacher absences. For example, The Netherlands does not have an effective substitute teacher
program; thus, children are regularly sent home when a teacher is out sick and working parents
are left scrambling to find childcare on short notice (OECD, 2007b).
Not only may the school day be irregular but, as in France, the school week may not be
continuous. The French school week includes what Esping-Andersen (2002b, p. 84) calls ―the
peculiar French practice of school-free Wednesdays.‖ He also notes that this practice is likely the
reason for low employment of French mothers with small children, despite the wide availability
of childcare for preschoolers; most public care facilities are also closed on Wednesdays.
Scheiwe (Scheiwe, 2000) reports that short and irregular school hours are a similar impediment
to mothers‘ employment in Germany, as well. Although school-free Wednesdays are uniquely
French, the practice of mid-week breaks is not. Both Belgium and The Netherlands close
schools on Wednesday afternoons, and Luxembourg‘s schools close on Tuesday and Thursday
afternoons (Gornick & Meyers, 2003). In these cases it is incumbent on parents, usually
mothers, to not only find care for their children, but also to leave work mid-day to pick up the
children and take them to the care provider; this makes it challenging for a mother of small
children to maintain a career (Abrahamson, 2007). Thus, non-continuous school schedules are
generally a hindrance to the full-time employment of women.
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Cross National Analysis of Child Care Policies
The Child Care Index (CCI)
The overall nature of a country‘s child care policies must be considered when attempting
to determine their overall female-friendliness. I have accounted for this by constructing an index
measure of childcare policies. Following Gornick and Meyers (2003), I identified four policies
related to female-friendly child care. These are listed in Table 5.4, below.
[Table 5.4, here]
To ensure that each variable is given equal weight, the data have all been scaled so that their
values fall between 0 and 1; for example, the school day may be continuous (1), sometimes
continuous (0.5), or not continuous (0). Because higher values indicate greater female
friendliness, school age was first divided by the observed maximum (7) and then subtracted from
1. Thus the highest school age has a value of 0 in the index, while the lowest (4) has a value of
0.43.
As in the previous chapter, I used the Cronbach‘s alpha test to determine whether or not
there is an underlying structure inherent in the variables. Given the small number of variables,
the scale reliability coefficient (0.37) indicates that the scale formed from the variables likely60
measures a single unidimensional latent construct. Therefore, I again sum the values of each
variable to create the index. The theoretical minimum value of the additive index is 0; the
theoretical maximum is 4. The actual minimum value is 0; the actual maximum is 3.14. Figure
60

When using Cronbach‘s Alpha, increasing the number of variables typically increases the alpha score; thus the low
score here is likely the result of the small number of variables rather than an indicator that an additive index is
inappropriate.
87

5.1 shows, by country, the difference between the relative female friendliness of childcare
policies in 1970 versus their relative female friendliness in 2005, by country.
[Figure 5.1, here]
Analyses
In general, I expect that higher female representation at the cabinet level will have a
positive effect on the female-friendliness of individual child care leave policies, particularly
those that are gender role changing, as well as on the child care index. As explained in chapter 2,
I test this using OLS regression with standard errors clustered by country. The observations are
compressed into 5 year period averages to increase variation on the dependent variables. The
key independent variables are once again women in cabinet, women holding social welfare
portfolios, and women in the legislature. The control variables are, as detailed in chapter 2:
women‘s movements, union density, strikes, welfare regime type (Christian Democratic, Social
Democratic, and Liberal), left government, federalism, European Union membership, and GDP
per capita. The results of the statistical analyses are summarized in Tables 5.5 and 5.6 below.
The Predictors of Child Care Policies
I first determined the influence of female officeholders on the individual policies that
make up the Child Care Index. I estimated six models; each assessed the influence of the three
key explanatory variables on a single child care-related policy. The results are shown in table
5.5, below. Although I expected female ministers to have a significant influence on all policies,
they seem to have little influence on any policy in the group. This would be shocking, if not for
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the fact that it echoes the results found in the previous chapters: female officeholders have had
little influence on gender role changing policies. Child care policies are, by definition, gender
role changing as they explicitly change the locus of care activities to non-maternal caregivers.
Thus, it is not surprising that the primary determinants of public care for children aged 0-6 are
the social democratic welfare regime and GPD per capita. Non-maternal public care is widely
accepted in the SD countries, as shown by the high percentages of children in public care
(Waldfogel, 2001), and all four countries are wealthy enough to shoulder the costs of public
child care. Similarly, it is not surprising that EU membership increases the likelihood that a
country will provide childcare; of the 51 non-EU observations in the study, 42 (82%) do not
include any form of child care. Conversely, of the 53 observations in which the country is an EU
member, 38 (72%) include at least some public care.
[Table 5.5, here]
One of the most intriguing results in these analyses is that union density seems to have a
significant negative influence on the adoption of day care subsidies. This contradicts findings
from Lambert (2008) and Weldon (2010) that indicate labor union strength should have a
positive effect on female-friendly policy. Interestingly, my findings are similar to some findings
in the labor and employment literature, although it should be noted that researchers in this field
have found mixed effects of union activity on childcare policy. For example, Glass & Fujimoto
(1995) found that, the presence of unions, even in predominantly female workplaces, had a
negative influence on the adoption of childcare policies in the US workplace. Bardoel, Moss,
Smyrnios & Tharenou (1999) found little evidence of a positive relationship between union
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presence and employers‘ adoption of child care policies in Australia, while Heywood and Jirjahn
(2009) find that the presence of a works council (an enterprise-level worker‘s representative
council) increases the likelihood that German companies will respond to demand for child care
policies.
A second result that must be noted is the negative effect of women‘s movements on
school age. To interpret this finding, it is important to remember that lower school ages are more
female-friendly. In that context, it is not surprising that strong women‘s movements would work
to lower school ages. That federal countries have a positive influence on school age is driven by
the Swiss school age of 7. Similarly, both CD and SD countries typically have higher school
ages than liberal states; the mean age for each is 5.8, 6.8 and 5.5 respectively. Less explicable,
however, is the negative relationship between continuous school days and left government. A
possible explanation is that of the 42 observations in which there is not a continuous school
day,61 the proportion of left government is higher than the mean in 42 (57%). Of those, there are
13 in which left government has a simple majority and 7 where the proportion of left government
is more than one standard deviation above the mean.62 That all of these countries are CD welfare
states helps to explain the negative effect of the CD regime type on continuous school days.
That there is little commonality of determinants is the most striking result from this group
of analyses. Welfare regime, often thought to be the primary driving force behind social
policies, is an inconsistent predictor of individual child care policies. EU membership, which in
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Five countries: Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Switzerland
Conversely, of the 103 observations in which a continuous school day is present, 74 (72%) lack a left government
with a simple majority. Of those, the proportion of left government is one standard deviation or more below the
mean in 29.
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this project has routinely been a fairly positive indicator of female-friendly policy, does not
predict female-friendliness in four of the six estimations of the determinants of individual
childcare policies. The most consistent pattern is that in none of the analyses do female
officeholders seem to affect the adoption of female-friendly child care policy.63 However, given
that the effects on individual policies can be different than the effects on the overall femalefriendliness of the policy area, it is important to see if this pattern holds in the analyses of child
care policy in general (OECD, 2001).
The Predictors of the Child Care Index
To test the effects of female officeholders on female-friendly child care policy, I
estimated five models assessing the effect of each key explanatory variable independently and in
combination. These results are shown in Table 5.6, below. Model 1 presents the effects of
female cabinet ministers on child care policies; as expected, they have a strong positive effect on
child care policy in general. Model 2 presents the relationship between women in social welfare
portfolios and child care. This analysis indicates that female social welfare ministers do not have
a statistically significant independent influence on the overall adoption of child care- related
policies. Model 3 presents the effect of female legislators on child care policy; like female
social welfare ministers, female legislators seem not to have a significant influence.
[Table 5.6, here]

63

Indeed, I estimated the joint significance of the female officeholders on each policy; in no model was the test
statistic significant.
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In Model 4, I test the effects of both women in cabinet and female legislators on the index. As
hypothesized, when both variables are included in the model, women in cabinet is the stronger
predictor of female-friendly child care policy. However, when all three female officeholder
variables are included in Model 5, none of the three are significant predictors of child care
policy. In fact, a test of joint significance shows that the key explanatory variables do not have a
significant joint effect on the adoption of female-friendly child care policy.64
Turning to the controls, that left cabinet has a significant negative effect in all models is
slightly puzzling. However, closer examination of the data reveals that of the 59 observations in
which the CCI equals or exceeds the mean (1.37), 25 also exceed the left cabinet mean (.37)—10
exceed the left cabinet mean by one standard deviation (.31) or more. This may help explain the
unexpected negative influence of left cabinets. Also confusing is the strong negative influence
of union density in all five models. However, as noted above, the labor and employment
literature is ambivalent, at best, on the effects of labor unions on female-friendly child care
policy. In addition, Morgan and Zippel (2003) note that women within trade unions championed
child care; thus it may be the case that if I were to look at the influence of trade unions with large
proportions of female members, we might see a more positive influence on the adoption of child
care policies. Finally, most observers would likely find it odd that Christian Democratic states
are a significant negative predictor of female-friendly child care policies in comparison with the
liberal reference category. However, this is likely driven by the higher school ages and noncontinuous school days found in many of the CD states.

64

Test statistic=1.28; probability=0.31
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Because the number of observations is relatively small, 104 per model, I also examined
the effect of outliers on the results.65 For each model I computed dfbeta statistics for each
gender indicator, identified and omitted those cases for which the dfbeta was above or below
2/√N (a commonly used standard) and re-ran each model, once for each indicator‗s outliers.
Thus, for example, model five was re-run three times, once removing women in legislature
outliers to examine the effect on the women in legislature indicator, once removing women in
cabinet outliers to examine the effect on the women in cabinets indicator, and so on. Only in
model 5 did the removal of outliers affect a key explanatory variable. In each estimation, the
removal of outliers caused the women in cabinets variable to attain statistical significance.
When considered in conjunction with the statistical significance of female ministers in models 1
and 4, it seems likely that there is an independent effect of female ministers on female-friendly
child care policy.
Conclusion
In previous chapters, the relationship between women in cabinet and female-friendly
policy has been very clear: these women have a strong independent effect on policy. However,
the analyses presented in this chapter are slightly less clear-cut. Here we see that female
ministers have a clear influence on child care policy in two of the three models in which the
variable included, they verge on significance in the third, and when the outliers are removed
from the analysis, women in cabinet have significant influence on the adoption of childcare
policy.

This ambiguity may result from a lack of public demand for expansion in child care

policy.
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See Appendix B, Table 5.7 for results
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Child care policy tends to be gender-role changing, as it—at least for working hours—
ensures that the mother does not have to be the primary care-giver. However, research indicates
that mothers in many countries may not actually want their role to change. For example, in
Abrahamson‘s (2007, p. 201) qualitative study of work reconciliation policies, he found that
where German mothers of small children were actually still working, they felt that the limited
number of hours of non-maternal care was not a problem. Abrahamson reports that according to
the mother, the larger issue was their own working hours. Thus, in this case there seems to be
little demand for longer school hours or continuous school days.
Furthermore, as mentioned in Chapter 3, parents in many countries believe that children
are best cared for by their parents. Valiente (2000, p. 143), reports that in Spain ―societal views
about childrearing emphasize the value of the care provided by mothers and family members and
mistrust public childcare centres for very young children.‖ Indeed, if a Spanish mother must
work when her children are small the typical preference is that children be cared for by a female
relative, usually a grandmother. Del Boca, Locatelli, and Vuri (2004, p. 7) report similar
preferences among Italian parents, noting that parents favor care by relatives as it is the option
that most closely approximates parental care. They find that where a grandmother is in a
position to care for children, Italian mothers are significantly more likely to engage in paid
employment (Daniela Del Boca, et al., 2004, p. 19). Similarly, as noted in Chapter 3, 50% of
French parents in the Fine-Davis et al (2004, p. 14) study believe that parents are the best
caretakers for young children; 32% of respondents felt the mother should be the stay-at-home
caretaker. Finally, in studies of American attitudes toward non-parental child care, Joesch and
Heidemann (2002) show that significant proportion of parents feel that parents should be the
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primary caregivers, while Kuhlthau and Mason (1996) find that the majority of American
mothers believe that parents are the best care takers for their small children. Given these
widespread societal preferences for parental care of small children, the fact that the relationship
between women in cabinet and the adoption of childcare policies is ambiguous is less puzzling.
In essence, it is not that female ministers are not representing the interests of women; it is that
the child care policies measured here do not seem to be of interest to the majority of women.
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Chapter 6: Gender Systems and Support for Women’s Employment
Introduction
In this project, I have argued that in order to better understand the influence of female
officeholders on the adoption of female-friendly policy and the female-friendliness of the labor
market,, we need to measure female-friendly policy holistically. To this end, I created the
Support for Women‘s Employment Index (SWEI); it attempts to measure the overall femalefriendliness of each country‘s package of reconciliation policies. The SWEI includes measures
of family leave policy, working time regulation, and child care policy. As noted in Chapter 2,
given the Chronbach‘s Alpha score of 0.78, I can confidently state that the SWEI does measure a
single underlying structure. However, there is no statistical measure that tests whether or not the
SWEI captures the overall female-friendliness of state policy. To determine how well the index
measures female-friendliness, I first review existing theories of state-gender relations, including
the relationship between gender and welfare state regimes as well as feminist theories of gender
systems. I then compare state SWEI scores with both the welfare state and gender systems
typologies.
In addition to arguing for an index measure of female-friendliness, I have also argued that
female officeholders, particularly female cabinet ministers, are likely to be strong determinants
of female-friendly policy. Indeed, I have found that women, both in cabinet and in legislature,
are strong determinants of family leave and working time, and that they likely influence child
care policy. In this chapter, I also seek to determine whether or not female officeholders are
also key determinants of an overall policy environment that supports women‘s employment. To
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do so, I use regression analysis to test the effects of female officeholders on the overall provision
of female-friendly work-family reconciliation policy.
The Female-Friendliness of the State
The overall female-friendliness of the state has long been a subject of debate in the
gender and welfare state literature (Fraser, 1994; Lewis, 1992, 2006; Lewis, et al., 2008). Much
of the traditional welfare state literature assumes that gender relations are associated with or
explained by the classic welfare state regimes (Esping-Andersen, 1990, 1999, 2002b). For
example, Arts and Gelissen (2002) define the liberal/Anglo-American66 social welfare states,
such as the United Kingdom and Ireland, as those which typically have a relatively high level of
means-tested social welfare coverage (Bambra, 2007). Liberal states are likely to provide
benefits only in the event of a market or familial failure; hence single mothers are the women
most likely to receive benefits in these systems—albeit benefits which are meager and highly
stigmatized. The goal in these states is subsistence, not economic freedom for benefit recipients;
this contributes to comparatively high levels of female and childhood poverty liberal welfare
regimes.
Conservative or Christian Democratic (CD) social welfare states, such as Germany and
Switzerland, have a ―strong link between work position…and social entitlements,‖ and benefits
are proportional to income (Arts & Gelissen, 2002; Bambra, 2007). Because men typically earn
more in the family, and benefits are family-based rather than individually-based, benefits are
typically predicated on the male income level. The state, particularly in continental Europe, also
66

All of the English-speaking advanced industrial democracies are classified as liberal regimes: Australia, Canada,
Ireland, the UK, and the US
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promotes traditional gender roles by providing to use tax benefits and cash transfers to encourage
women to stay at home with their children. The Southern European CD states (e.g. Greece,
Spain, Portugal, Italy) follow a slightly different pattern. Trifiletti (1999, p. 50), argues that this
group employs a the ―tacit and half-hearted‖ approach to family policy. As with their continental
neighbors, the Southern CD states provide little in terms of state services, but they also spend
relatively little on cash transfers to support families (Gauthier, 2005). Esping-Andersen (2002a,
pp. 59-60) notes ―Spain is arguably an excellent illustrative case because it combines very low
female employment, exceptionally undeveloped economic support to families, and fairly high
child poverty rates: in brief, a worst-case benchmark for comparison.‖ In both types of CD
states, however, the end result is that traditional gender roles are typically not challenged;
women are first caregivers, then workers.
Finally, the Social Democratic (SD) welfare states (Denmark, Finland, Norway and
Sweden) are those in which benefits are universal in nature, and there are strong benefits to
offset ―various social risks,‖ including childrearing (Arts & Gelissen, 2002, p. 144; Bambra,
2007). Among the SD welfare states, there are several countries providing paid parental leave of
one to two years after the birth of the first child. The rest have paid maternal/parental leave of at
least 14 to18 weeks where the pay is equal to between 50 and 80 percent of the parent‘s
earnings—they also have widely available public childcare/early education programs and childrelated tax allowances are common (Gauthier, 2005; OECD, 2004). Thus, of the three, the SD
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states are the most likely to challenge the traditional gender division of labor resulting in women
and men who both work and perform care activities.67
To some extent, the argument that welfare regimes explain gender relations can be
substantiated (Sainsbury, 1999). For example, female labor force participation rates are
generally higher in SD and liberal welfare states, while FLP is generally low in CD states
(OECD, 2007c). Birth rates follow a similar pattern—higher in SD and liberal states than in CD
states (WDI, 2010). Indeed, Figure 6.168 shows that states with the same welfare regime type
generally cluster together on the SWEI rankings—the liberal states mostly cluster at the bottom,
while the SD states all cluster at the top.
[Figure 6.1, here]
However, welfare state regimes do not fully explain within-regime variations in the
provision of female-friendly policies, thus welfare regime type does not explain the level of
support for women‘s employment in countries like the UK, Portugal or Switzerland (Sainsbury,
1999). For example, although the US and UK are both typically classified as liberal states, the
UK provides 26 weeks of moderately paid maternity leave; the US provides 12 week of unpaid
family leave. In addition, the US does not specifically provide paternity leave,69 while the UK
provides both paternity leave and incentives for fathers to take leave. Indeed, the UK far
outstrips the not just the US in the provision policies that support women‘s employment, but it
also outstrips the majority of the remaining liberal states.
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Women are still more likely to be caregivers, but this is not a legally institutionalized constraint.
All tables and figures can be found in Appendix B.
69
Although fathers are also allowed to take 12 weeks of family leave, it is not reserved for them.
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In addition, Portugal performs well in comparison with its CD counterparts, while fellow CD
regimes Switzerland and Japan cluster with most of the liberal states at the bottom of the femalefriendly barrel. Feminist scholars argue that the reason that welfare states are not perfect
predictors of support for women‘s employment is that classic conceptions of welfare state
regimes are predicated on male labor patterns—specifically on Esping-Andersen‘s (EspingAndersen, 1990) concept of the decommodification of labor (Crompton, 1999; Lewis, 1992;
Sainsbury, 1999). The concept presumes that labor has first been commodified in order to then
need decommodification; the problem is that the bulk of women‘s labor has traditionally been
non-commodified—thus the SD/CD/Liberal classifications are based on male labor and male life
patterns. Crompton (1999) posits that there are five gender systems that often cross-cut welfare
state regimes: male breadwinner (MBW), dual earner/female part-time carer, dual earner/market
carer, dual earner/state carer, and dual earner/dual carer. These are shown in Figure 6.2.
[Figure 6.2, here]


Male breadwinner (MBW) systems are those in which men are expected to be the
primary wage earners and women are expected to be the primary caregivers, thus state
policies reinforce traditional gender roles and the traditional gender division of labor by
providing care allowances and tax/transfer benefits to stay-at-home mothers.



Dual earner/female part-time carer (PTC) systems are modified male-breadwinner
regimes. Although a woman is typically expected to bring in income, it is secondary to
her male partner‘s income. In addition ‗part time carer‘ can either result from a career
interruption in which the woman takes a break to perform care activities, or from a
woman‘s choice of part-time work in order to be able to also perform care work. In a
PTC system, the state provides little in the way of benefits and/or services; thus, parents
must rely on market solutions for care services. This system, like the MBW system, does
little to change the gender division of labor or promote gender equity.



Dual earner/market carer (MKT) systems encourage women to engage in full-time
employment; however public policy does not support work-family reconciliation.
Working hours are minimally regulated, the state provides few tax or transfer benefits,
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and care services are organized by the market. This can have a bifurcating effect on
equity; women with better educations and resources will be able to better assimilate into
the working world, while women with lower income/education will be more
marginalized. Many in the latter group may well provide the poorly-remunerated
services that allow the former to work.


Dual earner/state carer (SC) regimes encourage the full time employment of women by
state-organized care services. Although the specific goal is to increase equity, the unpaid
gender division of labor may be reproduced in the paid labor force in the dual earner/state
care system. The heavily gender segregated Swedish labor force provides evidence of
this; women tend to be concentrated in public care work, while men are concentrated in
private industry (Esping-Andersen, 2002b).



Dual earner/dual carer (DC) regimes are theoretically the most gender egalitarian,
promoting policies that encourage both parents to engage in equal levels of paid
employment and unpaid domestic/care work.

These gender systems help explain the within-welfare regime variations noted above. I have
categorized each of the countries in the study according to Crompton‘s gender systems
parameters. The systems are ideal types, thus few countries match one system perfectly.
Therefore, I have assigned both primary and secondary gender systems. As shown in Table 6.1,
the states in which market provision of care predominates also have tend to have the lowest
levels of support for women‘s employment; here you can clearly see that Switzerland‘s gender
system more clearly explains its low level of female-friendliness than does its welfare regime.
The MBW systems with secondary PTC systems fall in the lower-middle range of support for
women‘s employment; these countries tend to be CD regimes.
In contrast, countries which combine PTC system with increased state care tend to score
towards the higher end of the scale. In this upper-middle range, particularly, we see countries
whose level of support for women‘s employment is better explained by their gender systems;
these include the UK, Portugal, and The Netherlands. Finally, the SC countries that have
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incorporated elements of the DC model rank highest in terms of support for women‘s
employment; this also corresponds to the SD welfare regime type. The general fit between the
countries‘ SWEI scores, welfare regimes, and gender systems suggests that the SWEI is a good
measure of the overall female-friendliness of state reconciliation policy. This further indicates
that the SWEI provides an appropriate measure with which to test the influence of female
officeholders on the adoption of female-friendly policy.
Analyses
Analysis of family leave, working time and childcare policy has shown that female
officeholders have varying levels of influence on female-friendly policy. However, it remains to
be seen whether or not they help to create a more female-friendly society; I expect that they do.
As explained in chapter 2, I test this using OLS regression with standard errors clustered by
country. The observations are compressed into 5 year period averages to increase variation on
the dependent variables. The key independent variables are once again women in cabinet,
women holding social welfare portfolios, and women in the legislature. The control variables
are, as detailed in chapter 2: women‘s movements, union density, strikes, welfare regime type
(Christian Democratic, Social Democratic, and Liberal), left government, federalism, European
Union membership, and GDP per capita.
The Predictors of Support for Women’s Employment
To determine the influence of female officeholders on policies that support female
employment I estimated five models. Each assessed the influence of the three key explanatory
variables on the Support for Women‘s Employment Index. The results are presented in Table
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6.2. Model 1 presents the effects of female ministers on the female-friendliness of a broad range
of work-life reconciliation policies; as expected, their influence is significant and positive.
Model 2 presents the relationship between female social welfare ministers and the adoption of
policies that promote female employment. These women seem to have little independent effect
on such policies. Model 3 indicates that female legislators are significant and positive predictors
of female-friendly reconciliation policy.
[Table 6.2, here]
In Model 4, I test the effects of both women in cabinet and female legislators on the
index. As hypothesized, when both variables are included in the model, women in cabinet are
the stronger predictor of female-friendly child care policy. In fact, despite their strong positive
impact in Model 3, women in legislature lose significance in Model 4; thus I tested the joint
significance of women in cabinet and legislature. The test statistic (5.83) is significant at the
99% confidence level; this indicates that women in cabinet are better able to pursue a femalefriendly agenda when there are higher proportions of women in the legislature. When all three
female officeholder variables are included in Model 5, women in cabinet are again a significant
and positive determinant of female friendly policy; however, female legislators and social
welfare ministers seem to have little independent influence. Given the significance of female
ministers in Model 3, and their joint significance with women in cabinet in Model 4, I again test
for joint significance. Female ministers and legislators again prove to be jointly significant at the
95% confidence level.70

70

Test statistic=5.94; Probability = 0.01
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Turning to the control variables, it is unsurprising that EU membership is a significant
and positive determinant of female friendly policy in every model. The EU has taken several
steps to address female-friendly reconciliation policy, including EU directives on part time work,
parental/family leave, and working time (EU, 2007c; Eurofound, 2009; Gornick & Meyers,
2003). What is surprising is that very few other control variables seem to have independent
effects on the adoption of female-friendly reconciliation policy. In Model 3, we see that GDP
per capita and the SD welfare regime are significant; however these results are not repeated in
the other four models.
Given the relatively small number of observations, 104 per model, I also examined the
effect of outliers on the results.71 For each model I computed dfbeta statistics for each gender
indicator, identified and omitted those cases for which the dfbeta was above or below 2/√N (a
commonly used standard) and re-estimated each model, once for each indicator‗s outliers. Thus,
for example, model five was estimated three times, once removing women in legislature outliers
to examine the effect on the women in legislature indicator, once removing women in cabinet
outliers to examine the effect on the women in cabinets indicator, and so on. Only in Model 2 did
the removal of outliers affect a key explanatory variable. The removal of nine female social
welfare minister outliers caused the female social welfare minister variable to attain statistical
significance. The remaining results are remarkably consistent with the original analyses; we see
changes in only models 4b and 5b. The removal of six outliers causes the SD and CD welfare
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See Appendix B, Table 6.3 for results
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regimes to attain significance in Model 4b, while the removal of eight outliers causes GDP per
capita and the CD welfare regime to attain significance in Model 5b.72
Conclusion
This chapter addressed two primary questions. First, it was important to determine
whether or not the Support for Women‘s Employment Index is an appropriate and valid measure
of the overall female-friendliness of a state‘s package of reconciliation policies. The comparison
of levels of support for women‘s employment, welfare state regimes, and gender systems
determined that the SWEI lines up well with both the classic welfare state explanations of stategender relations and the feminist gender systems explanations of state-gender relations. This
determination helped to analyze the second question: do female officeholders influence the
overall female-friendliness of state policy? The results presented here indicate that female
ministers do indeed have a significant independent effect on the adoption of female-friendly
policy. The analyses further indicate that higher proportions of female legislators may increase
the efficacy of female representation at the cabinet level.
Analysis of other factors indicates that the influence of a supra-national body with a
female-friendly agenda may also be helpful to the adoption of female-friendly policy, while
many of the common explanations for the adoption of social policy (e.g. women‘s movement,
union activity, and left government) do not seem to have strong independent effects on femalefriendly reconciliation policy. These results are important for helping to understand the
conditions under which female-friendly legislation is most likely to be adopted. They are useful
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In both models, the female cabinet minister outliers were removed.
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for evaluation of the efficacy of gendered representation, and they provide considerable support
for the argument that higher proportions of women in office are necessary in order for women‘s
policy demands to be met. In short, these results support the argument that descriptive
representation leads to substantive representation. This is particularly important given the
current climate, wherein low fertility and rapidly aging populations are causing many countries
to adopt work-life reconciliation policies. The research presented here indicates that the
presence of female policymakers will help to increase the female-friendliness of the policies
adopted, while the policies adopted by male dominated bodies may be less female-friendly.
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Chapter 7: Conclusion
Introduction
As a result of aging populations and historically low birthrates, women‘s participation in
the labor market has become an issue of prime importance to governments in most of the
advanced industrial democracies. Many governments have begun to promote policies that help
women reconcile childrearing and paid employment; the hope is that this will encourage women
to participate in the labor market, thus increasing the number of people contributing to welfare
state funding, and to bear children, thus increasing birthrates. Despite increased national and
supranational focus on work-life reconciliation, as well as increased focus on whether or not
these policies increase female labor force participation (FLP) and total fertility rate (TFR),
research on the adoption of reconciliation policy has been limited (Daniela Del Boca, Pasqua, &
Pronzato, 2005; EU, 2006; Gauthier, 2005, 2007; Hyatt & Milne, 1991; OECD, 2002a). The
research on gender and policy adoption indicates that union activity, women‘s movements,
women in legislature, or a combination of these are key determinants of the adoption of policy
that helps women work and care for their families (Kittilson, 2008; Lambert, 2008; SchwindtBayer & Mishler, 2005; Weldon, 2010).
In this study, I argue that this research has two main flaws. First, researchers have, by
and large, ignored the influence of the cabinet. The majority of advanced industrial democracies
are parliamentary systems in which the cabinet has considerable control over the policy
process—from origination to implementation. I hypothesize that women in cabinet, particularly
women who hold social welfare portfolios, are likely to have considerable influence over the
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adoption of female-friendly reconciliation policy. Thus, when a study omits women in cabinet
from the analysis, the results may overstate the influence of women in legislature, women‘s
movements, or labor unions. To address this issue, I have introduced an original dataset that
measures the presence of women in cabinet; I measure both the number of women in cabinet and
the number who hold social welfare related portfolios.
The second issue is that most studies analyze a single policy (e.g. maternity leave) and
base their conclusions about the adoption of female-friendly policy on those results. However,
there is evidence that women are likely to have varying levels of influence on different policy
areas (e.g. Sanbonmatsu, 2003). Thus, though these studies provide insight into the adoption of a
specific policy, it is likely that they do not give generalizable insight into the determinants of
female-friendly policy more broadly. I address this issue by introducing the Support for
Women‘s Employment Index (SWEI), a composite measure of female-friendly reconciliation
policy. This additive index includes 19 individual policies from three policy areas: family leave,
working time, and child care. I use multivariate statistical analysis to test the determinants of
each policy, policy area, and the overall level of support for women‘s employment. In this
chapter, I briefly review the findings from these analyses. I then highlight the implications of
this research, and conclude with a discussion of future directions for research on gender and
public policy.
A Review of the Findings
There are three main groups of findings in this study: individual policies, policy areas
(e.g. family leave), and overall support for women‘s employment. Analysis of specific
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reconciliation policies provides considerable support for the argument that female officeholders
are likely to have varying levels of influence on different policies. Indeed, female ministers are a
significant predictor of only a handful of the individual policies included in the SWEI: weeks of
maternity leave, weeks of childcare leave, and average working hours.73 Furthermore, female
ministers and legislators are only jointly significant in the analysis of incentives for fathers to
take family leave. If I were generalizing based on the results of individual policy areas, then, it
would seem that female officeholders have very little influence on the adoption of femalefriendly reconciliation policy.
However, analysis of the determinants of a range of female-friendly reconciliation
policies provides a very different picture. I include of a variety of potential determinants of
female-friendly policy in my analyses of family leave, working time, and child care policy; these
include women‘s movements, left government, and welfare state regime. These are commonly
assumed to be predictors of female-friendly policy; however in these analyses, shown together in
Table 7.1,74 they appear to have little independent effect. I also include women in legislature,
another variable strongly argued to be a determinant of female friendly policy; these women
seem to have an effect, but only in conjunction with women in cabinet. Thus higher proportions
of women in legislature are likely helpful to the adoption of female-friendly policy, but have less
effect on their own.
[Table 7.1, here]
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In this analysis, higher proportions of women in cabinet are associated with higher average working hours, while
female ministers holding social welfare portfolios are associated with shorter average working hours.
74
All tables and figures can be found in Appendix B.
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Higher proportions of women in cabinet clearly improve the female-friendliness of
family leave and working time. While their independent effect on childcare policy is less clearcut, women in cabinet—when working in conjunction with female legislators—do have a strong
effect on the provision of childcare policies that benefit women. Furthermore, higher
proportions of women in cabinet are strong predictors of the level of support a country provides
to working mothers. Thus, it appears that women in cabinet, more so than women‘s movements
or legislators, are key determinants of the female-friendliness of reconciliation policies.
At its core, the Support for Women‘s Employment Index is an attempt to measure the
female-friendliness of the state, at least as far as work-life reconciliation policy is concerned.
Thus it is important to compare the SWEI with common explanations for state-gender relations,
such as welfare regime and gender systems, to determine how well the SWEI captures countries‘
levels of female-friendliness. I do so, and find that countries‘ SWEI scores generally cluster
along welfare regime lines, with many of the liberal states at the bottom of the scale and the SD
states at the top. While the fit between SWEI and regime type is fairly good, there are a few
prominent examples (e.g. the UK and Portugal) in which a country‘s level of support for
women‘s employment cannot be explained by its welfare regime type. The parallels between the
countries‘ SWEI scores and Crompton‘s (1999) gender systems typology75 help to bridge this
gap.
At the top of the rankings, we have countries in which public policy supports a dualearner family by providing higher levels of state care; at the low end of the rankings, we have
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Male breadwinner, dual-earner/female part-time carer; dual-earner/market carer; dual-earner/state carer; dualearner/dual-carer; see Chapter 5 or Crompton (1999) for more detail.
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countries in which the dual-earner family predominates but it is left to families to find marketbased care solutions. In the lower-middle range, countries which promote male-earners and
female-carers predominate; while the upper-middle is mainly comprised of countries which are
moving towards expanded levels of state care. Given the general fit between the SWEI and both
welfare regime and gender systems explanations of gender-state relations, I find that the SWEI is
an appropriate measure of the overall female-friendliness of work-life reconciliation policy.
The Implications
One of the most intriguing implications in this study comes from the analysis of
individual reconciliation policies. As Beckwith and Cowell-Meyers (2007, p. 555) point out,
―much [of the] research on women‘s policy issues conflates women‘s policy with feminist
policy.‖ Given that I define female-friendly policy as policies that ―specifically address both
discrimination and socio-economic loss by attempting to ensure that a woman‘s career is not
harmed when she temporarily leaves the workforce for childbearing or when she must take time
away from work for child care activities,‖ I have certainly followed suit. The analysis of
individual policies does reveal that female ministers and legislators have a jointly significant
influence on the adoptions of incentives for fathers to take family leave; this is certainly a
feminist/gender-role changing policy, as it encourages men to do more care work.
However, the two individual policies on which female officeholders have the greatest
independent effect are two of the least feminist policies included in the study: maternity and
child care leave. Indeed, feminist groups have often opposed expansions of maternity and child
care leave, as they reinforce the traditional role of women as primary caregivers (Gelb & Palley,
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1996). In spite of this, female ministers seem to have a strong influence on policies that lengthen
maternity and child care leaves. I have posited that this is likely a result of demand; constituents
have expressed their desire for longer leave periods, but not for policies that do more to change
traditional gender roles. Thus, these analyses may imply that, in the minds of female
officeholders and female voters, a female-friendly policy does not necessarily equate to a genderrole changing policy.
Indeed, the analysis of the influence of female officeholders on the overall adoption of
child care policy reinforces this idea. Policies that expand public provision of child care are
gender-role changing, as they ensure that the mother is not the primary caregiver during the work
day. However, the analyses presented in Chapter 5 indicate that the link between female
representation and child care policy is less clear-cut than the link between female representation
and family leave. I argue that this, too, is likely the result of a lack of demand for gender-role
changing policies; there is considerable evidence that, at least as far as care for small children is
concerned, women may not want their roles as primary caregivers to change. This further implies
that when we are studying substantive representation—how well a representative translates her
constituency‘s demands into policy—we must clearly define the constituents‘ demands. More
simply put, if women are not demanding expansion of child care, then we should not expect that
female officeholders will have much influence on child care policy.
The final implications from this study come from analysis of countries‘ levels of support
for women‘s employment. Despite the lack of findings in the analyses of individual policies, the
show a clear and positive relationship between female ministers and the overall level of support a
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country provides for women‘s participation in the labor market. This indicates that women are
able to influence the general policy environment in ways that they may not be able to (or
interested in) with individual policies. This provides considerable support for my argument that
women‘s influence on individual policies does not necessarily predict their influence on the
female-friendliness of state policies in general. This indicates that the index measure approach
may provide more insight into substantive representation than does single-policy analysis.

Directions for Future Research
Stripped to its essence, the central question posed in this study is whether or not female
cabinet ministers matter in the adoption of female-friendly social policy. The analyses
determined that they do indeed; however, this has led to new questions and possible avenues for
future research. First, my analyses indicate that higher proportions of women in cabinet are
likely to improve the female-friendliness of reconciliation policy. It is likely that this is the case
with other policies that are of particular interest to women, such as equal pay and antidiscrimination policy; the caveat is that female ministers are likely to be of assistance in the
adoption of these policies only if there is demand for them.
Second, the analysis reveals that while female legislators seem to have little independent
effect on the adoption of female-friendly policy, they do have an effect in conjunction with
female ministers. This indicates that they are not strictly necessary to the process, but are helpful
in the adoption of female-friendly policy. It is imperative to better understand the relationship
between female ministers and female legislators; how do the two work together to increase the
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female-friendliness of state policy? This is a question that I plan to address with a qualitative
study of the adoption of female-friendly policy.
Third, I have not addressed women‘s policy machineries in this study. Women‘s policy
machineries are government institutions (e.g. bureaus, commissions, ministries) that are designed
to address women‘s equality issues. Weldon (2002), for example, finds that women‘s policy
machineries have significant influence on the adoption of policies that address violence against
women. Do these policy machineries have similar influence on work-like reconciliation
policies?
Fourth, the analysis revealed that EU membership is a strong positive predictor of the
female-friendliness of reconciliation policy. The EU has been quite outspoken in its advocacy of
family leave and working time policies that benefit women; it would be interesting to determine
the origins of the EU‘s position. Is the influence of women in the European Commission, or in
the European Parliament? Is it the influence of particular countries? Finland and Sweden, for
example are commonly credited with the inclusion of stronger equality policies in the Treaty of
Amsterdam (Stratigaki, 2000).
Finally, cabinet ministers are responsible not only for the adoption of policies, but also
for administering the bureaucracies that implement them. Studies of bureaucratic representation
suggest that given discretion in implementation, female and minority bureaucrats may be able to
exert an influence on the implementation of policies that reflect their groups‘ policy agendas
(Dolan, 2000; Riccucci & Meyers, 2004; Wilkins & Keiser, 2006). Does this also hold true at
the administrative level—do female ministers increase the female-friendliness of policies by
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influencing the implementation process or increasing street-level bureaucrats‘ level of
discretion?
Conclusion
In this study, I have shown that increased state support for women‘s employment can, in
large part, be attributed to the increased presence of women in cabinet. My analysis suggests
that research which analyzes cabinet influence will provide new insight into policymaking in
advanced industrial democracies. It indicates that when the cabinet is not included in the
analysis of policy adoption, the results may be of limited utility. If sound, this analysis further
suggests that increasing the presence of underserved groups in the executive is likely to ensure
that those groups are better represented in the policy process.

To ensure that their issues are

included in the policy agenda, activists should target the people and institutions that have the
most influence: the cabinet. Thus, this study of female-friendly policy provides many new
directions for research, as well as evidence that practitioners may be better able to influence
policy if they focus their efforts on cabinet ministers.
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1.
2.
3.

4.
5.
6.
7.

8.

The Family Leave Index
Sources
(Gauthier & Bortnik, 2001), (Deven & Moss,
2005)
Maternity leave benefit
(Gauthier & Bortnik, 2001), (Deven & Moss,
2005)
Job Protection (Pregnancy (ILO, 1952, 2008, 2010a); (Neal, 1984);
& Maternity)
(Department of Justice, 1977; 1985); (Federal
Ministry of Economics and Labour (BMWA).
2008); (ILO, 2008); (G. James, 2004); ("Federal
Act on Gender Equality (Gender Equality Act,
GEA)," 1995); (Socrates Program., 1999);
(Edwards, 1992); (Human Rights Commission.,
2002); (Karamessini, 2003); (Government of
Portugal., 1999)
Childcare leave
(Gauthier & Bortnik, 2001), (Deven & Moss,
2005)
Childcare leave benefit
(Gauthier & Bortnik, 2001); (Deven & Moss,
2002, 2005);
Paid paternity leave
("Paternity Leave/International Comparisons,"
2008), (EU, 2007d), (Denmark, 1990);
Incentives for Fathers
(Drew, 2005); (Deven & Moss, 2002, 2005);
(Gauthier, 2003; Gauthier & Bortnik, 2001);
(Kamerman & Kahn, 1991)
Some paid leave after 3rd
(Deven & Moss, 2002, 2005); (Drew, 2005;
birthday
Gauthier, 2003; Gauthier & Bortnik, 2001);
(Kamerman & Kahn, 1991); (Plantenga & Seigel,
2004a, 2004b); (Trentini & Lombardini, 1999);
(Department of Labour (NZ), 2007); (Hyde &
Essex, 1991)
Variable
Maternity leave

133

1.
2.

3.

4.
5.

76

The Working Time Index
Variable
Source
Average Working Hours, (ILO, 2007); (OECD, 2010)
per Week76
Vacation Time
(ILO, 2010a); (Lombard, 1995); (ILO, 1995);
(Carley, 2000); (Blyton, 1985); (EU, 2008;
Madsen, 2000a, 2000b)
Regulation of weekly
("Federal Act on Arrangement of Hours of Work,"
hours
1969); (Gornick & Meyers, 2003); (Madsen,
2000a, 2000b); (Esping-Andersen & Regini, 2000;
Grubb & Wells, 1993; McCann, 2005); (Crépon &
Kramarz, 2002); (Lee, McCann, Messenger, &
ILO, 2007)
Protections for part time (ILO, 2010a); (ILO, 2010b); (ILO, 1989);
work
Gendered regulation of
(ILO, 2010a); (McCann, 2005); (ILO, 2001);
non-standard working
(Grubb & Wells, 1993)
hours

All data are ―hours worked, manufacturing‖ unless otherwise noted here: Canada , Germany , Greece, Ireland,
Netherlands, US – hours paid (manufacturing);
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1.

2.

3.

4.

Child Care Index
Sources
(EU, 2008/09a, 2008/09b, 2008/09c, 2008/09d,
2008/09e, 2008/09f, 2008/09g, 2008/09h,
2008/09i, 2008/09j, 2008/09k, 2008/09l,
2008/09m, 2008/09n, 2008/09o, 2008/09p); (Child
Policy International., 2008)
Daycare benefit (tax or
("A New Tax System (Family Assistance) Act
transfer)
1999," 1999); ("Mutual Information System on
Social Protection in the EU member States and the
EEA," 1998-2007); (Child Policy International.,
2008); (The Norwegian Ministry of Children and
Family Affairs 1998); (Blundell, Duncan, McCrae,
& Meghir, 1999); (Averett, Peters, & Waldman,
1997)
Continuous school day
(EU, 2008/09a, 2008/09b, 2008/09c, 2008/09d,
2008/09e, 2008/09f, 2008/09g, 2008/09h,
2008/09i, 2008/09j, 2008/09k, 2008/09l,
2008/09m, 2008/09n, 2008/09o, 2008/09p);
(Androwski, 2010)
School age
(World Bank, 2009); (EU, 2008/09a, 2008/09b,
2008/09c, 2008/09d, 2008/09e, 2008/09f,
2008/09g, 2008/09h, 2008/09i, 2008/09j,
2008/09k, 2008/09l, 2008/09m, 2008/09n,
2008/09o, 2008/09p)
Variable
Guaranteed public
daycare
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1 Chapter 1
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Figure 1.1: Proportion of Female Cabinet Ministers in Advanced Industrial Democracies
Source: Europa World Yearbook (Europa Publications Limited., 1981-2006)
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Figure 1.2: Proportions of Female S.W. Ministers in Advanced Industrial Democracies
Source: Europa World Yearbook (Europa Publications Limited., 1981-2006)
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2 Chapter 2
Table 2.1: The Family Leave Index
The Family Leave Index
Variable
Measurement
1.
Maternity leave
Number of weeks of maternity leave
2.
Maternity leave benefit
The level of wage replacement for leave
(unpaid=0, 1-33%=1, 34-67%=2, 68-100%=3)
3.
Job Protection (Pregnancy A binary measure of the existence of job
& Maternity)
protections for pregnancy and/or use of family
leave (yes=1; no=0)
4.
Childcare leave
Number of weeks of childcare leave
5.
Childcare leave benefit
The level of payment for leave (unpaid=0, flat
rate=1, percent unemployment insurance=2,
percent of wages=377)
6.
Paid paternity leave
A binary measure of the existence of paid
paternity leave (yes=1; no=0)
7.
Paternity leave benefit
The level of payment for leave (unpaid=0, flat
rate=1, percent unemployment insurance=2,
percent of wages=3)
8.
Incentives for Fathers
A binary measure of the existence of incentives
for fathers to take leave (yes=1; no=0)
9.
Some paid leave after 3rd
A binary measure of the existence of at least some
birthday
paid leave after the child reaches age 3 (yes=1;
no=0)
Sources: See Appendix A

77

There is variation among countries with regard to the percentage of wages replaced. Thus, rather than equally
weighting a wage replacement program that pays 30% of wages with one that pays 90%, I add the proportion paid to
the level of payment—thus, the wage replacement levels would be 3.3 and 3.9 respectively.
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Table 2.2: Working Time Index
The Working Time Index
Variable
Measurement
1.
Average Working Hours, The average number of hours worked per week
per Week
2.
Vacation Time
The minimum number of weeks of vacation
provided by law
3.
Regulation of weekly
A bivariate measure of whether or not maximum
hours
weekly hours are regulated by statute (yes=1;
no=0)
4.
Protections for part time A bivariate measure of whether or not part time
work
work is protected by statute (yes=1; no=0)
5.
Gendered regulation of
A bivariate measure of whether or not women are
non-standard working
denied access to non-standard working hours
hours
(yes=0; no=1)
Sources: See Appendix A

Table 2.3: Child Care Index
Child Care Index
Measurement
1.
A measure of a country‘s guarantee of public care
for children prior to pre-school (children aged 06=1; children aged 3-6=0.5; no guaranteed
placement=0)
2.
Daycare benefit (tax or
A measure of whether or not parents receive
transfer)
benefits to offset daycare costs (yes=1; no=0,
means tested=0.5)
3.
Continuous school day
A measure of whether or not the school day
contains a midday gap (yes=1; no=0,
sometimes=0.5)
4.
School age
Age at which children must begin primary
education
Sources: See Appendix A
Variable
Guaranteed public
daycare
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Table 2.4: Chronabach’s Alpha Scale Reliability Coefficients
Index Measure

Alpha Score

Family Leave Index
Working Time Index
Child Care Index
Support for Women‘s Employment Index

0.76
0.63
0.41
0.78

Theoretical
Min | Max
0|9
0|5
0|4
0 | 17

Actual
Min | Max78
0 | 6.5
0.81 | 4.2
0 | 3.14
2.29 | 12.64

Support for Women's Employment Index
1970 & 2005
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0

1970

2005

Figure 2.1: Support for Women's Employment Index Scores, 1970 & 2005
Sources: Various (See Appendix A)
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Minimum | Maximum Countries
FLI: Australia (1970-79), New Zealand (1970-84), US (1970-74) | Italy (2000-05))
WTI: Germany (1970-74) | UK (2000-05)
CCI: Switzerland (1990-94) | Finland (1995-99)
SWEI: US (1970-74) | Norway (2000-05)
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3 Chapter 3
Table 3.1: Maternity Leave Policies
Country
Australia

Maternity Leave Policy - 2005
Weeks
Pay Level79
0
No Pay

Year Maternity-Related
Job Protection Adopted
1984

Austria

16

High

1979

Belgium

15

High

1971

Canada

17

Medium

1977

Denmark

18

Medium

1978

Finland

43.5

High

1986

France

16

High

1982

Germany

14

High

1952

Greece

17

High

2003

Ireland

22

High

1994

Italy

21.5

High

1966

Japan

14

No Pay

1986

Netherlands

16

High

1980

New Zealand

0

No Pay

1987

Norway

42

High

1979

Portugal

20

High

1995

Spain

16

High

1980

Sweden

68.5

Medium

1945

Switzerland

16

No Pay

1995

UK

26

Medium

1975

US

0

No Pay

1978

Source: See Appendix A

79

Maternity Leave Pay Levels – No Pay (0% wage replacement), Low (1-33% wage replacement), Medium (3467% wage replacement); High (68-100% wage replacement).
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Table 3.2: Leave Policies for Fathers
Year of Policy Adoption
Paternity Leave

Father Incentives80

0

0

Austria

1990

1997

Belgium

1978

1998

Canada

0

0

Denmark

1984

1998

Finland

1978

2004

France

2002

0

0

0

Greece

1992

1999

Ireland

1994

0

Italy

1997

2000

Japan

0

0

Netherlands

2001

1998

New Zealand

0

0

Norway

1978

1991

Portugal

2000

1999

Spain

1999

0

pre-1970

1994

0

0

UK

2003

1998

US

0

0

Country
Australia

Germany

Sweden
Switzerland

Source: See Appendix A

80

Note that these are incentives for fathers to take parental or child care leave and are typically unrelated to paternity
leave.
143

Table 3.3: Child Care Leave Policies
Country

Original Policy
Adopted
Weeks

Weeks

2005 Policy
Type of
Pay
0

Australia

1993

52

Type of
Pay81
0

Austria

1961

52

%UI

104

FR

Yes

Belgium

1985

52

FR

52

FR

Yes

Canada

1990

10

%E (60)

36.5

%E (70)

No

Denmark

1992

52

%UI

32

%E (50)

Yes

Finland

1985

156

FR

156

FR

No

83

52

Leave
Post 382
No

France

1977

104

0

156

FR

No

Germany

1985

43

FR

156

FR

Yes

Greece

1984

26

0

26

0

No

Ireland

1998

28

0

28

0

No

Italy

1973

26

%E (30)

46

%E (30)

Yes

Japan

1992

52

0

52

0

No

Netherlands

1990

52

0

52

0

Yes

New Zealand

1987

52

0

56

0

No

Norway

1978

52

084

106

FR

No

Portugal

1984

104

0

104

0

No

Spain

1980

156

0

156

0

No

Sweden

1978

78

0

78

0

Yes

-

0

0

0

0

No

UK

1999

26

0

12

0

No

US

1993

12

0

12

0

No

Switzerland

Source: See Appendix A

81

%UI – percent of unemployment insurance; %E –percent of earnings, actual percentage in parentheses; FR – flat
rate; 0 – unpaid.
82
Year adopted: Austria, 2005; Belgium, 1985; Denmark, 2004; Germany, 2003; Italy, 2000; The Netherlands,
2002; Norway, 1988.
83
France added flat rate pay in 1985.
84
Norway added flat rate pay in 1998.
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Table 3.4: Family Leave Variables
Family Leave Variables
Variable
Measurement
1.
Maternity leave
Number of weeks of
maternity leave
2.
Maternity leave benefit
The level of wage
replacement for leave
(unpaid=0, 1-33%=1, 3467%=2, 68-100%=3)
3.
Job Protection (Pregnancy A binary measure of the
& Maternity)
existence of job
protections for pregnancy
and/or use of family leave
(yes=1; no=0)
4.
Childcare leave
Number of weeks of
childcare leave
5.
Childcare leave benefit
The level of payment for
leave (unpaid=0, flat
rate=1, percent
unemployment
insurance=2, percent of
wages=385)
6.
Paid paternity leave
A binary measure of the
existence of paid paternity
leave (yes=1; no=0)
7.
Incentives for Fathers
A binary measure of the
existence of incentives for
fathers to take leave
(yes=1; no=0)
8.
Some paid leave after 3rd
A binary measure of the
birthday
existence of at least some
paid leave after the child
reaches age 3 (yes=1;
no=0)
Source: See Appendix A

85

Gender Role Changing?
N

N

N

N

N

Y

Y

N

There is variation among countries with regard to the percentage of wages replaced. Thus, rather than equally
weighting a wage replacement program that pays 30% of wages with one that pays 90%, I add the proportion paid to
the level of payment—thus, the wage replacement levels would be 3.3 and 3.9 respectively.
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Table 3.5: OLS Regression Results, by Individual Family Leave Policy
ML
Weeks
Female Cabinet Ministers
Female Social Welfare Ministers
Female Legislators
Women‘s Movements
Left Government
Strikes
Union Density
GDP per Capita
Federal
European Union Membership
CD Welfare State
SD Welfare State
Constant

Observations
Adj. R-squared

61.78*
(29.35)
-1.04
(4.79)
-11.51
(19.39)
-7.39**
(2.76)
-4.97*
(2.85)
0.00
(0.00)
7.59
(8.02)
-0.00
(0.00)
-1.24
(3.02)
6.68
(4.15)
-0.49
(3.52)
10.36
(8.33)
9.77
(6.40)

ML
Pay

Job
Protection

CC
Weeks

CC
Pay

Leave
Post-3

Paternity
Leave

Father
Incentives

3.92
(2.30)
0.39
(0.43)
-1.66
(2.30)
0.26
(0.25)
-0.72*
(0.40)
-0.00
(0.00)
0.63
(0.87)
-0.00
(0.00)
-0.19
(0.33)
0.98***
(0.29)
1.19***
(0.35)
1.15**
(0.45)
0.70
(0.59)

0.85
(1.20)
-0.00
(0.25)
0.03
(1.12)
-0.07
(0.11)
0.03
(0.15)
-0.00
(0.00)
0.25
(0.36)
0.00**
(0.00)
-0.08
(0.09)
0.27**
(0.10)
-0.20
(0.13)
-0.46***
(0.15)
0.49*
(0.25)

270.63**
(120.91)
35.45
(21.25)
-19.98
(129.58)
-31.58**
(14.35)
16.15
(20.18)
0.00
(0.00)
-82.69
(49.43)
-0.00
(0.00)
-8.93
(8.96)
16.98
(12.60)
9.54
(18.79)
-12.97
(23.47)
39.02
(36.70)

-0.85
(2.10)
0.39
(0.50)
1.10
(2.22)
0.02
(0.31)
-0.45
(0.37)
0.00*
(0.00)
1.38
(0.80)
0.00
(0.00)
0.51**
(0.20)
0.63**
(0.29)
0.49
(0.45)
0.14
(0.49)
-1.49*
(0.72)

0.65
(0.90)
-0.22
(0.17)
-0.59
(0.47)
0.06
(0.10)
0.07
(0.07)
0.00
(0.00)
0.44
(0.26)
0.00
(0.00)
0.16**
(0.08)
0.21*
(0.11)
0.18
(0.11)
0.21
(0.15)
-0.53**
(0.25)

0.44
(0.66)
-0.05
(0.16)
0.32
(0.97)
0.01
(0.13)
-0.13
(0.09)
0.00
(0.00)
1.22***
(0.30)
0.00
(0.00)
0.07
(0.09)
0.24*
(0.14)
0.25
(0.15)
0.29
(0.25)
-0.73**
(0.28)

0.80
(0.47)
-0.35**
(0.13)
0.57
(0.49)
0.06
(0.06)
0.11
(0.08)
0.00*
(0.00)
-0.10
(0.20)
0.00*
(0.00)
0.08
(0.05)
0.12**
(0.05)
0.03
(0.08)
0.11
(0.12)
-0.34*
(0.16)

104

104

104

104

104

104

104

104

0.66

0.58

0.36

0.52

0.12

0.23

0.52

0.35

Two-tailed test. Clustered standard errors in parentheses; * p<=0.1, ** p<=0.05, *** p<=0.01
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Table 3.6: OLS Regression Results, Family Leave Index
Model 1
Female Cabinet Ministers

Model 2

6.10**
(2.61)

Female Social Welfare Ministers

Left Government
Strikes
Union Density
GDP per Capita
Federal
European Union Membership
CD Welfare State
SD Welfare State
Constant

Model 4

6.28**
(2.93)
0.62
(0.53)

Female Legislators
Women‘s Movements

Model 3

-0.15
(0.43)
-0.26
(0.37)
0.00
(0.00)
1.95*
(1.12)
0.00
(0.00)
0.21
(0.27)
1.54***
(0.42)
0.83
(0.58)
0.60
(0.65)
-0.89
(1.00)

-0.17
(0.45)
0.13
(0.36)
0.00
(0.00)
2.01*
(0.96)
0.00**
(0.00)
0.24
(0.29)
1.74***
(0.48)
0.67
(0.59)
1.09
(0.72)
-1.00
(0.90)

4.39
(2.84)
-0.13
(0.48)
0.08
(0.37)
0.00
(0.00)
1.72
(1.09)
0.00*
(0.00)
0.31
(0.27)
1.63***
(0.50)
0.65
(0.62)
0.67
(0.73)
-1.01
(0.92)

-0.29
(2.76)
-0.15
(0.44)
-0.26
(0.37)
0.00
(0.00)
1.97
(1.16)
0.00
(0.00)
0.21
(0.27)
1.54***
(0.44)
0.84
(0.56)
0.62
(0.68)
-0.89
(1.01)

Model 5

6.46**
(2.94)
-0.17
(0.46)
-0.22
(2.76)
-0.16
(0.44)
-0.25
(0.37)
0.00
(0.00)
1.96
(1.16)
0.00
(0.00)
0.23
(0.29)
1.55***
(0.43)
0.84
(0.56)
0.64
(0.68)
-0.89
(1.01)

Observations
104
104
104
104
104
Adj. R-squared
0.64
0.59
0.61
0.64
0.63
Two-tailed test. Clustered standard errors in parentheses; * p<=0.1, ** p<=0.05, *** p<=0.01
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Family Leave Index, 1970 & 2005
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0

Family Leave Index 1970

Australia
Austria
Belgium
Canada
Denmark
Finland
France
Germany
Greece
Ireland
Italy
Japan
Netherlands
New Zealand
Norway
Portugal
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
UK
US

Family Leave Index 2005

Figure 3.1: Leave Index Scores, 1970 & 2005
Source: See Appendix A
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Table 3.7: OLS Regression Results, Family Leave Index Outlier Testing
Model
1
Female Cabinet Ministers

7.52**
(2.72)

Observations
R-squared

9686
0.74

Model
2

Model
3

Model
4a

Model
4b

9888
0.691

7.16**
(2.97)

10089
0.70

9990
0.73

Model
5b

Model
5c

4.88
6.25** 7.18**
(2.81)
(2.60)
(3.25)
Female Social Welfare Ministers
0.60
-0.06
-0.18
-0.46
(0.44)
(0.46)
(0.55)
(0.36)
Female Legislators
5.29* 2.63
-0.73
1.19
0.63
-0.47
(2.89) (2.60)
(2.78)
(2.61)
(2.61)
(2.64)
Women‘s Movements
-0.27
-0.56
-0.07 -0.01
-0.09
-0.11
-0.30
-0.39
(0.42)
(0.38)
(0.45) (0.41)
(0.42)
(0.43)
(0.42)
(0.39)
Left Government
-0.24
0.33
0.46
-0.09
-0.30
-0.17
-0.13
-0.08
(0.36)
(0.33)
(0.36) (0.34)
(0.35)
(0.36)
(0.31)
(0.32)
Strikes
0.00
-0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00) (0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
Union Density
2.92*** 2.17**
1.50
1.81*
2.69**
1.79
2.53** 2.24*
(0.96)
(0.89)
(0.90) (1.03)
(1.13)
(1.08)
(1.05)
(1.17)
GDP per Capita
0.00
0.00*
0.00
0.00
0.00*
0.00
0.00** 0.00**
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00) (0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
Federal
0.21
0.43*
0.31
0.13
0.26
0.24
0.31
0.38
(0.26)
(0.21)
(0.27) (0.28)
(0.23)
(0.28)
(0.27)
(0.24)
European Union Membership
1.48*** 1.69*** 1.65*** 1.39*** 1.33*** 1.50*** 1.29*** 1.43***
(0.35)
(0.38)
(0.50) (0.45)
(0.38)
(0.43)
(0.38)
(0.35)
CD Welfare State
0.84
0.74
0.59
0.88
1.09**
0.90
1.01** 0.93**
(0.51)
(0.44)
(0.58) (0.56)
(0.48)
(0.56)
(0.43)
(0.42)
SD Welfare State
-0.11
0.81
0.45
0.25
0.44
0.64
0.31
0.40
(0.64)
(0.53)
(0.71) (0.78)
(0.66)
(0.68)
(0.68)
(0.61)
Constant
-1.24
-0.68
-0.94 -0.98
-1.50
-1.00
-1.33
-1.09
(0.89)
(0.85)
(0.87) (0.98)
(0.94)
(0.97)
(0.89)
(0.90)
9487
0.725

4.78
(2.74)

Model
5a

10291
0.68

9992
0.746

9793
0.759

Two-tailed test. Clustered standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Model 1, 8 outliers: Belgium (1984-89), Denmark (1974-79), New Zealand (2000-05), Norway (1990-94, 1995-99), Spain
(2000-05), Sweden (1970-74), Switzerland (2000-05)
87
Model 2, 10 outliers: Denmark (1974-79), Italy (2000-05), Norway (1980-84, 1985-89), Sweden (2000-05), Switzerland
(1970-74, 1975-79, 1980-84, 1985-89, 1995-99)
88
Model 3, 6 outliers: Denmark (1974-79), Finland (1989-94), Italy (2000-05), Netherlands (1989-94; 1995-99), New Zealand
(2000-05)
89
Model 4a (legislative outliers dropped), 4 outliers: Netherlands (1990-94, 1995-99), New Zealand (2000-05), Switzerland
(1989-94)
90
Model 4b (cabinet outliers dropped), 5 outliers: Italy (1985-89), Spain (2000-05), Switzerland (1990-94; 2000-05), US
(1995-99)
91
Model 5a (legislative outliers dropped), 2 outliers: Netherlands (1995-99), Switzerland (1990-94)
92
Model 5b (cabinet outliers dropped), 5 outliers: Italy (2000-05), Spain (2000-05), Switzerland (1990-94, 1995-99, 2000-05)
93
Model 5c, (female social welfare minister outliers dropped) 7 outliers: Finland (1985-89), Italy (2000-05), Norway (1979-84),
Switzerland (1984-89, 1995-99, 2000-05)
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Share of Part-Time Work by Sex
120.00
100.00
80.00
60.00
40.00
20.00
0.00

Women

Men

Figure 4.1: Share of Part-Time Employment by Sex, 2005
Source: OECD.stat, Labour Force Statistics (2010)

Weekly Hours of Unpaid Domestic Work
25%
20%
15%
10%

% of Women
% of Men

5%
0%

Figure 4.2: Average Weekly Hours of Unpaid Domestic Work by Sex, 2004
Source: Eurobarometer Survey (Papacostas, 2004)
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Weekly Hours of Paid Employment
45%
40%
35%
30%
25%
20%
15%
10%
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% of Women
% of Men

Figure 4.3: Average Weekly Hours of Paid Employment by Sex, 2004
Source: Eurobarometer Survey (Papacostas, 2004)

Working Time Index, 1970 & 2005
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1970

Figure 4.4: Working Time Index Scores, 1970 & 2005
Source: See Appendix A
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US

UK

Switzerland

Spain

Sweden

Portugal

Norway

New Zealand

Japan

Netherlands

Italy

Ireland

Greece

France

Germany

Finland

Denmark

Canada

Austria

Belgium

Australia

2005

Table 4.1: Working Time Regulation Adoption & Average Hours Worked

Country

Regulation of Maximum Working Time
Average Working
Year
Time94

2005
Average Working Time

Australia

-

36.9

34.7

Austria

1969

41.8

34.8

Belgium

196795

39.9

31.8

Canada

-

39.7

37.9

32.1

31.6

Denmark

96

2000

Finland

1996

38.3

37.8

France

1936

44.897

37.8

Germany

1994

38

37.4
4

43.2

Greece

1932

44.6

Ireland

1993

40.4

36.2

Italy

1923

40.6

4

2000

Japan

-

47.54

43.5

Netherlands

1919

44.24

38.5

New Zealand

-

37.34

38

Norway

1977

38.2

36.9

Portugal

1971

43.6

36.6

Spain

1995

36.7

36.2

Sweden

1982

36

35.6

Switzerland

1964

46

4

42.3

UK

1998

38.1

36.9

US

-

39.8

41.1

Sources: See Appendix A

94

If there is no regulation of maximum working hours, average working hours listed are for 1970.
This is the earliest mention of regulation
96
Per Madsen (2000): Denmark‘s weekly hours had been constrained by collective agreements; however, in 1999
the European Commission served notice to the Dutch government that Dutch arrangements did not properly
implement the EU directive on working time. The Dutch response was implemented in February of 2000.
97
Average working time for implementation year not available; number is for 1970.
95
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Table 4.2: Vacation Time, 1970 and 2005
Weeks of Vacation
Country

1970

2005

Australia

-

-

Austria

4

5

Belgium

-

5

Canada

2

2

Denmark

3

5

Finland

5

5

France

4

5

Germany

4

4

Greece

4

4

Ireland

3

4

Italy

4

4

Japan

2

2

Netherlands

3

4

New Zealand

-

4

Norway

4

4

Portugal

N/A

5

Spain

N/A

5

Sweden

5

5

Switzerland

2

4

UK

-

5.6

US

-

-

Sources: See Appendix A
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Table 4.3: Working Time Index
Working Time Regulations
Variable
Measurement
1.
Average Working Hours, The average number of
per Week
hours worked per week
2.
Vacation Time
The minimum number of
weeks of vacation
provided by law
3.
Regulation of weekly
A bivariate measure of
hours
whether or not maximum
weekly hours are
regulated by statute
(yes=1; no=0)
4.
Protections for part time A bivariate measure of
work
whether or not part time
work is protected by
statute (yes=1; no=0)
5.
Gendered regulation of
A bivariate measure of
non-standard working
whether or not women are
hours
denied access to nonstandard working hours
(yes=0; no=1)
Sources: See Appendix A
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Gender Role Changing?
Y
Y

Y

N

Y

Table 4.4: OLS Regression Results, by Individual Working Time Policy
Average Weekly Annual Regulation of Part-time
Gendered
Working Hours Vacation Weekly Hours Protections Regulations
Female Cabinet Ministers
Female Social Welfare Ministers
Female Legislators
Women‘s Movements
Left Government
Strikes
Union Density
GDP per Capita
Federal
European Union Membership
CD Welfare State
SD Welfare State
Constant

17.01**
(7.99)
-2.11**
(0.90)
-14.66
(8.45)
-0.73
(1.13)
-3.85***
(1.16)
-0.00
(0.00)
-6.57*
(3.58)
-0.00
(0.00)
-1.76**
(0.61)
-2.94**
(1.04)
1.38
(1.36)
-0.44
(1.59)
45.60***
(2.25)

0.25
(0.47)
0.16*
(0.09)
0.40
(0.53)
-0.05
(0.04)
0.13
(0.09)
-0.00
(0.00)
0.03
(0.21)
-0.00
(0.00)
0.05
(0.06)
0.18***
(0.06)
0.45***
(0.07)
0.45***
(0.11)
0.03
(0.12)

Observations
Adj. R-squared

1.59
(1.07)
-0.29
(0.18)
0.49
(1.06)
0.25*
(0.14)
0.21
(0.17)
0.00
(0.00)
0.25
(0.34)
0.00
(0.00)
0.15
(0.13)
0.25
(0.18)
0.90***
(0.12)
0.24
(0.26)
-0.74**
(0.32)

0.41
(0.92)
-0.12
(0.21)
1.39
(0.98)
-0.10
(0.11)
0.05
(0.10)
-0.00**
(0.00)
-0.35
(0.37)
0.00
(0.00)
-0.17
(0.10)
-0.23
(0.15)
0.54***
(0.17)
0.00
(0.27)
0.53
(0.33)

0.89
(0.72)
-0.11
(0.14)
0.05
(1.13)
-0.15
(0.13)
-0.17
(0.15)
-0.00
(0.00)
-0.50
(0.31)
-0.00
(0.00)
-0.23
(0.14)
-0.19
(0.15)
-0.90***
(0.13)
-0.23
(0.24)
1.68***
(0.37)

104
104
104
104
104
0.53
0.75
0.61
0.51
0.63
Two-tailed test. Clustered standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 4.5: OLS Regression Results, Working Time Index
Model
1
Female Cabinet Ministers

Model
2

3.94***
(1.27)

Female Social Welfare Ministers

Left Government
Strikes
Union Density
GDP per Capita
Federal
European Union Membership
CD Welfare State
SD Welfare State
Constant

Model
4

2.44*
(1.26)
0.27
(0.32)

Female Legislators
Women‘s Movements

Model
3

-0.06
(0.18)
0.25
(0.17)
-0.00**
(0.00)
-0.29
(0.58)
0.00
(0.00)
-0.22
(0.17)
0.09
(0.20)
0.99***
(0.28)
0.61
(0.42)
1.55***
(0.51)

-0.08
(0.20)
0.52**
(0.21)
-0.00***
(0.00)
-0.25
(0.46)
0.00*
(0.00)
-0.18
(0.17)
0.22
(0.24)
0.88***
(0.25)
0.96**
(0.44)
1.48***
(0.45)

Observations
Adj. R-squared

4.34***
(1.42)
-0.02
(0.19)
0.42**
(0.19)
-0.00**
(0.00)
-0.54
(0.64)
0.00
(0.00)
-0.16
(0.17)
0.09
(0.24)
0.88***
(0.28)
0.45
(0.46)
1.49***
(0.48)

2.52*
(1.32)
-0.03
(0.19)
0.29
(0.18)
-0.00*
(0.00)
-0.44
(0.62)
-0.00
(0.00)
-0.20
(0.18)
0.06
(0.22)
0.95***
(0.29)
0.44
(0.45)
1.53***
(0.52)

104
104
104
104
0.65
0.58
0.65
0.66
Clustered standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Model
5

(1.43)
-0.33
(0.30)
2.66*
(1.35)
-0.04
(0.17)
0.30
(0.19)
-0.00*
(0.00)
-0.45
(0.63)
-0.00
(0.00)
-0.16
(0.18)
0.06
(0.22)
0.95***
(0.28)
0.47
(0.44)
1.53***
(0.51)
104
0.66

Table 4.6: OLS Regression Results, Working Time Index Outlier Testing
Model
1
Female Cabinet Ministers

Model
2

4.03***
(1.15)

Female Social Welfare Ministers

Left Government
Strikes
Union Density
GDP per Capita
Federal
European Union Membership
CD Welfare State
SD Welfare State
Constant

Observations
R-squared

Model
4a

Model
4b

3.04***
(0.96)

1.52
(0.92)

0.72***
(0.21)

Female Legislators
Women‘s Movements

Model
3

0.01
-0.02
(0.18)
(0.16)
0.30
0.56***
(0.17)
(0.15)
-0.00** -0.00*
(0.00)
(0.00)
0.08
-0.40
(0.53)
(0.49)
0.00
0.00*
(0.00)
(0.00)
-0.19
-0.03
(0.18)
(0.12)
-0.00
0.19
(0.19)
(0.19)
1.10*** 1.21***
(0.32)
(0.20)
0.57
1.19***
(0.46)
(0.28)
1.27** 1.12**
(0.54)
(0.42)
9798
0.73

9499
0.74

5.05***
(1.10)
-0.02
(0.15)
0.63***
(0.19)
-0.00
(0.00)
-0.67
(0.64)
-0.00
(0.00)
-0.20*
(0.11)
-0.04
(0.19)
0.85***
(0.18)
0.40
(0.30)
1.55***
(0.43)

3.03***
(1.01)
0.04
(0.18)
0.43***
(0.14)
-0.00**
(0.00)
-0.43
(0.56)
-0.00*
(0.00)
-0.18
(0.14)
-0.08
(0.19)
1.07***
(0.25)
0.34
(0.39)
1.49**
(0.52)

97100
0.76

97101
0.77

Model
5a

Model
5b

Model
5c

3.40*** 2.00*
2.20**
(1.11)
(1.09)
(0.96)
-0.35
-0.23
-0.15
(0.27)
(0.28)
(0.25)
2.91** 3.15*** 2.74* 3.69***
(1.24)
(0.98)
(1.35)
(1.02)
-0.00
0.03
-0.00
0.00
(0.18)
(0.16)
(0.17)
(0.18)
0.22
0.44***
0.23
0.47***
(0.15)
(0.15)
(0.16)
(0.15)
-0.00 -0.00** -0.00
-0.00
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
-0.14
-0.44
-0.14
-0.18
(0.55)
(0.57)
(0.55)
(0.53)
0.00
-0.00*
0.00
-0.00
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
-0.08
-0.13
-0.06
-0.08
(0.16)
(0.14)
(0.17)
(0.14)
0.11
-0.07
0.12
-0.05
(0.21)
(0.18)
(0.21)
(0.19)
1.05*** 1.08*** 1.05*** 1.19***
(0.30)
(0.24)
(0.30)
(0.24)
0.65
0.40
0.65
0.45
(0.43)
(0.39)
(0.43)
(0.33)
1.18** 1.47** 1.18** 1.10**
(0.51)
(0.51)
(0.50)
(0.49)
98102
0.75

97103
0.78

97104
0.75

97105
0.83

Clustered standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

98

Model 1, 7 outliers: Denmark (1974-79), Finland (1970-74), New Zealand (2000-05), Sweden (1970-74), Switzerland (200005), UK (2000-05), US (1995-99)
99
Model 2, 10 outliers: Denmark (1974-79), Ireland (2000-05), Italy (1995-99), New Zealand (2000-05), Norway (1980-84,
1985-89), Spain (2000-05), Switzerland (1995-99), UK (2000-05), US (1995-99)
100
Model 3, 6 outliers: Belgium (1995-99), Denmark (1975-79; 1995-99 ), Ireland (2000-05), New Zealand (2000-05), Spain
(1995-99; 2000-05)
101
Model 4a (legislative outliers dropped), 7 outliers: Australia (2000-05), Finland (1975-79), France (2000-05), Ireland
(2000-05), New Zealand (2000-05), US (1995-99)
102
Model 4b (cabinet outliers dropped), 6 outliers: Denmark (1985-89; 1995-99), Finland (1975-79), France (2000-05), UK
(2000-05), US (1995-99)
103
Model 5a (legislative outliers dropped), 7 outliers: Australia (2000-05), Finland (1975-79), France (2000-05), Ireland
(2000-05), New Zealand (2000-05), US (1995-99)
104
Model 5b (cabinet outliers dropped), 7 outliers: Denmark (1985-89; 1995-99), Finland (1975-79), France (2000-05), UK
(2000-05), US (1995-99)
105
Model 5c, (female social welfare minister outliers dropped) 7 outliers: Denmark (1995-99), Ireland (2000-05), Italy (199599), Japan (2000-05), New Zealand (2000-05), Norway (1979-84), UK (2000-05)

157
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Table 5.1: Childcare Policy, 2005

Country
Australia
Austria
Belgium
Canada
Denmark
Finland
France
Germany
Greece
Ireland
Italy
Japan
Netherlands
New Zealand
Norway
Portugal
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
UK
US

Public Care, Age
3+106























Childcare Policy
Public Care, Ages
Subsidies107
0-6


















109


























Sources: See Appendix A
106

Guaranteed spot for children over the age of 3; guaranteed spot from infancy to age 6
Tax credits/deductions or transfers
Means Tested in: A
108
Means Tested in: Australia, Austria, Finland, and Germany
109
Sweden gives 52 weeks of parental leave and then guarantees a spot starting at age 1.
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107

Child Care
Allowances108























Table 5.2: Childcare Access, 2005

Country
Australia

Ages 0-3
Childcare
Primary
Access110
Provision111
Low
Private

Ages 4-6
Childcare
Primary
Access
Provision
Moderate
Private

Female
Labor Force
Participation
69.6

Austria

Low

Private

Moderate

Private

65.7

Belgium

Low

Private

High

Public

59.5

Canada

Low

Private

Moderate112

Private

72.8

Denmark

High

Public

High

Public

76.2

Finland

High

Public

High

Public

73.3

France

Low

Public/Private

High

Public

64.5

Germany

Low

Private

High

Public

67.4

Greece

Low

Private

Low

Public

54.1

Ireland

Low

Private

High

Public

60.9

Italy

Low

Public

High

Public

50.4

Japan

Low

Public

Low

Public

65.3

Netherlands

Low113

Private114

High

Public

66

New Zealand

Low

Private

High

Public

72.3

Norway

High

Public

High

Public

75.4

Portugal

Low

Private

High

Public

71.7

Spain

Low

Public

High

Public

58.4

Sweden

High

Public

High

Public

76

Switzerland

Low

Private

Low

Private

74.3

UK

Low

Private

High115

Public

69.6

Moderate

Private

High

Public

69.2

116

US

Sources: Child Policy International Country Reports ; OECD (2001-2004)
110

Low: Under 50% coverage; Moderate: 50-75% coverage; High: Over 75%
Private: non-governmental formal care centers; Public: publically provided or subsidized care.
112
Child Policy International (2003) reports that coverage is fragmented (because provinces are responsible for
regulation and reporting) and data are inadequate. Thus, the overall picture is one of ―uneven coverage and supply
shortages.‖
113
Low coverage for ages 0-4. At age 4, pre-primary school is available universally. Compulsory school age is 5.
114
Costs are shared among parents, employers, and government.
115
Starting from age 3
116
Moderate coverage aged 0-4; high coverage age 5 as free public kindergarten begins from age 5 in most states
159
111

Table 5.3: Public School Policies, 2005
Country

School Age117

Continuous Day

Australia

5

Yes

Austria

6

Sometimes

Belgium

6

Sometimes

Canada

6

Yes

Denmark

7

Yes

Finland

7

Yes

France

6

No

Germany

6

No

Greece

4

Sometimes

Ireland

4

Yes

Italy

6

Yes

Japan

6

Yes

Netherlands

5

Yes

New Zealand

5

Yes

Norway

6

Yes

Portugal

5

Yes

Spain

6

Yes

Sweden

7

Yes

Switzerland

7

No

UK

5

Yes

6

Yes

118

US



Sources: See Appendix A

117

Age at which parents may first enroll children in public school—either optionally (e.g. in Ireland a parent may
enroll a child in optional pre-primary school at age 4; however compulsory school age is 6.)
118
No national standard applies; data are the most typical state standards.
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Table 5.4: Child Care Index
Child Care Index
Measurement
1.
A measure of a country‘s
guarantee of public care for
children prior to pre-school
(children aged 0-6=1; children
aged 3-6=0.5; no guaranteed
placement=0)
2.
Daycare benefit
A measure of whether or not
(tax or transfer)
parents receive benefits to offset
daycare costs (yes=1; no=0, means
tested=0.5)
3.
Continuous school A measure of whether or not the
day
school day contains a midday gap
(yes=1; no=0, sometimes=0.5)
4.
School age
Age at which children must begin
primary education
Sources: Various (See Appendix A)
Variable
Guaranteed public
daycare

161

Gender Role Changing?

Yes

Yes

Yes
No

Table 5.5: OLS Regression Results, by Individual Child Care Policy
Public Care Public Care
Ages 0-6
Ages 3-6
Female Cabinet Ministers
Female Social Welfare
Ministers
Female Legislators
Women‘s Movements
Left Government
Strikes
Union Density
GDP per Capita
Federal
European Union Membership
CD Welfare State
SD Welfare State
Constant

Public
Care119

Day Care
Subsidies

School
Age

Continuous
School Day

-0.31
(0.43)
-0.06

-0.04
(0.64)
0.13

-0.33
(0.46)
0.00

1.84
(1.22)
0.23

0.52
(1.06)
-0.21

0.23
(0.85)
-0.07

(0.12)
0.87
(0.58)
0.05
(0.08)
-0.04
(0.06)
0.00
(0.00)
-0.10
(0.30)
0.00*
(0.00)
0.05
(0.04)
0.07
(0.07)
0.01
(0.05)
0.71***
(0.18)
-0.27*
(0.13)

(0.08)
0.53
(0.71)
0.21
(0.16)
-0.05
(0.10)
-0.00
(0.00)
0.10
(0.27)
-0.00
(0.00)
-0.09
(0.10)
0.36***
(0.11)
0.37
(0.22)
-0.24
(0.22)
-0.10
(0.33)

(0.12)
1.13
(0.67)
0.15
(0.12)
-0.07
(0.07)
0.00
(0.00)
-0.05
(0.31)
0.00
(0.00)
0.01
(0.05)
0.25***
(0.08)
0.19
(0.12)
0.59***
(0.17)
-0.32
(0.19)

(0.14)
-2.37
(1.39)
-0.04
(0.10)
-0.15
(0.14)
0.00
(0.00)
-1.22**
(0.51)
0.00
(0.00)
-0.11
(0.10)
-0.04
(0.10)
-0.14
(0.17)
0.24
(0.27)
0.72**
(0.29)

(0.16)
-2.00
(1.85)
-0.38**
(0.18)
0.13
(0.18)
0.00
(0.00)
0.21
(0.40)
0.00
(0.00)
0.52***
(0.13)
-0.18
(0.13)
0.72***
(0.17)
1.92***
(0.30)
5.32***
(0.26)

(0.16)
0.95
(1.18)
0.01
(0.11)
-0.28*
(0.14)
-0.00
(0.00)
0.23
(0.45)
-0.00
(0.00)
-0.19
(0.12)
-0.04
(0.13)
-0.52***
(0.17)
-0.38
(0.24)
1.32***
(0.29)

Observations
104
104
104
104
104
104
Adj. R-squared
0.65
0.54
0.54
0.35
0.70
0.40
Two-tailed test. Clustered standard errors in parentheses; * p<=0.1, ** p<=0.05, *** p<=0.01

119

The general provision of care – either 3-6 or 0-6. 3-6 is coded 0.5, 0-6 is coded 1.
162

Table 5.6: OLS Regression Results, Child Care Index
Model
1
Female Cabinet Ministers

Model
2

2.73*
(1.53)

Model
3

Model
4

Model
5

3.10*
(1.75)

2.90
(1.78)
Female Social Welfare Ministers
0.49
0.19
(0.30)
(0.20)
Female Legislators
1.68
-0.63
-0.71
(1.76) (1.87) (1.88)
Women‘s Movements
-0.03
-0.03
-0.02
-0.03
-0.03
(0.23) (0.22) (0.23) (0.23) (0.23)
Left Government
-0.57** -0.43* -0.41* -0.58** -0.59**
(0.22) (0.22) (0.22) (0.22) (0.23)
Strikes
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Union Density
-0.98** -0.96** -1.07** -0.94* -0.94*
(0.42) (0.42) (0.42) (0.48) (0.49)
GDP per Capita
-0.00
0.00
0.00
-0.00
-0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Federal
-0.12
-0.14
-0.08
-0.13
-0.15
(0.20) (0.20) (0.21) (0.20) (0.20)
European Union Membership
0.21
0.28
0.26
0.22
0.21
(0.23) (0.25) (0.24) (0.23) (0.23)
CD Welfare State
-0.78** -0.85** -0.86** -0.77** -0.77**
(0.33) (0.34) (0.35) (0.33) (0.33)
SD Welfare State
-0.01
0.15
0.06
0.03
0.01
(0.42) (0.38) (0.44) (0.45) (0.45)
Constant
2.04*** 2.00*** 1.99*** 2.05*** 2.05***
(0.51) (0.48) (0.49) (0.51) (0.52)
Observations
104
104
104
104
104
Adj. R-squared
0.38
0.33
0.33
0.38
0.37
Two-tailed test. Clustered standard errors in parentheses; * p<=0.1, ** p<=0.05, *** p<=0.01
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Figure 5.1: Child Care Index, 1970 & 2005

Source: See Appendix A
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US

United Kingdom

Switzerland

Sweden

Spain

Portugal

Norway

New Zealand

Netherlands

Japan

Italy

Ireland
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Finland
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Child Care Index, 1970 & 2005
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3
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1.5
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Table 5.7: OLS Regression Results, Child Care Index Outlier Testing
Model
1

Model
2

Model
3

Model
4a

Model
4b

4.03**
(1.45)

3.45*
(1.73)

Model
5a

Model
5b

Model
5c

3.80** 2.62**
3.22*
(1.40)
(1.23)
(1.63)
0.24
0.15
0.28
0.17
Female Social Welfare Ministers
(0.21)
(0.20)
(0.23)
(0.14)
2.22
-1.32
-1.77
-1.34
-1.52
-1.62
Female Legislators
(1.49)
(1.59)
(1.72)
(1.61)
(1.61)
(1.63)
-0.03
0.08
-0.03
0.01
-0.03
-0.04
0.05
Women‘s Movements
-0.04
(0.16)
(0.22)
(0.21)
(0.19)
(0.21)
(0.20)
(0.18)
(0.20)
Left Government
-0.74*** -0.39** -0.43* -0.67** -0.61** -0.67** -0.57** -0.71***
(0.17)
(0.22)
(0.24)
(0.24)
(0.25)
(0.22)
(0.21)
(0.22)
0.00
0.00*
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
Strikes
0.00
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
-0.91
-0.53
-0.90
-0.02
Union Density
-0.97* -1.53** -1.25** -0.53
(0.56)
(0.47)
(0.37)
(0.68)
(0.39)
(0.68)
(0.51)
(0.56)
0.00
-0.00
-0.00
0.00
-0.00
0.00
0.00
GDP per Capita
-0.00
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
-0.06
0.06
-0.02
-0.08
-0.04
-0.10
-0.12
Federal
-0.09
(0.14)
(0.18)
(0.18)
(0.17)
(0.17)
(0.16)
(0.15)
(0.16)
0.09
0.36
0.34
0.22
0.34
0.18
0.05
European Union Membership
0.17
(0.18)
(0.28)
(0.23)
(0.20)
(0.23)
(0.17)
(0.15)
(0.19)
CD Welfare State
-0.68** -0.66** -0.83** -0.65** -0.60** -0.65** -0.62** -0.57**
(0.24)
(0.30)
(0.28)
(0.26)
(0.28)
(0.25)
(0.22)
(0.28)
0.43
0.19
0.18
0.37
0.16
0.30
0.05
SD Welfare State
0.03
(0.28)
(0.29)
(0.39)
(0.40)
(0.39)
(0.39)
(0.36)
(0.32)
Constant
1.95*** 2.23*** 1.78*** 1.74*** 1.79*** 1.73*** 1.78*** 1.48***
(0.45)
(0.48)
(0.44)
(0.48)
(0.45)
(0.48)
(0.35)
(0.49)

Female Cabinet Ministers

3.07**
(1.37)

96120
0.504

94121
95122
95123
96
0.403
0.497
0.518
0.490
Two-tailed test. Clustered standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Observations
R-squared

120

95124
0.520

97
0.517

96
0.542

Model 1 Outliers: Austria (2000-05), Denmark (1975-79), Finland (2000-05), France (1975-79), Spain (2000-05), Sweden
(1990-94), Switzerland (1970-74; (2000-05).
121
Model 2 Outliers: Finland (1995-99; 2000-05), France (1975-79), Spain (1995-99), Sweden (1980-84), Switzerland (1970-74;
1975-79; 1980-84, 1985-89, 1995-99)
122
Model 3 Outliers: Austria (2000-05), Denmark (1975-79), Finland (2000-05), Japan (1985-89, 1990-94, 1995-99), The
Netherlands (1985-89), Spain (1995-99; 2000-05)
123
Model 4a Outliers (Female Legislators): Australia (1995-99; 2000-05), Austria (2000-05), Japan (1990-94, 1995-99), Norway
(1970-74), Spain (1995-99), Sweden (1990-94), Switzerland (1990-94); Model 4b Outliers (Female Ministers): Australia (199599; 2000-05), Finland (2000-05), France (1975-79), Spain (2000-05), Sweden (1990-94), Switzerland (1990-94; (2000-05).
124
Model 5a Outliers (Female Legislators): Australia (1995-99; 2000-05), Austria (2000-05), Japan (1990-94; 1995-99); Norway
(1970-74), Spain (1995-99), Sweden (1994-99), Switzerland (1994-99); Model 5b Outliers (Female Ministers): Australia (199599; 2000-05), Spain (1995-99), Sweden (1994-99), Switzerland (1990-94, 1995-99, 2000-05); Model 5c (Female Social Welfare
minister outliers): Finland (1995-99), Spain (1990-94; 1995-99), Sweden (1980-84; 1994-99), Switzerland (1985-89, 1994-99,
2000-05)
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Support for Women's Employment
6.3 6.9
5.1 5.9
4.4
4.1

8.0

9.1 9.4

11.0 11.0 11.2 11.4
10.0 10.2 10.7

11.7 12.3 12.3 12.6

13.5

Figure 6.1: Support for Women's Employment, 2005

GENDER RELATIONS
Traditional
Male
breadwinner/
female-carer

Less Traditional
Dual earner/
female part-time
carer

Dual earner/
Dual
Earner/Market
Carer carer

Dual earner/
state carer

Dual earner/
dual carer

GENDER DIVISION OF LABOR125
Figure 6.2: Gender Systems Continuum

125

Reproduced from Crompton (1999, p. 205) with one change; I switched the positions of dual-earner/state carer
and dual earner/market carer. The systems with state care are trending toward dual carer policies; thus, dual
earner/state carer is more closely aligned with dual earner/dual carer on the continuum.
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Table 6.1: Gender Systems, by Country
Support for Women’s
Employment Score

Welfare
Regime Type

Primary
Gender System

Secondary
Gender System

Switzerland

4.1

CD

Dual Earner/Market
Carer

Dual Earner/Female
Part-Time Carer

US

4.4

Liberal

Dual Earner/Market
Carer

New Zealand

5.1

Liberal

Dual Earner/Market
Carer

Dual Earner/Female
Part-Time Carer

Australia

5.9

Liberal

Dual Earner/Market
Carer

Dual Earner/Female
Part-Time Carer

Japan

6.3

CD

Male Breadwinner

Dual Earner/Female
Part-Time Carer

Canada

6.9

Liberal

Dual Earner/Market
Carer

Dual Earner/Female
Part-Time Carer

Germany

8.0

CD

Male Breadwinner

Dual Earner/Female
Part-Time Carer

Greece

9.1

CD

Male Breadwinner

Country
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Rationale
No provision of state care
Female part-time employment
rate: 45%
FLP: 74%
Almost no provision of state care
Female part-time employment
rate: 18%
FLP: 69%
Low provision of state care
Female part-time employment
rate: 35%
FLP: 72%
Social emphasis on maternal care
Female part-time employment
rate: 39%
FLP: 70%
Low provision of state care
Female part-time employment
rate: 32%
FLP: 65%
Low provision of state care
Female part-time employment
rate: 27%
FLP: 75%
Social emphasis on maternal care
Female part-time employment
rate: 39%
FLP: 67%
Social emphasis on maternal care
Female part-time employment
rate: 11%
FLP: 54%

Table 6.1, continued
Support for Women’s
Employment Score

Welfare
Regime Type

Primary
Gender System

Secondary
Gender System

Ireland

9.4

Liberal

Male Breadwinner

Dual Earner/Female
Part-Time Carer

Austria

10.0

CD

Male Breadwinner

Dual Earner/Female
Part-Time Carer

France126

10.2

CD

Dual Earner/State Carer

Dual Earner/ Female
Part-Time Carer

United Kingdom

10.7

Liberal

Dual Earner/Female
Part-Time Carer

Dual Earner/State Carer
-Market Carer127

Spain

11.0

CD

Male Breadwinner

Dual Earner/State Carer

Italy

11.0

CD

Dual Earner/State Carer

Dual Earner/Female
Part-Time Carer

Country

126

Rationale
Social emphasis on maternal care
Female part-time employment
rate: 35%
FLP: 61%
Social emphasis on maternal care
Female part-time employment
rate: 29%
FLP: 66%
Social acceptance of state care
post-3
Female part-time employment
rate: 23%
FLP: 65%
Expanding provision of state care
post-3
Female part-time employment
rate: 39%
FLP: 70%
Social emphasis on maternal care
but expanding state services
Female part-time employment
rate: 22%
FLP: 58%
Social emphasis on maternal care
but expanding state services
Female part-time employment
rate: 29%
FLP: 50%

France is challenging to categorize; the state has long promoted reconciliation policies in order to increase the birth rate; this indicates a state care model.
However, state policy encourages stay-at-home motherhood until age 3; even after age 3, irregular care hours contribute to low-moderate FLP. In addition, the
FLP rate and preference for maternal care indicate a modified male breadwinner model – female part-time carer.
127
The Netherlands and the UK are interesting in that they truly combine three gender regimes; the part-time carer regime predominates, but both states are
expanding care for children 3 and up – while parents must rely on market solutions for care of younger children and infants.
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Table 6.1, continued
Country

Support for Women’s
Employment Score

Welfare
Regime Type

Primary
Gender System

Secondary
Gender System

Belgium

11.2

CD

Dual Earner/State
Carer

Dual Earner/ Female
Part-Time Carer

Netherlands

11.4

CD

Dual Earner/Female
Part-Time Carer

Dual Earner/State
Carer-Market Carer

Portugal

11.7

CD

Male Breadwinner128

Dual Earner/State
Carer

Denmark

12.3

SD

Dual Earner/State
Carer

Dual Earner/Dual
Carer

Sweden

12.3

SD

Dual Earner/State
Carer

Dual Earner/Dual
Carer

128

Rationale
Social acceptance of state care
post-3
Female part-time employment
rate: 33%
FLP: 60%
State promotes female part-time
work
Female part-time employment
rate: 61%
FLP: 66%
Social emphasis on maternal care
but expanding state services
Female part-time employment
rate: 14%
FLP: 72%
High public provision of services
Sate encouragement of paternal
care
Female part-time employment
rate: 24%
FLP: 76%
High public provision of services
Sate encouragement of paternal
care
Female part-time employment
rate: 19%
FLP: 76%

In terms of policy adoption, Portugal has moved heavily toward state care; however, in terms of take-up rates (e.g. low take up of state provided care), the
male-breadwinner system predominates. Portugal‘s FLP is high, and in the last 10-15 years, the state has adopted policies to support this; however, culturally
women‘s participation is secondary to men‘s.
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Table 6.1, continued
Country

Support for Women’s
Employment Score

Welfare
Regime Type

Primary
Gender System

Secondary
Gender System

Norway129

12.6

SD

Dual Earner/State
Carer

Dual Earner/Dual
Carer

Finland

13.5

SD

Dual Earner/State
Carer

Dual Earner/Dual
Carer

129

Rationale
High public provision of services
Sate encouragement of paternal
care
Female part-time employment
rate: 33%
FLP: 75%
High public provision of services
Sate encouragement of paternal
care
Female part-time employment
rate: 14%
FLP: 73%

Although Norway‘s rate of female part-time employment is high, it has fallen from 41% in 1989 to 33% in 2005; the state is actively encouraging full-time
employment.
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Table 6.2: OLS Regression Analyses, Support for Women's Employment

Female Cabinet Ministers

Model
1

Model Model
2
3

12.77***
(3.67)

11.81** 12.14**
(4.28) (4.32)
1.38
-0.31
(0.87)
(0.77)
10.41** 1.60
1.73
(4.63) (4.64) (4.64)
-0.28
-0.18
-0.22
-0.23
(0.71) (0.75) (0.70) (0.69)
0.22
0.08
-0.55
-0.54
(0.62) (0.63) (0.55) (0.56)
-0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
0.81
0.12
0.59
0.58
(1.36) (1.74) (1.82) (1.83)
0.00** 0.00
0.00
0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
-0.08
0.07
-0.12
-0.09
(0.50) (0.50) (0.49) (0.52)
2.24** 1.97** 1.82** 1.82**
(0.78) (0.81) (0.66) (0.66)
0.71
0.66
1.01
1.01
(0.97) (1.04) (0.98) (0.98)
2.20*
1.18
1.09
1.13
(1.16) (1.04) (0.94) (0.95)
2.47
2.47
2.69
2.69
(1.52) (1.59) (1.75) (1.75)

Female Social Welfare Ministers
Female Legislators
Women‘s Movements
Left Government
Strikes
Union Density
GDP per Capita
Federal
European Union Membership
CD Welfare State
SD Welfare State
Constant

-0.23
(0.68)
-0.58
(0.54)
0.00
(0.00)
0.69
(1.73)
0.00
(0.00)
-0.14
(0.48)
1.84**
(0.63)
1.04
(0.98)
1.20
(0.89)
2.70
(1.74)

Model
4

Model
5

Observations
104
104
104
104
104
Adj. R-squared
0.68
0.59
0.63
0.68
0.68
Two-tailed test. Clustered standard errors in parentheses; * p<=0.1, ** p<=0.05, *** p<=0.01
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Table 6.3: OLS Regression Results, Support for Women's Employment Outlier Testing
Model
1
Female Cabinet Ministers

14.36***
(3.68)

Female Social Welfare Ministers
Female Legislators
Women‘s Movements
Left Government
Strikes
Union Density
GDP per Capita
Federal
European Union Membership
CD Welfare State
SD Welfare State
Constant

Observations
R-squared

-0.25
(0.63)
-0.57
(0.49)
0.00
(0.00)
1.09
(1.63)
0.00
(0.00)
-0.07
(0.45)
1.65***
(0.51)
1.12
(0.85)
0.77
(0.87)
2.30
(1.60)
96130
0.77

Model
2

Model
3

Model
4a

Model
4b

Model
5a

Model
5b

Model
5c

12.78** 13.24** 12.11** 11.72** 12.04**
(4.71)
(4.65)
(4.22)
(4.06)
(4.96)
1.64*
-0.01
-0.14
-0.32
(0.83)
(0.75)
(0.86)
(0.61)
13.76**
0.69
0.01
1.06
1.09
1.50
(5.44)
(4.85)
(4.51)
(4.75)
(4.58)
(4.48)
-0.80
-0.10
-0.09
-0.03
-0.14
-0.36
-0.45
(0.60)
(0.69)
(0.67)
(0.63)
(0.69)
(0.69)
(0.67)
0.50
0.30
-0.44
-0.72
-0.41
-0.50
-0.40
(0.59)
(0.68)
(0.49)
(0.51)
(0.51)
(0.47)
(0.47)
-0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
0.07
-1.06
1.26
1.02
0.41
1.54
1.33
(1.67)
(1.88)
(1.87)
(1.83)
(1.74)
(1.95)
(1.90)
0.00*
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00*
0.00
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
0.15
-0.24
-0.16
0.02
-0.17
0.16
0.17
(0.42)
(0.61)
(0.45)
(0.38)
(0.54)
(0.45)
(0.44)
2.27*** 1.64** 1.41** 1.60*** 1.63** 1.49** 1.55***
(0.60)
(0.76)
(0.57)
(0.53)
(0.69)
(0.54)
(0.49)
0.69
0.35
1.29
1.58**
1.03
1.66*
1.45
(0.82)
(1.09)
(0.85)
(0.75)
(1.00)
(0.81)
(0.85)
2.03**
0.65
0.90
1.43*
1.14
1.43
1.00
(0.74)
(1.11)
(1.01)
(0.79)
(1.20)
(0.87)
(0.86)
3.14*
3.32*
2.19
1.72
2.84
1.52
1.89
(1.53)
(1.64)
(1.59)
(1.48)
(1.71)
(1.67)
(1.65)
95131
0.68

93132
0.69

98133
0.76

99134
0.77

99135
0.73

96136
0.79

97137
0.80

Two-tailed test. Clustered standard errors in parentheses; * p<=0.1, ** p<=0.05, *** p<=0.01
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Model 1, 8 outliers: Belgium (1984-89), Denmark (1974-79), France (1975-79), New Zealand (2000-05), Norway (1990-94,
1995-99), Switzerland (2000-05), US (
131
Model 2, 9 outliers: Denmark (1974-79), Italy (2000-05), Norway (1980-84, 1985-89), Spain (2000-05), Switzerland (197074, 1975-79, 1980-84, 1995-99)
132
Model 3, 11 outliers: Belgium (1990-94, 1995-99), Denmark (1974-79), Finland (1989-94), Ireland (2000-05), Japan (199094), Netherlands (1990-94; 1995-99), New Zealand (2000-05), Spain (1995-99;2000-05)
133
Model 4a (legislative outliers dropped), 6 outliers: Australia (2000-05), New Zealand (2000-05), Norway (1970-74),
Switzerland (1989-94; 2000-05), US (2000-05)
134
Model 4b (cabinet outliers dropped), 5 outliers: Australia (2000-05), France (1975-79), Switzerland (1990-94; 2000-05),
US (1995-99)
135
Model 5a (legislative outliers dropped), 5 outliers: Australia (2000-05), New Zealand (2000-05), Norway (1970-74),
Switzerland (1989-94), US (1995-99)
136
Model 5b (cabinet outliers dropped), 8 outliers: Australia (1995-99, 2000-05), Italy (2000-05), Sweden (1990-94),
Switzerland (1990-94, 1995-99, 2000-05), US (2000-05)
137
Model 5c, (female social welfare minister outliers dropped) 7 outliers: Finland (1985-89), Italy (2000-05), Norway (198084), Switzerland (1984-89, 1995-99, 2000-05), UK (2000-05)
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7 Chapter 7
Table 7.1: OLS Regression Results, All Indices
Family
Leave

Working Child
Time
Care

Female Cabinet Ministers

6.46**
2.78* 2.90
(2.94)
(1.43) (1.78)
Female Social Welfare Ministers -0.17
-0.33 0.19
(0.46)
(0.30) (0.20)
Female Legislators
-0.22
2.66* -0.71
(2.76)
(1.35) (1.88)
Women‘s Movements
-0.16
-0.04 -0.03
(0.44)
(0.17) (0.23)
Left Government
-0.25
0.30
-0.59**
(0.37)
(0.19) (0.23)
Strikes
0.00
-0.00* 0.00
(0.00)
(0.00) (0.00)
Union Density
1.96
-0.45 -0.94*
(1.16)
(0.63) (0.49)
GDP per Capita
0.00
-0.00 -0.00
(0.00)
(0.00) (0.00)
Federal
0.23
-0.16 -0.15
(0.29)
(0.18) (0.20)
European Union Membership
1.55***
0.06
0.21
(0.43)
(0.22) (0.23)
CD Welfare State
0.84
0.95*** -0.77**
(0.56)
(0.28) (0.33)
SD Welfare State
0.64
0.47
0.01
(0.68)
(0.44) (0.45)
Constant
-0.89 1.53*** 2.05***
(1.01)
(0.51) (0.52)

Support-Women‘s
Employment
12.14**
(4.32)
-0.31
(0.77)
1.73
(4.64)
-0.23
(0.69)
-0.54
(0.56)
0.00
(0.00)
0.58
(1.83)
0.00
(0.00)
-0.09
(0.52)
1.82**
(0.66)
1.01
(0.98)
1.13
(0.95)
2.69
(1.75)

Observations
104
104
104
104
Adj. R-squared
0.63
0.66
0.37
0.68
Clustered standard errors in parentheses; * p<=0.1, ** p<=0.05, *** p<=0.01
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